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1CHAPTER I
Introduction
In many respects, the world is growing smaller.  Today, businesses must 
develop products, policies, procedures, and processes that deliver products and 
services to a market of one as efficiently and effectively as they deliver to a mass 
market.  For example, the concept of mass customization describes an organization’s 
ability to produce highly customized products across a wide—and often fickle—
customer base.  Customer service representatives that historically served to help 
customers determine wants and needs have been replaced by technology that allows 
customers to research products, modify them according to personal preferences and 
place orders directly to factories.  No longer must an individual settle for a mass-
produced product that exists on the store shelf.  And, businesses have responded by 
improving efficiency.  They have reduced the number of available customer service 
representatives with customer-driven call centers and inventories of products to those 
items that are in transit to the store shelves—just in time inventories.  This process 
has made businesses much more efficient as they have shed excess infrastructure and 
unnecessary inventories.  However, it has also made businesses much more 
vulnerable to external influences.  There are fewer customer service people dealing 
with customers and others who have an interest in what the organization is doing, and 
information technology has made more and more processes and decisions once 
performed behind organizational boundaries increasingly visible to customers, 
suppliers, shareholders, and stakeholders.  
2Technology has accelerated the pace of change complicating organizational 
decision-making.  Today, people are much more aware of company behavior and 
decisions.  Because technology has reduced the barriers to entry in the business of 
mass communication, people now can determine with relative ease what actions a 
company may intend to take and, depending on how well the actions are aligned with 
their interests, can seek to prevent or facilitate the organizational actions by making 
others around the globe aware of the issue through collective action.  Sandler (1992) 
observed that the “advances in technology and the growth of population will increase 
the importance of collective action in the 1990s and the century to come… As 
technology, population growth, and resource needs draw the nations of the world 
closer together, the relevance of collective action increases” (pp. 193-200).  In short, 
companies must communicate faster in a global society with a growing number of 
people who are increasingly empowered by information technology.  But how do 
executives make strategic decisions in a world of increasing transparency?
Lack of timely and accurate information can create significant problems for 
organizations as motivations behind decisions and actions are questioned or 
challenged outright.  More and more, organizations are beginning to understand the 
necessity to be open in their culture, architecture, and decisions; however they also 
struggle with increased risks as key internal processes are subject to influences or 
challenges by competing interests or stakeholders.  As companies become 
increasingly global, they find the environments increasingly complex.  
In examining globalization, Friedman (2000) observed that historically, in 
order for people to influence organizations, they were motivated by a common 
3interest and associated to exert enough power to affect issues and organizational 
decisions.  At a minimum, people were able to create disruptions to otherwise 
generally accepted practices and processes.  Politics and economics were primarily 
based on local issues and conditions.  
For example, an energy developer might expect resistance from a community 
where a nuclear power plant was to be built.  Frequently, these types of concerns are 
called “not in my backyard” issues because, while people recognize the importance of 
the issue, they prefer the solution be located somewhere else.  This “not in my 
backyard” issue could be defined geographically and people concerned about the 
project could be identified.  Depending on the degree of formalization among those 
interested in the issue, the group typically had one or more individuals who served as 
leaders.  From a communication management perspective, the developer could 
identify and communicate directly with the group in an open forum or through its 
leadership to address the group’s concerns and seek to mitigate the amount of power 
that could be exerted to influence organizational decisions.  
Today, however, Friedman (2000) argued that the democratization of finance, 
information, and technology has resulted in a world where no one is in charge yet 
everyone is in charge.  No longer can the developer assume that the construction of a 
nuclear power plant will meet resistance only by the community where the plant is to 
be constructed.  The developer can expect to meet resistance from anti-nuclear 
protestors, anarchists, or groups from around the world eager to take advantage of the 
publicity resulting from the issue.  This has tremendous implications for the 
globalization of public relations.  A vivid example is provided by Anderson (1992) 
4who chronicled the failed attempt of a multinational food company that desired to 
develop part of the rain forest in Belize in order to plant and harvest oranges.  The 
company’s failure was the not the result of forces in Belize, but of an activist group, 
Friends of the Earth, which was based on an entirely different continent.  
Power can be exercised through cooperation, compromise, or conflict to 
influence organizational behavior by local stakeholders who are motivated by 
common concerns for particular issues as efficiently and effectively as one individual 
who uses technology to leverage the support of those like-minded people around the 
world.  As the forces of finance, information, and technology have resulted in an 
increasingly connected world, there has also been a significant increase in 
fragmentation and conflict.
Following this introduction, I briefly discuss the study’s purpose, significance 
for public relations professionals and scholars, and proposed methodology, including 
the reasons for selecting the subject and the ethical concerns.  I conclude Chapter I by 
addressing the study's delimitations.  Chapter II provides conceptual foundations from 
the fields of group behavior, decision theory, and public relations theory.   Chapter III 
reviews qualitative methods, including the appropriateness of the interviewing 
method that will be used for this study and a general framework for analysis.  Chapter 
IV examines results and discusses them in relation to the study's research questions.  
Chapter V draws connections to the conceptualization for this study and discusses 
their implications for public relations and the strategic management of organizations.  
The final chapter also provides recommendations for future research and discusses 
the study's limitations.  
5Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to explore how senior executives in organizations 
make strategic decisions and determine what role public relations does or might serve 
in that process.  Specifically, the study will examine group behavior, strategic 
decision-making, and public relations strategies and how public relations can and 
should serve as a critical component of the strategic management of organizations.  I 
believe public relations professionals who have an understanding of how strategic 
decisions are made and can reduce the uncertainty of how relevant groups will 
respond to those decisions can provide critical information to the strategic 
management of organizations and enhance the field of public relations as an essential 
component of the strategic management process.  
How do organizations include the interests of these multiple, conflicting, and 
fragmented stakeholders in their strategic decision-making?  Are there strategies that 
might be employed by executives in the decision-making process to mitigate the risk 
that conflicting publics will emerge locally or converge from around the world to 
affect strategic decision-making?  And, what can public relations professionals do to 
reduce the uncertainty that groups will behave in an undesirable manner?  The 
paradoxes of globalization present real challenges for communication managers and 
the strategic management of organizations. 
Significance of Study
Kruckeberg (2000) recognized the significance of globalization on public 
relations professionals:
6At the forefront of those who must understand the societal impact of 
communication technology are public relations practitioners; they 
must reconcile their organizations’ ongoing relationships with a range 
of seemingly amorphous publics that are evolving within a global—yet 
multicultural and highly diverse—society that shows little inclination 
toward becoming a global community.  (p. 146)
Amid the backdrop of this increasing complexity and rising potential for 
conflict, management is demanding that elements of the organization better 
understand the environment.  As the cycle times between organizational decisions and 
implementation decrease, the pressure for executives to quickly know and understand 
more about the environment is particularly obvious for those functions that typically 
span organizational boundaries.  In fact, new management positions are being 
established to respond to the growing complexity of the business environment—chief 
information officer and chief knowledge officer, for example (Kulik, 2000).  As 
executives in organizations search for useful information about the environment upon 
which to make better decisions, there are both opportunities and threats for 
organizational roles responsible for managing these processes and relationships.  
One of these boundary-spanning organizational roles is public relations.  
Plowman (1995) observed, “Professionals in public relations have issued call after 
call for public relations to make the transition from technical support to strategic 
planning and consequently manage the return on investment organizations have made 
in public relations” (p. 2).  Ironically, Plowman also acknowledged that “the essential 
nature of communication in an organization seems to be juxtaposed against the 
7exclusion of public relations at the policy-making levels of organizations” (p. 4).  
Some public relations professionals have responded to calls for the profession to 
exercise a more strategic management approach.  Jack Bergen (1995), then of General 
Electric said he believed “public relations should drive change” (p. 7).  I have 
witnessed this in my own organization, occasionally resulting in adverse financial and 
social consequences for the organization and its stakeholders.  
There is increasing academic and professional consensus that public relations 
must move beyond a technician-centered practice to a management-centered practice 
if the field is going to make meaningful and unique contributions to the strategic 
management of organizations.  The prevalent paradigm that has emerged from public 
relations research reflects a management perspective (Plowman, 1995; Cutlip, Center 
and Broom, 1994; J. Grunig, 1992; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992). 
The evolution of public relations as a management function separate and 
distinct from other disciplines suggests that there is a unique role to be served in the 
strategic management process of an organization.  From an internal power 
perspective, this is important because strategic management represents the process 
whereby organizational entities exert their power and influence to provide corporate 
vision and to guide long-term corporate decision-making.  From an external power 
perspective, this is important because strategic management represents the process 
whereby an organization seeks to gain a competitive advantage in the environment 
(Porter, 1980, 1985).  
In order to participate in this organizational process, the public relations 
function must be included as part of the internal coalition—“those people charged 
8with making the decision and taking the actions on a permanent, regular basis” 
(Mintzberg, 1983, p. 26).  Mintzberg noted that in lieu of the descriptor “internal 
coalition”, which he used to avoid prejudicing his discussion of which groups had 
more power, the term “dominant coalition” could also be found frequently in the 
literature.  Because power is a significant determinant of control and influence in 
organizations, the term “dominant coalition” is a more appropriate descriptor for my 
research.  The term also acknowledges that there are views that may not necessarily 
be represented in the final analysis; however, it does not suggest that the views were 
excluded from deliberative processes.  
According to South (1981), one of the primary goals of strategic management 
is to develop a competitive advantage for organizations.  Because the dominant 
coalition represents the internal coalition that makes decisions and directs actions in 
an organization, it is critical that public relations professionals gain access to this 
group.  One way to achieve access to and acceptance by the dominant coalition is to 
provide unique contributions and information to the strategic decision-making 
process.  For example, public relations managers can bring perspectives from groups 
perceived to be disenfranchised to the strategic decision-making process.  As a 
member of the dominant coalition, public relations professionals can help meet the 
growing demand for information by organizations.
Beyond the traditional public relations practice of gaining publicity for clients, 
the emerging paradigm of public relations as relationship management has the 
potential to further enhance the public relations function in the strategic management 
of organizations.  The construct of “relationships” is growing in the business world as 
9“what matters.”  Executives involved in the boom and bust of the information 
technology business sector delivered via the Internet are also coming to recognize the 
strategic importance of relationships (Swisher, 2001).   
As a commissioned U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 21 years of 
experience, I worked most of my career in communication and strategic management 
at all levels of the organization—from entry level to the Office of the Commandant, 
or chief executive.  These experiences have been significant factors that influenced 
my interest in understanding the nexus between communication management and 
strategic management.  
I observed and participated in organizational decisions that affected important 
stakeholders who held different perspectives on various issues.  Many decisions had 
the potential to simultaneously affect the relationships in opposing ways with 
multiple stakeholders.  Some of these decisions improved the organization's 
relationships with important stakeholders while other decisions adversely affected the 
relationships.  In addition to the loss of trust with stakeholders that resulted from 
decisions, there were financial consequences as well.  In certain cases, there was 
significant investment made establishing the apparent optimal business decision only 
to learn that it was unacceptable to known stakeholders.  I often wondered how the 
executives reached their decisions and what organizational elements and stakeholders 
were consulted prior to the final determinations.  White and Dozier (1992) have 
suggested that this area serves as "a basis for further research on public relations 
practitioners and participation in management decision-making" (p. 106).  
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I also participated in restructuring efforts designed to improve the 
communication management of the organization.  Thus, the underlying perspective 
guiding much of my professional and academic experience has been a desire to 
improve the communication management of my organization—the U.S. Coast Guard.  
This observer-participant role provided me with a unique perspective in 
organizational decision-making at the executive level.  However, it also presents 
unique challenges that must be acknowledged such as bias and objectivity.  These and 
other methodological concerns will be addressed in Chapter III.
One of the constructs used in the practice of public relations is issues 
management.  Bridges and Nelson (2000), in developing a relational approach to 
issues management, observed:  
Issues management requires making difficult decisions regarding 
relationships.  Ironically, in the public relations approach to issues 
management, there has been very little serious attention paid to what is 
meant by relations, and the attention proposed is generally assumed to 
be at best communication by the organization's management to various 
constituent groups accompanied by evaluative research to determine 
the effects of this outreach.  (pp. 105-106)
Issues management is important to this study because of its centrality to why 
groups form.  Issues develop when organizational decisions and activities affect those 
inside the organization as well as those outside.  Issues are often revealed through an 
environmental monitoring process that public relations professionals employ known 
as environmental scanning.  Although environmental scanning will be discussed in 
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greater detail in the next chapter, this communication research tactic essentially acts 
like “radar” that tracks items that will likely result in consequences on groups.  
Given the increasing complexity of the environment and the increasing 
potential for more conflict between organizations and their environment, how do 
executives in organizations make optimal decisions on issues that affect more than 
one stakeholder group?  How are decisions derived when competing stakeholder 
interests drive executives to make decisions that may result in excluding the interests 
of one or more groups?  How does group behavior influence decision-making by 
executives?  How is this type of environmental information introduced into the 
strategic management process?  And, what distinct role, if any, does or should public 
relations perform in the decision-making process at the executive level?  
Lapinski (1992) argued that public relations could not “afford to ignore the 
theories of strategic management” (p. 230).  Public relations can and should provide 
important and unique contributions to the strategic management process.  
The central question of how public relations becomes an essential element of 
the strategic management of organizations is not new.  Plowman (1995) pointed this 
out when he asked, "how does public relations become an essential part of the 
strategic communication processes of top management" (p. 4).
Wilson (1996) suggested that, at least in the international arena, a strategic 
management approach to public relations was limited in three ways.  First, due to the 
rationalist and utilitarian approach to the identification of key publics and their 
immediate affect on organizational goals, information is almost always translated into 
economic terms.  Second, even though strategic issues often may be identified years 
12
in advance, the solutions are most often based on "short-term thinking."  Last, 
decisions are frequently based on a self-interest approach and "less concerned with 
relationships than profit" (p. 73).  
Wilson (1996) observed that "the trends [in society] should have sparked 
recognition that the truly strategic role of public relations in today's organization and 
society is not to manipulate the environment with the bottom-line mentality, but 
rather to build bridges and relationships with publics to create an environment in 
which the organization thrives over time" (pp. 68-69).  
Theory and evidence from the IABC Excellence project support this view (J. 
Grunig & L. Grunig, 2000).  The study established a foundation for public relations to 
serve as a relevant and necessary part of an organization's strategic management 
process (p. 303).  The study focused on two important questions that sought to answer 
"how, why and to what extent does communication contribute to the achievement of 
organizational objectives," and "how must public relations be practiced and the 
communication function organized for it to contribute the most to organizational 
effectiveness?" (p. 304).  The study's authors concluded that public relations 
"contributes to strategic management by building relationships with publics that it 
affects or is affected by—publics that support the mission of the organization or can 
divert it from its mission" (p. 310).  But, beyond building these relationships with 
affected publics, how else does public relations contribute to strategic management? 
Mintzberg (1994) considered strategic management to be a process by which 
an integrated system of relatively consequential decisions to the organization created 
results.  How are these relatively consequential decisions derived?  J. Grunig and L. 
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Grunig (2000) argued that people do not "make rational decisions in the way that 
classical economists envisioned" (p. 310).  Rather, participants in this process "assert 
their disciplinary identities" (p. 310).  The significance for public relations is that it 
brings the problems of stakeholder publics into the decision-making process.  
What is relatively new is the construct of public relations as relationship 
management.  This idea was first posited by Ferguson (1984) when she argued that 
the field of public relations should focus on relationships.  The proposition that public 
relations should focus on relationships did not receive serious consideration until the 
IABC Excellence Project was conducted (Dozier, L. A. Grunig & J. Grunig, 1995, pp. 
226-235).  However, this construct does have critics.  For example, Ehling (1992) 
observed that the shift toward the conceptualization of public relations as establishing 
and maintaining relationships “may be far too open-ended to be helpful in giving 
needed specificity to this kind of end state” (p. 622).  
This research seeks to expand the relationship management construct by 
exploring the role of public relations in the strategic decision-making process that 
guides the strategic management of organizations.  Some executives argue that 
“communication counselors need to be present when strategic decisions are made—at 
the moment of influence—in order to shape the process” (Conference Board Report 
1240-99-CH, p. 5).  This makes sense, providing communication counselors 
understand and can predict the potential consequence on the relationship with the 
affected public—and how the affected public will behave to either support or 
undermine organizational decisions.  In particular, how do executives make strategic 
decisions on consequential issues when there are multiple stakeholder groups that are 
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important to the organization?  How does or can the public relations function leverage 
the emerging construct of public relations as relationship management in reducing 
conflict between organizations and multiple stakeholder groups that often hold 
opposing positions on mutually relevant issues?  In short, how do multiple groups, or 
publics, with competing interests behave, or collectively act, and how do executives 
in organizations address the interests of these conflicting publics in their strategic 
decision-making?  Sandler (1992) observed: “An understanding of collective action 
and its supporting processes and environment will allow policymakers to foster the 
required preconditions to achieve effective collective action” (p. 200).  Chapter II will 
define and conceptualize a “public” as used in this research.  Although a public is a 
group, a group may not necessarily represent a public.  
This study departs from previous studies in several ways.  There has been 
invaluable research by Anderson (1992), L. Grunig (1992), and Lauzen (1995) in 
understanding the effect of environment on the model of public relations practiced 
and the potential effect of activism on organizations.  Broom (1986), Dozier (1992), 
and Wright (1995) identified the major roles that practitioners played in organizations 
and how the organizational placement of the function influenced its practice.  
Among his many contributions, J. Grunig may be credited as providing the 
first systems theory approach to the field and developing a situational theory to help 
practitioners determine whether a stakeholder public was more likely to communicate 
with an organization on a particular issue (Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  In addition, J. 
Grunig identified four models of public relations practice and the critical importance 
of such concepts as symmetry.  
15
Ehling (1983, 1984) introduced the mixed-motive model based on decision 
theory, game theory, and conflict resolution theory that scholars such as Plowman 
(1995) and Murphy (1989) have advanced.  Vercic and Grunig (1995) examined the 
origins of public relations theory in economics and strategic management.  Cutlip 
(1994) observed that public relations professionals improved the conduct of 
organizations they serve by stressing the need to gain public approval.  
More recently, Huang (1997) advanced Ferguson's (1984) work by identifying 
a new measure of public relations effects and rethinking the models of public 
relations.  Huang also introduced important concepts of relationships to public 
relations research such as trust, control mutuality, relational satisfaction, and 
relational commitment (p. 4).  Huang determined that symmetrical/ethical 
communication proved to be an effective predictor of trust, control mutuality, 
satisfaction, and commitment in organization-public relationships (p. 274).  In 
addition, Huang demonstrated that trust was a good predictor of conflict management 
strategies (p. 273).  And, the book edited by Ledingham and Bruning (2000) provided 
a framework for the current relationship management research by public relations 
scholars.  
However, there has been relatively little public relations research to extend 
our understanding of how executives make strategic decisions on issues affecting 
multiple stakeholders with different interests and how group behavior influences that 
process.  Vercic and J. Grunig (1995) identified the “contributions of public relations 
to management decision-making” as one of the two core theoretical problems in 
public relations (p. 3).  For public relations to make meaningful contributions to 
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strategic decision-making in organizations there must be a theoretical understanding 
of how publics might behave when they become aware of organizational issues.  This 
understanding must not only be in relation to the organization, but also in relation to 
other publics that may behave in a completely different manner motivated by 
different interests.  Cialdini and Trost (1998) observed: “As humans, we are 
motivated to act in ways that are effective in achieving our goals: We want to make 
accurate decisions” (p. 155).  This requires an understanding of collective action.  
What factors give rise to collective action?  How do individual and group processes 
influence the behavior of collective action?  And, what might executives do in their 
decision-making to reduce uncertainty and risk associated with collective action 
motivated by company actions.  
Mintzberg (1983) understood the importance of strategic decisions.  He 
argued that “the strategic decisions of large organizations inevitably involve social as 
well as economic consequences, inextricably intertwined. . . . Every time the large 
corporation makes an important decision—to introduce a new product line, to locate a 
plant, to close down a division—it generates all kinds of social consequences” (p. 
610).  Mintzberg also recognized that there “is always some zone of discretion in 
strategic decision-making” (p. 611).  
Huang (1997) called for “qualitative research to explore a depth of contextual 
information as the basis for further data interpretation” of her work (p. 278).  No 
substantive public relations research has been published that has advanced or 
synthesized Ehling's work on decision theory, White and Dozier’s work on public 
relations and management decision-making, and L. Grunig's research on dealing with 
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activism by interest groups.  What activities contribute to the strategic decision-
making process and why?  
J. Grunig (1996) identified the significance of strategic management to the 
field when he observed that the findings from the IABC Excellence Study revealed
that the “involvement of public relations in strategic management consistently was 
the best predictor of excellent public relations” (p. 2).  
Nutt (2001) argued that more than half of the decisions made by managers are 
wrong and cited three primary reasons.  He noted that a lack of participation in the 
decision-making process combined with short cuts often made by managers under 
pressure on improperly framed issues resulted in incorrect decisions (pp. 63- 64).  The 
evolving paradigm of public relations as relationship management presents new 
territory for research and expanding our understanding of how organizations build 
bridges, maintain relationships and make decisions—all very important concepts to 
whether organizations thrive or perish. 
L. Grunig, J. Grunig and Dozier (2002) noted that “The results of the 
Excellence Study. . . have highlighted the central importance of participation in 
strategic decision processes of an organization if a public relations department is to 
contribute to organizational effectiveness. . . we believe much additional research is 
needed to develop ways for public relations managers to participate in strategic 
management…” (p.  548).  This study seeks to add to the body of public relations 
knowledge by exploring this gap particularly as it relates to strategic decision-
making.
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Several theoretical concepts frame this study.  First, organizational and 
strategic management theories provide a foundation for why organizations form and 
how they achieve and sustain competitive advantage.  In addition, theories of 
collective action are instrumental to understanding why groups form and how they 
behave.  Second, decision theory places this study in the context of what 
organizations do to optimize effectiveness.  Finally, the excellence theory identifies a 
framework for public relations to contribute to strategic management theory and 
organizational excellence.
Procedures
This inquiry seeks to better understand the dynamic of multiple and 
conflicting publics and strategic decision-making by interviewing senior Coast Guard 
officers and executives in organizations who represent the multiple publics who have 
had to address issues that place them in conflict with not only the organization, but 
also other publics.  Using a qualitative approach, I intend to determine whether there 
are underlying principles, processes, or best practices that might serve to guide public 
relations managers by interviewing senior executives involved in strategic decision-
making on several important organizational issues that were involved in four separate 
strategic decision events for the Coast Guard.  Each of the four decision events will 
be examined in relation to how dispersed the power is among the stakeholders in the 
decision process and how the net result of the decision affected the relationship with 
the organization—the U.S. Coast Guard.  Chapter III will outline the four decision 
events and how I will approach collecting and analyzing the data.  
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I propose to explore the behavior of multiple publics, strategies by public 
relations managers, and strategic decision-making of senior executives in 
organizations by interviewing leaders of various publics involved in a common issue 
and senior executives in the Coast Guard responsible for managing the issue.  There 
are several reasons why I believe interviewing represents the best alternative to reveal 
the answers to the research questions posited in Chapter II.
As a research methodology, Marshall and Rossman (1995) noted that 
qualitative approaches provide flexibility to acquire data that cannot be obtained from 
experiments because of ethical or practical reasons, unknown or ambiguous variables, 
and complex processes.  H. Rubin and I. Rubin (1995) observed that interviews allow 
researchers an opportunity to understand unfamiliar experiences and to reconstruct 
events.  This approach also requires an understanding of culture, recognition that 
interviewers are participants, and an acknowledgement that interviewers give voice to 
those interviewed while silencing others.  Of significant import is my interest in the 
individual’s perspective, the ability to connect my research to theory, and the relative 
ease and low cost of collecting data.  
Because depth and understanding the meaning of concepts, categories, terms, 
relationships, and assumptions of people and groups are central to this research, I 
believe that active interviews are most appropriate.  Active interviews allow for the 
development of a common narrative, rich in detail and context.  This approach is 
articulated more fully in Chapter III.   
Delimitations
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To some extent, the theoretical concepts framed by this study are found at all 
levels in organizations.  Pearce and Robinson (1982) suggested that strategic 
management occurs at all levels.  Additionally, many decisions are made in 
organizations everyday at many different levels.  White and Dozier (1992) introduced 
the “key concepts of the dominant coalition, levels of decision-making, and strategic 
management” to the theory of excellent public relations (p. 91).  However, certain 
decisions must necessarily stand as more important than other decisions because the 
consequences for the organization are much more significant.  
This inquiry will focus on senior executives to understand the theoretical 
implications for the strategic management of organizations—and for the strategic 
management of public relations.  The study is limited to a purposive sample of senior 
executives and leaders of groups because of their expertise and experience.  
Consequently, the results cannot be generalized.  However, from a theoretical 
perspective, the results will provide executives, public relations professionals, and 
scholars a perspective heretofore not examined in research.  
In summary, this study seeks to understand how executives make strategic 
decisions during four different decision events and how the executives account for the 
interests of multiple publics in their strategic decision-making by going directly to 
company leaders and stakeholder publics and interviewing them.  The four decision 
events are contrasted by how dispersed power is perceived to be among stakeholders 
in the decision-making process and how the relationship was perceived prior to the 
decision event and following the decision.  The results should help communications 
managers better define their roles in the strategic decision-making process and help 
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organizations deal more effectively with important groups in a world of increasing 
complexity and fragmentation.  
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CHAPTER II
Conceptualization
Introduction
Understanding the linkage between group behavior and strategic decision-
making is fundamental to exploring how public relations might enhance an 
organization’s ability to deal more effectively with its environment, especially one 
that is becoming more global.  When organizations can reduce uncertainty in 
environments, they improve efficiency—especially in decision-making.  For example, 
knowledge of how groups behave in given situations involving strategic decisions 
serves to inform organizations during the decision-making process.  The following 
discussion reviews the literature associated with organizational theory and strategic 
decision-making, strategic management and the social psychology of groups, and 
public relations theory.  
First, a brief overview of what organizations are and what purpose they serve 
is important to understanding how the decision processes in them might be improved.  
How do environments affect organizational development and behavior?  How does an 
organization’s environment and character influence strategic decision-making by its 
senior executives?  What is the role of power and how do executives define and 
exercise power in strategic decisions?  How do executives make decisions in 
organizations?  What are the strategic decision-making models that have been 
revealed in the research and how are those models affected by the various inputs to 
the process?
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Second, what is the role of strategic management in organizations?  For public 
relations, it is necessary to understand the critical role that groups serve in enabling or 
constraining organizations.  Specifically, how and why do groups form and what 
factors influence group behavior in relation to other groups and organizations?  To 
what degree are relationships between groups voluntary?  What factors give rise to 
group activism?  And, how does activism affect organizations?    
Finally, to what extent, how, and why does public relations participate in 
strategic decisions?  Based on an understanding of group behavior, are there 
strategies that might be employed by public relations professionals that would 
enhance strategic decision-making in organizations?  This chapter concludes with a 
brief summary and a review of the significant research questions this inquiry seeks to 
address. 
Organizational Theory
The literature on organizational theory provides a framework for 
understanding what organizations are and why they develop.  Following is a brief 
discussion of what constitutes organizations and their evolution.  There is a review of 
relevant constructs such as systems theory, environment, power, empowerment, 
stakeholders, and publics.  Finally, I conclude with a discussion of decision theory 
and its importance for organizations.  
Robbins (1990) defined an organization as “a consciously coordinated social 
entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, that functions on a relatively 
continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals” (p. 4).  Important to this 
24
definition are the concepts of coordination, social relationships, boundaries, and 
goals.  
Robbins (1990) also noted that “conscious coordination” implied 
management.  This is an important link because Mintzberg (1983) argued that 
management theorists have evolved from a traditional reliance on classical economic 
theory [one actor—one goal] to explain the goals of a business or firm to:
an increasing attention to newer sociological themes [many actors—no 
goals], from the notion of given organizational goals to that of fluid 
power in and around the organization with no goals, from an 
organization devoid of influencers to one in which virtually everyone 
is an influencer, from the view that the organization as society’s 
instrument to that of it as a political arena (p. 8).
According to Magretta (2002), “Management is the art of performance… 
management’s mission, first and foremost is value creation” (pp. 15-20).  
“Increasingly, value creation is happening across company borders” (p. 95).  Magretta 
said that “value” not only comes from utility, quality, availability, distribution, and 
service; but also from less tangible attributes such as image.  In fact, she asserted “the 
more intangible the value appears, the more important it is to recognize that value is 
defined by customers, one person at a time” (p. 22).  An important distinction must be 
made between “value creation” as defined here and wealth creation—the more 
traditional framework for assessing company worth.  Wealth creation implies 
enhancing tangible assets that firms use to increase economic power.  In contrast, 
value creation consists of enhancing a broader range of a firm’s assets, including 
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those less tangible, to increase the return on investment for its owners and 
shareholders.  
Organizations are means to ends.  Magretta (2002) pointed out that Drucker 
observed that “Efficiency was necessary but not sufficient…Customers don’t buy 
products …they buy the satisfaction of particular needs” (p. 27).  
The idea that customers “buy the satisfaction of needs” is an important point 
for public relations.  Where trust, credibility, and other attributes are important 
qualities to a particular individual or group as a “need,” organizations must attend to 
these needs to compete successfully.  How organizations go about satisfying these 
needs is often known as strategy.  Magretta (2002) noted the primary difficulty in 
strategy formulation, “what makes strategy especially hard is that no organization acts 
in a vacuum” (p. 85).  
Galford and Drapeau (2003) studied the important role trust plays in 
organizations:
As difficult as it is to build and maintain trust within organizations, it’s 
critical… If people trust each other and their leaders, they’ll be able to 
work through disagreements.  They’ll take smarter risks.  They’ll work 
harder, stay with the company longer, contribute better ideas, and dig
deeper than anyone has a right to ask.  (p. 90).
Galford and Drapeau also noted that the building blocks of trust are 
“unsurprising” (p. 90).  Among others, these building blocks include clear and 
consistent communication, and being able to address difficult issues.  To build trust 
required ruthlessly attacking the “enemies of trust.”  These include:
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• Inconsistent messages
• Inconsistent standards
• Misplaced benevolence
• False feedback
• Failure to trust others
• Rumors in a vacuum
• Consistent corporate underperformance (pp. 90-94)
Most, if not all, of these issues are incidental to or are part of the domain of 
communication management.  
Today’s global economic environment requires that organizations 
acknowledge the highly interdependent nature of the various relationships involved.  
Magretta (2002) noted that, “Managing across boundaries, whether these are between 
the company and its customers, or the customers and its suppliers or business 
partners, can be as important as managing within one’s own company… Determining 
the relevant outsiders may be management’s single most important critical decision” 
(pp. 34-41).  
Successful companies recognize the benefits of bringing suppliers into the 
process.  “The better your suppliers understand what you’re trying to accomplish, the 
more they can tailor their efforts to fit” (Magretta, 2002, p. 103).  For public relations 
professionals, a similar logic can be used with stakeholders.  
Having identifiable boundaries suggests that organizations emerge in 
environments and can be thought of as systems where information and resources are 
absorbed through some periphery, acted upon, and then returned to the environment 
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for some organizational benefit.  Therefore, systems theory is important to the 
formation and survival of organizations.  
Systems Theory
Although there are many different ways of looking at organizations, this study 
conceptualizes organizations as “input-output transformation systems that depend on 
their environment for survival” (Robbins, 1990, p. 10).  Katz and Kahn (1967) 
suggested this “systems theory” approach possessed utility because it is “basically 
concerned with problems of relationships, of structure, and of interdependence rather 
than with the constant attributes of objects” (p.18).  Further, Katz and Kahn (1967) 
advocated that organizations be viewed as open systems.  Thus, organizations are 
entities that possess boundaries where actors compete internally and externally.  The 
goal of the competition can vary from the most basic of instincts—to survive, to the 
most Machiavellian of instincts—to dominate.  
Organizational theorists recognize the open nature and resource dependency 
of organizations.  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) observed: “organizations are 
inescapably bound up with the conditions of their environment.  Indeed, it has been 
said that all organizations engage in activities which have as their logical conclusion 
adjustment to the environment” (p. 1).  Pfeffer and Salancik also argued: 
organizations survive to the extent they are effective.  Their 
effectiveness derives from the management of demands, particularly 
the demands of interest groups upon which the organizations depend 
for resources and support… no organization is completely self-
contained. (p. 2)
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The open nature and resource dependency of organizations demand that this 
conceptualization is performed as part of an open-system perspective—that is, 
organizations do not operate independently of their environment.    
Robbins (1990) provided a broad overview of the development of 
organizational theory.  Prior to 1960, Robbins observed, “organizational theory was 
dominated by a closed-system perspective” (pp. 30-31). 
Contemporary organizational theorists argue in support of an open-systems 
perspective.  However, in the mid-1970s, theorists recognized that organizations 
possessed a significant social dimension.  Key to current theory is the notion that 
organizational structure is not the result of a rational process.  Rather, organizational 
structure is “the outcome of political struggles among coalitions within the 
organization for control” (Robbins, 1990, p. 32).  Important for the purposes of this 
study is Littlejohn’s (1983) observation that “a primary aim of GST [general systems 
theory] is to integrate accumulated knowledge into a clear and realistic framework” 
(p. 38).  In addition, J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) acknowledged the importance of 
systems theory to public relations theory by formalizing the role of the environment 
in public relations (L. Grunig & J. Grunig, 1997, p. 6).  The struggles that Robbins 
acknowledged suggest that power is a significant determinant in the development of 
organizational structure.  As a result, power is an important element to understanding 
organizational structure and behavior.  
Mintzberg (1983) argued that there were three means of external influence 
that differentiated the organization from its environment—social norms, formal 
constraints, and pressure campaigns.  These means of power are exercised by external 
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coalitions to “control the behavior of a distinct Internal Coalition” (p. 66).  
Consequently, it is important to understand the role of power.   
Role of Power
Because power is a significant determinant of organizational structure and 
behavior, the concept is critical to understanding control of organizations.  Mintzberg 
(1983) defined power as “the capacity to effect (or affect) organizational outcomes” 
(p. 4).  According to Mintzberg, power exists both internal and external to 
organizations.  Power is derived from five general bases: 
Three prime bases of power are control of (1) a resource, (2) a 
technical skill, or (3) a body of knowledge, any one critical to the 
organization. . .  A fourth basis of power stems from legal 
prerogatives–exclusive rights or privileges to impose choices. . .  The 
fifth basis of power derives simply from access to those who can rely 
on the other four. (p. 24)  
Pfeffer (1981) noted:
Most definitions of power include an element indicating that power is 
the capability of one social actor to overcome resistance in achieving a 
desired objective or result… Power becomes defined as force, and 
more specifically, force sufficient to change the probability of B’s 
behavior from what it would have been in the absence of the 
application of force. (pp. 2-3)   
Externally, power exerted by stakeholders influences, and to some extent, 
controls organizations; therefore, organizational functions must offer ways to deal 
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with these controlling forces.  Mintzberg (1983) recognized that a primary concern in 
control was organizational power.  He argued that control was traditionally linked to 
ownership.  However, more important in his view was “the question of de facto 
control: Can the owners in fact control the decisions and actions of the organizations 
they own” (p. 34).  Mintzberg believed that this was dependent on the influence that 
organizational actors exerted in the various organizational processes and proposed the 
following: “The more involved the owners, and the more concentrated their 
ownership, the greater their power in the External Coalition” (p. 34).  This view 
resulted in the following matrix (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 34):
Concentrated Ownership Dispersed Ownership
Detached Ownership closely held businesses… widely held corporations
Involved Ownership proprietorships, …  cooperatives
Mintzberg (1983) noted that with regard to the ability of owners to 
control organizations, it appeared that much of the control had shifted to managers, 
with owners becoming little more than providers of capital.  Thus, he concluded that 
ownership did not necessarily equate to control over organizational behavior (p. 37).  
Rather, Mintzberg argued that there were three critical factors that resulted in “power 
relationships” for organizations.  These included essentiability—or how important the 
resource was for the organization; substitutability—or how dependent the 
organization is on a particular supplier of a resource; and, concentration—or how 
concentrated the suppliers of the resource are (p. 38).  Mintzberg also added a fourth 
that he classified as “intimacy” and was determined by longevity and intimacy of 
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relationship between organizations and suppliers.  In short, the longer and closer the 
relationship, the more likely the supplier was to hold greater power in the 
relationship.  This is an especially important observation for public relations, for if 
public relations managers can establish and maintain important relationships with 
suppliers, or stakeholders, the managers can facilitate the dispersion of power among 
interested groups that are important to the organization.  How does and can public 
relations position itself within the organization to bring about such dispersion of 
power?   
Internally, power is necessary to affect an organizational outcome because 
organizations are systems made up of competing interests in contemporary 
organizational theory.  In order to participate in this process, an organizational 
function must be represented in the dominant coalition (Mintzberg, 1983; White & 
Dozier, 1992).  But, power as a construct is not independent of the means to exert it.  
Power must be exercised by actors to exist.  Pfeffer (1981) eloquently acknowledged: 
“The power of organizational actors is fundamentally determined by two things, the 
importance of what they do in the organization and their skill in doing it” (p. 98).  
Coombs (1993) called for a fuller discussion of the importance of power in the 
public relations philosophical debate.  He said that systems theorists such as J. 
Grunig, and rhetorical theorists such as Heath wrongly dismiss power issues in the 
organizational-stakeholder relationship.  Coombs incorrectly suggested that both 
paradigms are based upon pluralism, that is “the ideal type of government where all 
parties have equal access to and equal power in the policy making process,” and are, 
therefore blinded to power based issues (p. 112).  Coombs argued for a more complex 
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perspective of public relations to account for the important role of “power-related 
phenomenon” (p. 118).  
According to L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier (2002), Coombs’ observation 
that public relations assumes a pluralistic perspective was accurate for the rhetorical 
perspective.  However, the scholars said that that Coombs was incorrect in universally 
assuming a pluralistic perspective where a “symmetrical, managerial” model of 
public relations is concerned (p. 323).  Rather, 
Tying all these values together is the value of collaboration . . . [public 
relations professionals] must be able to convince their client 
organizations and their publics that a symmetrical approach will 
enhance their self-interest more than an asymmetrical approach and, at 
the same time, enhance their reputations as ethical, socially 
responsible organizations. (p. 323).  
J. Grunig (1992) recognized the importance of power as central to the 
Excellence theory (of public relations) when he wrote: “Our theory states that 
communication programs that are managed strategically help organizations to manage 
relationships with strategic publics that have the power [italics added] to constrain the 
ability of the organization to achieve its goals” (p. 27).  In addition, L. Grunig (1992) 
considered power in the public relations department and the importance for senior 
communication managers to participate as a full member of the organization’s 
dominant coalition.
Perhaps as important, if not more, to public relations in the discussion of 
power is the concept of empowerment.  As L. Grunig, J. Grunig and Dozier (2002) 
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found in their review: “Much of the literature on organizational power has defined the 
concept in terms of being able to control the behavior of others or the ability of those 
in power to secure their own interests.  The thrust of the Excellence theory, however, 
is the empowerment both of public relations and publics affected by organizational 
decisions” (p. 141).  Further:
People in organizations use power asymmetrically when they try to 
control or make others dependent on them… The symmetrical concept 
of power, in contrast, can be described as empowerment—of 
collaborating to increase the power of everyone in the organization to 
the benefit of everyone else in the organization.  (J. Grunig, 1992a, p. 
564)
According to Pfeffer (1981), power is essentially derived from: 
…having something that someone else wants or needs, and being in 
control of the performance or resource so that there are few alternative 
sources or no alternative sources, for obtaining what is desired… The 
relative power of one social actor over another is thus the result of the 
net dependence of one on the other.  (p. 99)
Pfeffer (1981) also noted that the concentration of power in the decision-
making process resulted in certain consequences.  Centralized power results in 
decisions being made and imposed by a central authority.  Dispersed power results in 
decisions being “worked out through the interplay of various actors with more equal 
power…” (p. 87).  Fundamental to this research is whether decisions made under 
dispersed power are more effective.  How are the relationships with stakeholders 
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affected with this approach?  Finally, what organizational function is responsible for 
not necessarily what an organization decides, but how it goes about deciding?  Who 
should be included in these decision processes?    
In an organizational setting, it is important to understand that unless 
organizational decisions and actions have consequences on a group, and vice-versa, 
there can be no relationship—at least as I am defining it for this research.  Therefore, 
it is necessary to define those groups for which power can be a determinant to 
influencing behavior.  
Stakeholders and Publics
According to J. Grunig and Repper (1992), “people are stakeholders because 
they are in a category affected by decisions of an organization or their decisions affect 
an organization” (p. 125).  Many people may be classified as organizational 
stakeholders; however, most of them remain passive on issues because of any number 
of reasons such as ignorance, ambivalence, or apathy.  This definition serves to define 
a role for an organizational entity that addresses communication as one of its primary 
functions.  
L. Grunig (1992) observed that Dewey (1927) provided one of the most 
“helpful” explanations of a “public” that J. Grunig (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 145) 
expanded.  L. Grunig noted that Dewey “characterized a public as a group whose 
members face similar problems, recognize that the problem exists, and organize to do 
something about it” (p. 508).  This definition was expanded by J. Grunig to include a 
nonpublic—“a group that has no consequences on the organization and vice versa” 
(L. Grunig, 1992, p. 508). 
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Building on Dewey’s definition of a public that included formation around 
problems affecting it, J. Grunig developed the situational theory of public relations.  
Publics, in J. Grunig’s view, arise around problems that affect them.  Publics are 
important to organizations because of their ability to influence or constrain behavior.  
Consequently, the value to public relations lies in the function’s ability to identify 
publics, develop a way to deal with the concerns of publics, and measure the results 
of the effort.   
According to J. Grunig and Repper (1992), it is important to understand the 
difference between publics and stakeholders—terms that are often used 
interchangeably.  Though many people may be classified as stakeholders, 
“stakeholders who are or become more aware and active can be described as publics” 
(p. 125).
The first implication of this important distinction for the strategic management 
of public relations, then, is to identify the organizational stakeholders of 
organizational decisions.  The second implication is the critical importance of public 
relations to be able to identify the publics within the stakeholder categories who are 
likely to become more aware and active.  In doing so, public relations can develop 
communications programs at the “stakeholder stage—ideally before conflict has 
occurred” (p. 127).  By establishing this rapport, public relations “helps to develop 
the stable, long-term relationships that an organization needs to build support from 
stakeholders and to manage conflict when it occurs” (J. Grunig & Repper, 1992, p. 
127).
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Once stakeholders are identified, how do executives account for them in 
strategic decision-making?  And, if they ignore them, what are the implications?  Are 
certain approaches to strategic decision-making better than others?  To understand the 
potential opportunities for public relations professionals, it is important to consider 
what can be learned from the literature on decision theory.  
Decision Theory
Garvin and Roberto (2001) suggested, “Decision-making is arguably the most 
important job of the senior executive and one of the easiest to get wrong” (p. 108).  
Their research revealed that although leaders are “made or broken by the quality of 
their decisions…[they] get decision-making all wrong” (p. 108).  Why is this, and can 
public relations managers help senior executives make better decisions?  Garvin and 
Roberto said the primary reason executives make bad decisions is that they treat 
decision-making as a discrete event where choice takes place at a single moment.  
What is the relevance to public relations, though?  
White and Dozier (1992) noted that “strategic public relations requires 
practitioner access to decision-making authority in an organization” (p. 91).  In trying 
to determine what role communication managers and public relations practitioners 
play in strategic decision-making, White and Dozier developed the concept of 
strategic decision-making for public relations and suggested ways “in which 
practitioners make useful contributions to decision-making” (pp. 91-92).  Building on 
the efforts of Vari and Vecsenyi (1984), White and Dozier suggested that the 
following “five distinct participant roles” in the decision-making process were 
reflected in Broom’s early work on public relations roles, which characterized public 
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relations practitioners as expert prescribers, problem-solvers, or communication 
facilitators: 
1. Decision Makers: these participants have executive power to 
define the use of outputs from the phases of the decision-making 
process.
2. Proposers: participants who only have the power to make 
recommendations.
3. Experts: participants who primarily supply input to the currently 
modeled problem structure.  
4. Consultants or Decision Analysts: participants who advise on 
methods of problem representation.  
5. Facilitators: participants who do not have the direct role in the 
decision-making process but who facilitate collaboration of experts 
and the transmission of results within and between rounds of 
decision-making.  (p. 104)
White and Dozier (1992) also noted: “Subsequent empirical studies indicate, 
however, that public relations managers (in their day-to-day work) shift easily from 
expert prescription, process facilitation, and communication facilitation” (p. 104).  
Thus, there appears to be a logical nexus between decision-making in organizations 
and the practice of public relations.  The challenge, however, is to understand the 
nature of strategic decision-making in a way that public relations professionals can 
use to help make organizations more effective in that process.  
38
The following review examines definitions of decisions, characteristics of 
decisions that distinguish strategic decisions from routine decisions, how executives 
make these decisions, and some of the dominant models executives use in making 
strategic decisions.  The review concludes with a discussion of one organizational 
decision-making approach—logical incrementalism—and its implications for 
communication management in organizational decision-making.  
What is a decision?  After reviewing the myriad definition of decisions, Miller 
and Starr (1967) concluded: 
The word ‘decision’ covers such a multitude of cases that it belongs to 
the class of omnibus words which semanticists warn us about.  There 
is general dictionary agreement that a decision is a conclusion or 
termination of a process.  However, the end point of one process can 
also be viewed as the starting point of another… This reflexive 
property of decisions is not illusory.  The organizational question of 
what triggers decisions is another way of asking: What causes the 
manager to decide to decide?  (pp. 21-22)    
In general, decisions can be thought of as part of a continuous process in 
which information from the environment either enters or is absorbed by the 
organization and a determination is made to its relevance.  The awareness and 
relevance of the information is then discarded or acted upon by the organization as 
necessary to produce a response to the input.  The cycle repeats itself as necessary 
until the organization successfully adapts to the input or suffers some consequence.  
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Thus, at its most fundamental level, an organization is a “communication network” 
that is “embedded in its environment” (Miller & Starr, 1967, pp. 14-15).   
The “decision problem” has been characterized differently according to 
tradition.  For example, philosophers “concerned themselves with the question of 
what constitutes a ‘good’ decision” (Miller & Starr, 1967, p. 22).  Economists 
typically frame any discussion of decisions in terms of utility and seek quantitative 
analysis to conclude whether decisions are optimized.  In addition, economists 
assume decisions are rational.  March (1994) defined rationality as “a particular and 
very familiar class of procedures for making choices” (p. 2).  Social scientists, on the 
other hand, argue that there is reason to believe that individuals do not always act in a 
way that maximizes utility.  In fact, “sociologists have accumulated considerable 
evidence to demonstrate the enormous influence of social situations, habit, and 
tradition on the choices and decisions made by individuals” (Miller & Starr, pp. 22-
26).   
According to March (1994):
Rational theories of choice assume decision processes that are 
consequential and preference-based.  They are consequential in the 
sense that action depends on anticipations of the future effects of 
current actions.  Alternatives are interpreted in terms of their expected 
consequences.  They are preference-based in the sense that 
consequences are evaluated in terms of personal preferences.  
Alternatives are compared in terms of the extent to which their 
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expected consequences are thought to serve the preferences of the 
decision maker.  (p. 2)
In March’s (1994) view, choice is concerned with four basic questions that 
include alternatives, expectations, preferences, and decision rules (pp. 2-3).  It is 
important to note that most current theories of choice recognize that rationality is 
limited, or bounded.  March observed that:
Decision makers do not consider all consequences of their alternatives.  
They focus on some and not others.  Relevant information about 
consequences is not sought, and available information is not used.  
Instead of having a complete, consistent set of preferences, decision 
makers seem to have incomplete and inconsistent goals, not all of 
which are considered at the same time.  (p. 9)
In addition to the concept of bounded rationality, March (1994) noted that 
there were also information constraints that pose challenges to decision makers.  For 
example, there are problems of attention.  Memory problems and problems of 
comprehension can interfere with decision processes.  And, communication problems 
limit the ability of decision makers to transmit and receive necessary information (p. 
10).  
Notwithstanding these social and psychological conceptual problems to the 
construct known as decisions, Miller and Starr (1967) concluded that there are 
essentially three aspects of decisions that should be considered in any analysis.  First, 
a decision requires the selection of a strategy to achieve objectives.  Second, 
decisions are made under certain states of nature.  Finally, the degree to which 
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objectives are met will be determined by selection of the most competitive strategy 
(p. 27).  They further suggested several kinds of decision problems that could be 
categorized in terms of what the decision maker knows and under what condition the 
decision is being made.  Decision-making under certainty means that the decision 
maker knows with confidence the state of nature—in other words, the outcome is 
known because all of the factors involved in the decision are known.  Decision-
making under risk implies that the decision-maker knows the probability of each state 
of nature; however, there are no guarantees for each course of action under 
consideration.  Decision-making under uncertainty removes probabilities from the 
process such that the decision maker may know the various states of nature but not 
the likelihood of occurrence.  Thus, the utility of knowing the various states of nature 
is significantly reduced.  The last category is decision-making under conflict where 
the decision maker is concerned with the opponent rather than a particular state of 
nature.
Game theory represents an effort to address this state of nature in decision-
making (pp. 108-111).  According to Plowman (1995), game theory is the "formal 
study of the rational, consistent expectations that participants can have about each 
other's choices.  The basic premise is that social relationships can be modeled as 
games of strategy" (p. 68).  The outcome of rational decision-making "depends on the 
choices both [individuals] make. . . .  There is no independently best choice that can 
be made; it depends on what others do" (p. 69).  However, there are scholars who 
question the characterization of decision-making as the result of a rational process 
(for example, see J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 2000).  
42
According to Robbins (1990), decision-making is traditionally presented as 
“the making of choices” (p. 108).  However, the simple act of making a choice is but 
one step in a much larger process.  Decisions possess dimensions beyond mere 
resource implications—social and psychological, for example.  Depending on the 
control of the process and the dimensions involved in the decision, the decision can 
be executed with relative ease.  For example, if an individual gathers the necessary 
information, establishes the criteria under which the choice will be made, analyzes the 
data, and possesses the authority to make the decision, the process can be controlled 
from beginning to end.  Of course, communicating the choice and implementing the 
course of action resulting from the decision represents another process entirely and, in 
certain instances, the resulting actions may be quite different from the original 
intentions.  
Robbins (1990) suggested that such a characterization of decision-making as 
indicated above was inadequate to represent organizational decision-making.  Seldom 
does one actor control all of these steps in an organization (p. 108).  A more realistic 
model of the organizational decision-making process would reflect the control by 
multiple actors over different parts of the process.  
In constructing a normative theory of public relations management, Ehling 
(1983) noted:
Decision theory is even more normative in that it provides both 
measures and criteria (norms) for making decisions under several 
different kinds of information conditions—namely, decision-making 
under certainty (complete information), risk (probabilistic 
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information), and uncertainty (incomplete or no information).  Game 
theory, in turn, extends decision theory to strategic situations in which 
a decision-maker is viewed as “playing” (making strategic moves) 
against another decision-maker.  (p. 6). 
Ehling (1983) observed that decision theory is essentially about maximizing 
expected value (p.7).  Although Ehling was correct in his assessment of decision 
theory as it might be discussed from an economic perspective related to utility, the 
literature reveals other perspectives, such as habits and norms, or philosophical 
traditions as discussed earlier, that should not be ignored when studying decisions.  
Miller and Starr (1967) noted, “One great strength of decision theory is that the value 
of information generated to provide forecasts and support predictions can be 
compared to the cost of obtaining it” (p. 30).  
Some decisions are necessarily more important than others.  The most 
important decisions are known as strategic decisions because of five general 
characteristics described by Papadakis and Barwise (1998, pp. 1-5).  First, strategic 
decisions involve committing a significant portion of an organization’s resources for 
a long time and are difficult to reverse.  Second, strategic decisions provide a 
connection between deliberate, or planned, and emergent, or unanticipated, strategy.  
Third, strategic decisions help organizations adapt and learn.  Fourth, strategic 
decisions help younger managers develop into seasoned leaders by providing 
opportunities to excel.  Finally, strategic decisions generally require cross-functional 
cooperation because of the substantial commitment of company resources.  Likewise, 
Harrison and St. John (1994) suggested that strategic decisions are non-programmed 
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and have few precedents.  They generally involve larger portions of the organization 
and command a larger number of assets such as people, money, and technology.  
Finally, these decisions are usually made at higher levels in organizations and clearly 
have long-term implications for the organization.
Because of their ability to significantly affect organizational direction, 
strategic decisions made at the highest level should be of paramount importance to 
public relations professionals.  Thus, this research focuses on how public relations 
professionals might enhance the effectiveness of these decisions.   
Decision-making models and strategies
Numerous decision-making models are revealed in the literature.  
For example, Eisenhardt (1998) acknowledged that there are essentially three 
fundamental paradigms in strategic decision-making theory: bounded rationality, 
power and politics, and the “garbage can” model.  However, she suggested a fourth 
for consideration that she called “improvisational” (pp. 251-258).  
Bounded rationality, as discussed earlier, is the notion that decision-makers 
are not completely rational.  Psychological factors intervene in the decision-making 
process and may result in choices that appear not entirely rational.  
The power and politics paradigm recognizes the many and varied goals that 
social actors have in organizations.  March (1994) characterized these types of 
decision-making models in one of two ways.  One model views decision-making “as 
based on a power struggle.  It asks: Who gets what, when, and how.  The second 
metaphor pictures decision-making as coalition formation.  It asks: How are partners 
found, how are agreements negotiated and enforced?” (pp. 139-140).  Theorists of 
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these models generally distinguish between “single-actor, or individual, decision-
making, on the one hand, and multiple-actor, or organizational, decision-making, on 
the other” (p. 172).  March noted that decision-making theories that rely on consistent 
individual preferences and identities seem inadequate to reflect the complexity of 
decision-making processes.  In his view, theories of individual decision-making do 
not help researchers to better understand organizational theories of decision-making.  
Further, March suggested that it is unclear in the literature whether theories of 
organizational decision-making can help better understand individual decision-
making (p. 173).   
The “garbage can” model “emphasizes the role of chance in the unfolding of 
strategic decisions” (Eisenhardt, 1998, p. 253).  March (1994) elaborated on this 
model as a system and recognized the importance of timing in the process: “Thus, the 
results produced by the system depend on the timing of the various flows and on the 
structural constraints of the organization” (p. 201).  March noted that much of the 
discussion “of garbage can processes found in the literature on decision-making 
emphasizes situations in which the access of problems, solutions, and decision 
makers to choice opportunities are unrestricted…There are probably more situations, 
however, in which garbage can processes exist but are constrained by social norms, 
organizational structures, and networks of connections that restrict the process in 
important ways” (p. 204).  
Finally, the improvisational paradigm is best characterized by “organizing in a 
way such that the actors both adaptively innovate and efficiently execute.  In music, 
this means creating good music in real-time, while adjusting to the shifting musical 
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interpretations of others” (Eisenhardt, 1998, p. 255).  There may be some merit in this 
approach when considering Mintzberg’s (1994) notion that there are really two types 
of organizational strategies—deliberate and emergent.  Such a strategic decision-
making process would allow for continuity of regular planning while being receptive 
to the dynamics of uncertain environments.  
Garvin and Roberto (2001) argued that decision-making is really a process 
that unfolds over “weeks, months, or even years; one that’s fraught with power plays 
and politics and is replete with personal nuances and institutional history; one that’s 
rife with discussion and debate; and one that requires support at all levels of the 
organization when it comes time for execution” (p. 110).  They suggested that there 
are two fundamental approaches to decision-making by individuals.  One approach 
could be defined as “advocacy” where decision-making is viewed as a contest 
whereby the purpose of communication is persuasion and lobbying, the participant’s 
role reflects that of a spokesperson, minority views are minimized, and there are 
winners and losers.  The second approach could be described as inquiry where 
decision-making is conceived as collaborative problem solving and the purpose of 
discussion is testing and evaluation, participants are viewed as critical thinkers, 
minority views are valued, and the outcome is collectively owned (p. 110).  
Schwenk (1998) offered a somewhat different approach regarding advocacy 
and suggested that the value of diversity, eccentricity, and devil’s advocacy was 
necessary to effective decision-making in organizations.  However, his description of 
devil’s advocacy mirrors many of the same attributes as Garvin and Roberto’s (2001) 
construct of “inquiry.”  
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Garvin and Roberto (2001) believed that executives should design and 
manage decision-making processes that favor the “inquiry” approach in order to make 
better decisions.  Unfortunately, the skills necessary to create such a decision-making 
process do not come naturally.  Participants who approach decisions from an 
advocacy perspective are generally more passionate about their solutions and seek 
information consistent with their positions while minimizing information inconsistent 
with their positions.  On the other hand, those who approach decision-making from an 
inquiry perspective seek to consider a greater variety of options, share information 
more readily and objectively, and allow others to draw their own conclusions from 
the information that is presented.  The researchers claimed that conflict was a natural 
part of both processes; however, in inquiry, the disagreements were about ideas and 
interpretations rather than personalities and “entrenched” positions.  To move toward 
an inquiry-based process, Garvin and Roberto suggested “careful attention to three 
critical factors, the three ‘C’s’ of effective decision-making: conflict, consideration, 
and closure” (pp. 110-111).  
The first is conflict and may include cognitive or affective conflict.  Key to 
improving decision-making is increasing cognitive conflict —or the disagreements 
over the ideas—and decreasing affective conflict—or the disagreements over the 
emotional aspects of the process.  Thus, it is important to attend to how issues are 
framed and what type of language is being used during the process.  Amason (1998) 
also raised this concern and argued that cognitive conflict generally enhances 
decision-making while affective conflict usually damages it.  The second is 
consideration—that is, the importance for people to believe that their views have been 
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included in the decision-making process even though a decision may not be consistent 
with their position.  Finally, closure represents the necessity of timing the decision in 
such a way that there does not appear to be a rush to judgment or an inability to 
decide.  Early decisions can often be attributed to “groupthink,” or the notion that 
people are reluctant to oppose strong advocates in a group setting.  Decisions that 
take too long can be attributed to “unchecked” advocacy (pp. 111-115).  
Though it is difficult to assess the quality of decision-making, Garvin and 
Roberto (2001) suggested a set of qualities to determine the health of the decision 
process.  First, are there robust alternatives?  Second, are assumptions challenged and 
tested?  Third, are the criteria for the decision clear and explicit?  This allows for 
consistent and valid comparison of alternatives.  Fourth, are the kinds of questions 
being asked sufficiently challenging and are the participants actively listening?  
Finally, is there a perception of fairness among the participants?  “In fact, keeping 
people involved in the process is, in the end, perhaps the most crucial factor in 
making a decision—and making it stick” (p. 116).    
From a symbolic interaction perspective, Faules and Alexander (1978) 
claimed there were “two prevailing characteristics of decision-making models: (1) a 
claim of universality or generalizability; and (2) a specific notion of human nature… 
[however] none of the models can be used in all situations; each is inappropriate in 
certain communication settings… behavior is situational and calls for different 
methods of processing decisions” (p. 177).   
Faules and Alexander (1978) noted:
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During most of this century logical thought has been regarded as the 
basis for decision-making…According to Dewey, there are five steps 
in the problem-solving process: (i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and 
definition; (iii) suggestion of a possible solution; (iv) development by 
reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observation and 
experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection… (p. 178)  
Two major problems arise with using such a Dewey-like model in studying 
real-life decision-making, though.  For example, not all decisions appear to be 
rational.  This model also presumes the existence of a problem that requires solving 
(Faules & Alexander, 1978, p. 178).  Many decisions are made without regard to 
rationality and many problems never get resolved.  
In order for an individual decision-making model to have value, Faules and 
Alexander (1978) proposed that it meet the following criteria:
1. It need not be tied to problem solving,
2. It must consider seemingly nonrational behavior,
3. It must demonstrate process,
4. It should be explanatory rather than prescriptive,
5. It must reflect the symbolic interactionist’s idea of the mental 
interpretative process.  (p. 179)
They noted that Leon Festinger developed a decision-making approach that 
satisfied these criteria.  Essentially, Festinger posited three phases to an individual’s 
decision-making based upon the notion that humans were “balance-seeking” 
cognitive systems.  These included conflict, decision, and dissonance (p. 179).   In the 
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first phase, people recognized alternatives and “objectively” considered them.  The 
second phase consisted of making the choice and becoming committed to it.  In the 
final phase, people looked for ways to justify a decision to reduce psychological 
discomfort and regain “balance” (p. 179).    
Klein and Weick (2000) argued that there were essentially three approaches or 
strategies to making decisions: the rational-choice approach, the intuitive approach 
and the experiential approach.  Because decision-making is a skill, one's ability 
improves with practice.  Understanding these approaches and their respective 
strengths and weaknesses can serve to improve a person's proficiency in making 
difficult decisions.  
The rational-choice approach to decision-making requires the executive to 
establish a range of options and determine how well each option achieves the 
objectives.  This approach is based on the premise that intuition cannot be trusted and 
that carefully established options minimize the possibility that an important option 
might be overlooked.  
This approach encourages decision makers to look for subtleties and consider 
different perspectives.  It also minimizes the risk inherent in impulsive decisions.  
Unfortunately, this approach requires time and deliberation among the various 
options.  Data may be scarce resulting in gaps critical for analysis.  In addition, this 
approach requires clear objectives from the beginning—something people may not 
have established.  However, when confronted with new or unfamiliar situations, the 
rational-choice approach may be a preferred strategy.
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The intuitive approach relies more on gut feelings and encourages a person to 
be more open to personal preferences.  This approach requires less time and 
experience.  Intuition means relying on experiences without having to analyze all of 
the available information.  According to Klein and Weick (2000): "Studies of brain 
activity show that people have an awareness of the right answer even before they 
consciously realize it" (p. 17).  Notwithstanding the strengths of this approach, 
intuition is not always enough, especially where there is no experience.  
The experiential approach is the strategy that most people use in coping with 
time pressure, uncertainty, changing conditions, and vague goals in making high-
stakes decisions.  This approach is faster than analytic approaches because it "relies 
on memory and recognition to get an immediate sense of what's happening.  It is also 
richer because it makes fuller use of context, experience, informed intuition, and 
imagination to flesh out the initial sense" (Klein & Weick, 2000, p. 18).
Klein (2003) noted that not all decisions are created equal.  For example, 
when alternatives have few distinguishing characteristics in terms of their strengths 
and weaknesses, the situation could be defined as a “zone of indifference” (p. 24).  
Consequently, there are marginal risks of making one choice over another.  Rather 
than invest a great deal of time, action is the preferred strategy.  Other decision 
situations require much greater deliberative analysis because of their complexity.  In 
these situations, a rational choice approach might be a preferred course to reach a 
decision.  Some decision-makers seek to avoid dismissing options because of sunk 
costs—or “trying to get some return for resources that have already been spent” (p. 
25).  Klein suggested that if the option is not viable, dismiss it and move on.  In 
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essence, Klein argued that by “becoming skilled at categorizing decision types, you 
can save yourself a lot of work and frustration” (p. 25).  
Sharfman and Dean (1998) said that managers make strategic decisions the 
way they do based upon strategic decision-making contexts and processes.  
Complexity, instability, and competitive threats frame managers’ contexts for 
decision-making.  From a process perspective, procedural rationality in decision-
making, political behavior in decision-making, and flexibility in strategic choice 
frame the strategic decision-making process.  Though the researchers were unable to 
demonstrate a correlation between the importance of the decision and rational 
behavior, they were able to show a correlation between effectiveness of strategic 
decisions and lack of political behavior, which they attributed to increased 
interpersonal trust between managers of strategic decisions.  In addition, political 
behavior was inversely related to the importance of the decision.  Finally, there 
appeared to be an inverse relationship between environmental competitiveness and 
flexibility in strategic choices.  Of central importance in their research is the finding 
that “decision processes do influence strategic decision-making effectiveness” (p. 
193).
In their research, Williams and Miller (2002) found that executives typically 
exhibited behavior associated with one of five decision-making categories: 
charismatics, thinkers, skeptics, followers, and controllers.  Charismatics, who 
accounted for approximately 25 percent of their sample of nearly 1,700 executives, 
were easily “intrigued” by new ideas but tended to make decisions based on 
“balanced information, not just emotions.”  Thinkers, who made up 11 percent of 
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their sample, could be the toughest to persuade but could be influenced by arguments 
supported by good data.  Skeptics, who accounted for 19 percent of their sample, 
tended to be “highly suspicious of every data point” that challenges their 
“worldview.”  Followers, who were most prevalent in their sample—36 percent—
tended to make choices based on how they had made choices in the past or based on 
the decisions of other trusted executives.  Lastly, controllers, who accounted for only 
9 percent of the executives in their sample, sought only information that was factual 
and avoided “uncertainty and ambiguity” (pp. 66-67).  Their research implies that 
understanding the decision-making style of an executive might help confidants and 
advisors better articulate positions in a manner that could be considered in the 
decision-making process.  
Based on his research of 163 decision-making cases of medium and large U.S. 
organizations that included public, private, and non-profit organizations, Nutt (1998) 
identified essentially four phases of decision-making: establishing direction, 
identifying options, evaluation, and implementing decisions (p. 210).  Within the first 
phase of the process, there were four different types of approaches used to provide 
direction for the decision-making process.  These approaches included concept, where 
an idea is “imposed on the decision-making process;” problem solving, where 
“problem analysis is used to infer a solution;” objectives, where “objectives are set to 
guide developmental activities;” and, reframing, where “renorming is used to 
dramatize the need for action” (p. 212).  Of the four approaches to the first phase of 
the decision-making process, he found that reframing was the least-used but the most 
successful.  Nutt (1998) proposed the following when establishing directions:
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1. Seek out people with different points of view and ask each to 
provide a diagnosis.
2. Look for both needs and opportunities that lie behind problem 
symptoms.
3. Consider problems from several vantage points and reconcile 
contradictions.
4. Find common themes in problems and use these themes to make a 
diagnosis.
5. State objectives in performance terms to keep the search process 
open to new ideas and insights.
6. Ensure that the expectations of improved performance are both 
understood and attainable.
7. Do not initiate a decision-making process without justifying the 
need for change.
8. Do not use a solution to justify a need for action.  (p. 217)
Regarding the second phase of the decision-making process, Nutt (1998) 
found three fundamental tactics for identifying options.  These included template 
tactics for which options are drawn from the experience of other similar decision-
making situations.  Most managers prefer this approach because it is efficient and 
pragmatic.  A second tactic employed search tactics for which “aggressive search” 
tactics were used to identify the best available options.  The final fundamental 
approach included a design tactic, for which the principle feature was innovation, or 
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“thinking outside the box.”  To improve tactics for identifying options, Nutt proposed 
the following:
1. Develop several options.
2. Acquire ideas from many sources and consider them carefully to 
explore how plans can be crafted.
3. Build options from the best features of practices that are observed.
4. Allow innovation to take place in at least one option that will be 
considered.
5. Promote the use of creativity in developing options.
6. Avoid selecting what appears to be a good option early in the 
process.  
7. Avoid stopping the search for options prematurely.  
8. Resist benchmarking the practices of a single organization unless 
the fit is clear.
9. Avoid options that are minor variations of existing practices.
10. Do not expect vendors to tailor their off-the-shelf solutions without 
incentives and directives to do so.  (pp. 220-221)
 Nutt (1998) discovered three different tactics for implementing decisions.  
These tactics included participation tactics, for which key stakeholders were included 
in the implementation process; persuasion tactics, for which implementation was 
delegated to an “expert;” and edict tactics, for which directives were issued with little 
or no consultation.  Not surprisingly, edict tactics had the highest failure rates and 
participation tactics had the highest success rates.  
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Based on his research of decision implementation, Nutt (1998) proposed the 
following guidance:
1. Demonstrate the need for and feasibility of making a change.
2. Use participation whenever possible to promote ownership for 
people affected by the decision.
3. Avoid using an edict until both participation and persuasion have 
been attempted or ruled out as infeasible.
4. Limit the use of persuasion.
5. Before using an edict check your balance of social credit.
6. Resist quick fixes that minimize the effort needed to carry out the 
implementation.
7. Consider the political and social factors that keep people from 
embracing ideas that are in the best interests of the organization.  
(pp. 224-225)
Because many of the cases he studied revealed high failure rates, Nutt (1998) 
offered the following tactics that might make or break decisions:
1. Ensure that a responsible leader manages the decision-making 
process.
2. Search for understanding.
3. Establish directions with intervention and an objective.  
Intervention establishes the rationale for action.
4. Stress idea creation and implementation.  A decision-making 
process guides thinking about action and taking action.  
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5. Identify more than one option.
6. Deal with barriers to action.  (pp. 226-227)
In short, Nutt (2001) argued that a manager could improve the chances of 
making better decisions by personally managing decision-making, searching for 
understanding, establishing the direction with an objective, and managing the social 
and political forces that can present challenges.  
From an organizational perspective, Nutt (2001) also offered some 
prescriptions for making better decisions.  For example, he advised against 
committing early to ready-made solutions.  Second, objectives should be set to 
overcome a "bias toward action and fear of being indecisive. . . .  Objectives liberate 
people to search widely for solutions and lower the chance for failure, and, therefore, 
criticism" (pp. 64-65).  Finally, intervention is necessary to ensure performance with 
the decision.  By broadening the search for solutions and avoiding becoming 
defensive, better decisions result.  
Papadakis and Barwise (1998a) drew several conclusions about strategic 
decision-making for executives under the following general groupings: rational 
planning versus incrementalism and intuition, politics, conflict, techniques for 
improving strategic debate, participation, and overall strategic decision-making 
tactics.  They said the literature characterizes strategic decision-making as both 
rational—in its ideal state, as well as “satisficers with bounded rationality” (pp. 268-
269).  Thus, some degree of rationality and intuition seems to be necessary in the 
strategic decision-making process.  In addition, although organizations seek to 
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establish strategy in a deliberate fashion, they must be prepared to deal with emergent 
strategies (Mintzberg, 1994).
Logical incrementalism 
Quinn (1980) explained that planning activities in organizations typically:
…become bureaucratized, rigid, and costly paper-shuffling exercises 
divorced from actual decision processes…the most important strategic 
decisions seem to be made outside of the formal planning 
structure…[and] much of the management literature and technique 
associated with planning has concentrated on developing more 
sophisticated models of a system that is not working the way the 
model builders think it is—or should be—operating.  (p. ix) 
Consequently, Quinn (1980) called for a different paradigm to describe the 
process of organizational strategy development and decision-making that synthesized 
“various behavioral, power-dynamic, and formal analytical approaches” (p. 16).  
Logical incrementalism recognizes that decisions should be made “as late as possible 
consistent with the information available and needed” (p. 22).  In his research, 
government and activist groups were cited as among the “most important forces 
causing significant changes in their [organizations] strategic postures” (p. 34).  
Strategic decisions, in his view, did not result primarily from “power-political 
interplays” (p. 51).  Rather, such decisions also accounted for “timing and sequencing 
imperatives necessary to create awareness, build comfort levels, develop consensus, 
and select and train people” (p. 51).  Quinn found it “virtually impossible” for one 
manager to coordinate all the elements that were necessary for strategic decisions.  
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However, Quinn also found that executives were able to deal with “subsystems” 
usually led by managers of their respective subsystem (p. 52).  In his view, the most 
effective strategies tended “to emerge step by step from an iterative process…[based 
on] a series of partial (incremental) commitments rather than through global 
formulations of total strategies” (p. 58).
According to Quinn (1980), logical incrementalism helps managers “build the 
seeds of understanding, identity, and commitment into the very processes that create 
their strategies” (p. 144).  Further, Quinn found that the following management 
processes are most important:
…sensing needs, amplifying understanding, building awareness, 
creating credibility, legitimizing viewpoints, generating partial 
solutions, broadening support, identifying zones of opposition and 
indifference, changing perceived risks, structuring needs flexibilities, 
putting forward trial concepts, creating pockets of commitment, 
eliminating undesired options, crystallizing focus and consensus, 
managing coalitions, and finally formalizing agreed-upon 
commitments.  (p. 146).    
For students and practitioners of public relations, many of these management 
processes noted by Quinn (1980) are immediately recognizable as important 
responsibilities of effective communication management in organizations.  In 
addition, many of these responsibilities also constitute much of the public relations’ 
world of work.  
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Before closing this discussion about organizational decision-making, it is 
important to note the work of Allison (1971).  Allison’s analysis of the Cuban missile 
crisis suggested that much could be gained from studying organizational decision-
making through different analytical frameworks.  Contrasting different analytical 
models, Allison concluded:
Such variance among interpretations demonstrates each model’s 
tendency to produce different answers to the same question.  …what is 
equally striking are the differences in the ways the analysts conceive 
of the problem, shape the puzzle, unpack the summary questions, and 
pick up pieces of the world in search of an answer.  (p. 249)
This observation simply underscores the importance of the organizational actors’ 
perspectives involved in processes.  Like other organizational actors, public relations 
brings a different perspective to organizational processes.  
What does the literature inform us about the nature of organizations, 
environments, power, stakeholders and strategic decision-making?  Organizations 
operate as systems and may be characterized as “a consciously coordinated social 
entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, that functions on a relatively 
continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals” (Robbins, 1990, p. 4).  
Systems theory, which is “basically concerned with problems of relationships, of 
structure, and of interdependence rather than with the constant attributes of objects,” 
suggests that organizations are open to influence by competitive forces in the 
environment (Katz & Kahn, 1967, p.18).  Organizations are effective to the degree 
they can address the various forces in the environment.  Organizational goals are 
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generally influenced by many actors who exert influence through the use of power—
often not through rational processes.  
Power has been traditionally defined as the force “sufficient to change the 
probability” of another’s behavior (Pfeffer, 1981, pp. 2-3).  Power can be 
concentrated or dispersed in organizations.  Dispersed power allows for the interplay 
of various organizational actors.  In addition, when power is more equally distributed, 
then “participants in the system have little ability or motivation to engage in a contest 
for control which provokes the visible conflict and political activity” (Pfeffer, 1981, 
p. 87). 
However, L. Grunig et al. (2002) suggested that, at least for public relations, 
the concept of empowerment was equally important and could be characterized as a 
collaborative process that benefits everyone in the organization.  This approach 
suggests that power is distributed more equitably under empowerment.    
Stakeholders are those people who are or may be affected by organizational 
decisions and have the potential to become or be made aware of organizational 
decisions and actions and emerge as publics (J. Grunig & Repper, 1992).  In turn, 
these publics can influence organizations.  
Decision-making by executives, though critical to the success of 
organizations, is arguably not done well.  Poor decision-making can be attributed to 
how decisions are framed, which voices are heard, and whether decisions are viewed 
as discrete or part of an on-going process.  Complicating decisions are issues of 
rationality, tradition, limited choice, and basic human tendencies to attend to some 
information while subconsciously avoiding other information in an effort to maintain 
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cognitive balance.  Notwithstanding these challenges, there appear to be some 
underlying principles that can serve to improve decision-making.  In addition, 
understanding the various phases of decision-making and the tactics and approaches 
available will help executives make better decisions.  Nutt (2001) argued that a 
manager could improve the chances of making better decisions by by personally 
managing decision-making, searching for understanding, establishing the direction 
with an objective, and managing the social and political forces that can present 
challenges.  
In order to understand how these concepts are fundamental to organizational 
success, it is important to be familiar with the process organizations use to compete in 
the environment and the environmental forces that seek to constrain that process.  
Thus, a review of strategic management and collective action is necessary.  
Strategic Management and Collective Action
Organizations succeed in their environments, depending on how successfully 
they strategically manage and compete for information and resources.  Miller and 
Starr (1967) suggested from a biological perspective: “Theories of evolution are 
applicable to organizations as well as species.  Organizations cease to thrive when 
they find themselves unable to adapt to environmental and competitive changes” (p. 
13).  They do so through a process known as strategic management.  
Following an extensive review of the literature, Bengfort (2000) defined 
strategic management as “the comprehensive, ongoing process of deciding and 
implementing the best course of action for meeting the organization’s objectives.  The 
process is based on the philosophy that an organization will maximize its 
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effectiveness by balancing the goals of the organization with influences from its 
strategic stakeholders and influences from its external environment” (pp. 30-31).  
Bengfort differentiated strategic planning as “a formalized subprocess of strategic 
management that follows a prescribed set of procedures within a given time period 
for researching and identifying alternatives for strategic choice” (p. 31).  This is an 
important distinction because strategic management is not the same as strategic 
planning.  Occasionally, theorists in the literature incorrectly use these terms 
interchangeably.  
Strategic management developed more than 25 years ago during the 1960s 
and 1970s in the midst of enormous economic growth in the United States.  However, 
based on an analysis by Knights and Morgan (1991), Bengfort (2000) convincingly 
argued that “the groundwork for the concept of strategy was laid in the U.S.” many 
years earlier within the “emerging business school culture of U.S. universities” (p. 
18).  
Tushman, O’Reilly, and Nadler (1989) said that Porter (1980) noted that 
strategic planning fell out of favor almost as rapidly as it came into favor because it 
did not contribute to strategic thinking.  As competitiveness problems continued 
through the 1970s for U. S. firms, strategic management grew in importance.  
Strategic management borrows heavily from “all functional disciplines including 
finance, marketing, accounting, economics, production, and human resource 
management” (Harrison & St. John, 1994, p. 5).  
Pearce and Robinson (1982) identified organizational levels that perform 
strategic management (pp. 6-7).  The corporate or organizational level sets the 
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direction and mission for the company (also called the macro level).  The business or 
specialty level deals with market segments (also called the meso level).  Finally, the 
functional level deals with the management of areas or specific functions.  J. Grunig 
(1996) noted that:
Bowman (1990) added a fourth, institutional, which involved ‘the 
issues of how a corporation fit itself into the social environment and 
the body politic.’  . . .  What Bowman called the institutional level 
obviously is the substance of public relations and a level at which 
theories of strategic management would benefit greatly from the work 
of public relations scholars and practitioners. (p. 17)  
J. Grunig (1996) argued that scholars of strategic management must pay more 
attention to the institutional level.  In an open-systems schema, each organizational 
level must maintain relationships with its external environment—and do so in 
harmony with other levels of the organization; otherwise, organizational decisions at 
best are sub-optimized.  At worst, they are catastrophic.  Lapinski (1992) observed 
that strategic management was most effective when practiced at all three levels.  He 
reasoned, 
(a) top management identifies the corporate mission and social 
responsibility at the highest or organizational level; (b) middle and 
upper management address groupings of stakeholder concerns at the 
flexible specialty level; and (c) all departmental managers gather basic 
information and design strategic programs at the functional level. (p. 
51)  
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Harrison and St. John (1994) argued that the strategic management process 
must pass through four phases to deal with increasing size, diversity, and 
environmental complexity: 
1. Basic financial planning (internal orientation)
2. Forecast-based planning (external trends)
3. Externally-oriented planning (developing strategies in response to 
markets)
4. Strategic management (management of resources to sustain the 
competitive advantage and create the future)
J. Grunig and L. Grunig (2000) suggested: “The value of public relations to 
strategic management becomes even clearer if we also look at strategic management 
as the arena in which important organizational problems are identified and decisions
are made how to address those problems” (p. 310).  But, how do executives make 
these decisions?  
J. Grunig and L. Grunig (2000) noted: “In the decision-making arena, the 
primary actors do not make rational decisions in the way classical economists 
envisaged” (p. 310).  They argued that the various disciplines in the process “asserted 
their disciplinary identities” (p. 311).
Tushman et al. (1989) indicated that Porter (1980) noted a number of 
problems within the field of strategic management.  Early strategic management was 
ineffective because strategy was separated from implementation and it was too 
infrequent.  Rather than be primarily the job of corporate staff, Porter believed that 
strategic management should become part of the company culture.  Gray (1986) noted 
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that most strategic management functions were not integrated with other control 
functions, therefore minimizing their value to the planning process.  CEOs were 
reluctant to rely on their strategic managers because the managers lacked the 
information necessary to perform the job.  Others such as Halal (2001) have 
concluded that management "is really not a very rational affair… I've come to see that 
organizational change is rarely the result of logic, planning, or even self-interest; it is 
usually driven by crisis, social convention, external pressures, and other 
uncontrollable forces, including sheer accidents" (p. 11).  J. Grunig and L. Grunig 
(1997) recognized a fundamental shift in the scholarly literature of strategic 
management that “originally conceptualized the environment as a constraint on an 
organization’s mission and choices [when] Porter turned the relationship around and 
conceptualized the environment as a source of competitive advantage” (p. 4).  In 
addition, the field was originally conceived without public relations as part of the 
process—further limiting its ability to meet expectations.  But are many of the forces 
Halal (2001) noted really beyond the organization’s ability to address?  
Although I do not discount the important contributions of these disciplines to 
strategic management, I submit that a critical discipline was missing from the original 
mix of disciplines that, to date, has prevented strategic management from maximizing 
its value to organizations.  Arguably, the field of public relations had not matured 
enough to contribute significantly in the early development of strategic management; 
however, I believe this is no longer the situation.  Although I acknowledge the 
significance of these disciplines to strategic management, my purpose is to define the 
relevance and importance of communication management to strategic management 
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through exploring how decisions are made by executives and understanding what role 
group behavior and relationships play in that process.  In doing so, I am confining my 
research of these concepts to the very top of the organization—what J. Grunig (1996) 
defined as the macro level.  
Role of Strategy
In defining strategic management, Chandler (1962) observed, “Strategy can be 
defined as the determination of the basic long term goals and objectives of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources 
necessary for carrying out these goals” (p. 13).  Put more simply, Gary (2001) noted 
that Eisenhardt (2001) suggested that “strategy answers two questions: Where do you 
want to go? and, How do you want to get there?” (p. 8).  Robbins (1990) suggested
that while goals refer to ends, “strategy refers to both means and ends” (p. 121).  
According to Collins and Montgomery (1995), the field of strategy was 
shaped around a framework first conceived by Andrews (1971).  Andrews defined 
strategy as the match between what a company can do, as in strengths and 
weaknesses, and what the environment would allow it to do, as in opportunities and 
threats.  J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1997) noted that “scholars of strategic management 
originally conceptualized the environment as a constraint on an organization’s 
missions and choices” (p. 4).  Few insights were available to organizational managers 
until Porter published Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors in 1980.  Porter argued that choosing the right industry and the most 
competitive position was paramount.  Internally focused, Porter concentrated on the 
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concepts of core competencies and competing capabilities and the manager’s ability 
to “marshal” them (Philbin, 1996).  
Knights and Morgan (1991) traced the development of “strategy discourse” as 
it was used in the military during the early twentieth century and identified the then-
apparent futility of trying to control economic forces that were guided by the “hidden 
hand” of the market (p. 270).  They also identified the “unintended effects of strategy 
wherein it helps to secure the power and the management of identity for managerial 
(and other) subjects and facilitates the development of a corporate image and 
rationalizations of success and failure for organizations” (p. 270).  And finally, 
Knights and Morgan noted that the “discourses and practices surrounding strategy 
have to be seen as social constructs which have the effect of constituting managerial 
and labour subjectivities that enhance the productive power of organizations through 
subjectively ‘locking’ individuals and groups into their tasks and commitments” (p. 
270).  In their view, treating strategy as a means to an end provides potential for a 
more critical study of organizations.
According to Andrews (1980), corporate strategy reflects the decision pattern 
that reveals goals, principal policies, plans, and contributions to shareholders, 
customers, and communities.  Mintzberg (1994) held that few people could claim to 
“perfectly” realize their strategies, “for, after all, perfect realization implies brilliant 
foresight, not to mention inflexibility, while no realization implies mindlessness.  The 
real world inevitably involves some thinking ahead of time as well as some 
adaptation en route” (p. 24).  Mintzberg classified these two approaches as intended, 
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or deliberate, strategy, and emergent strategy.  Intended, or deliberate, strategies are 
either realized or not, with the hope being that the former occurs.  
In contrast, Mintzberg argued that the literature did not acknowledge another 
option—one he called emergent strategy—“where a realized pattern was not 
expressly intended” (p. 25).  The important point Mintzberg sought to establish with 
emergent strategy was that “big strategies can grow from little ideas (initiatives), and 
in strange places, not to mention at unexpected times, almost anyone in the 
organization can prove to be a strategist” (p. 26).  To this I would add, depending on 
how the organization deals with external forces in the environment, anyone outside 
the organization can be a strategist as well.  
Mintzberg also said “to some people, notably Porter (1980, 1985) and his 
followers, strategy is position, namely the determination of particular products in 
particular markets.  To others, however, strategy is perspective, namely an 
organization’s way of doing things, in Peter Drucker’s phrase, its concept of 
business” (p. 27).  Because public relations acts as an organizational boundary 
spanner, the profession must bridge both perspectives.  Public relations must not only 
be concerned with what an organization is doing, but with how it goes about doing it.  
Often times, public relations is rightfully more concerned with strategy as 
perspective—“how” an organization goes about accomplishing its goals.  Regardless 
of one’s position on this issue, and because corporate strategy is fundamental to 
organizational success, it is imperative to participate in that process.    
According to Kaplan and Beinhocker (2003), the real value of strategic 
planning is not to develop strategic plans, rather it is to “create ‘prepared minds’ 
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within their management teams” (p. 71).  Because real strategy is “made in real time,” 
the objective of strategic planning is to ensure that decision-makers understand the 
business, share common facts, and, most importantly, “agree on important 
assumptions” (p. 72).  Kaplan and Beinhocker’s research revealed that more than a 
third of an executive’s time is invested in strategy.  Therefore, this time should be 
spent wisely.  
J. Grunig (1992) defined strategy as “an approach, design, scheme, or system” 
(p. 123).  J. Grunig also noted that the literature on strategic management makes clear 
that the concepts of environment and mission are key elements.  Therefore, in order 
for organizations to deal effectively with these elements, appropriate structures and 
processes are necessary.  The disciplines mentioned earlier, such as finance and 
marketing, do not individually possess the ability to manage an organization 
strategically.  However, in total, each discipline brings unique and relevant 
capabilities to the strategic management process that helps the organization succeed.    
One of Bengfort’s (2000) most significant contributions to improving the 
practice of public relations stems from his observations of “six principles underlying 
most of the emerging thought on strategic management” (p. 41).  These include: 
1.  An increasingly volatile environment is intensifying the need for 
some concept of strategic decision-making.
2.  Strategy-making is less formalized and positivistic, and more 
cognizant of political ambiguities, competing interests, and unexpected 
developments.
71
3.  The strategy-making process must be broadened to include new 
voices and perspectives.  Senior management, however, still makes 
final decisions about strategy.
4.  Strategic thinking should challenge assumptions and shake up the 
thinking of companies and organizations.
5.  The strategy-making process is more than determining goals and 
setting direction; the process itself plays an important role in 
organizational communication and determining the extent of power 
held by an organization’s constituencies.
6.  Globalization and technology will require greater interdependence 
among companies for them to be successful.  Companies must redefine 
their relationships, even with competitors, and enhance their ability to 
cooperate and develop alliances.  (pp. 41-58)
Bengfort (2000) observed that, traditionally, “strategic management was more 
about numbers than relationships… [but today] strategic management has evolved to 
be more about relationships” (p. 136).  He observed that public relations departments 
are only “peripherally involved in the strategic management process, but the potential 
exists for them to play a more integral role” (p. 136).  Prior to Bengfort’s findings, 
Vercic and J. Grunig (1995) perceived a greater role for public relations in the 
strategic management process as one able to “gain competitive advantage from 
successful relationships … with other stakeholder publics” (L. Grunig & J. Grunig, 
1997, p. 5).  
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As the field of public relations continues to mature theoretically, I believe the 
construct of relationships will grow increasingly important.  One of the ways for 
public relations departments to play a more integral role in the strategic management 
process is to understand the importance of group behavior as exhibited by the 
organization’s stakeholders and how it is accounted for in the decision-making 
process.  
In summary, I believe organizations may be thought of as open systems 
composed of social actors that compete for control within boundaries that 
differentiate processes and activities from the environment.  Actors compete for 
control by exercising power both inside as well as outside the organization.  
Internally, the dominant coalition operates as the group that directs organizational 
decisions and behavior through a process known as strategic management.  Although 
strategic management can and should be practiced at all levels of organizations, I am 
primarily concerned with strategic management as it is practiced at the most senior 
levels of organizations.  External forces such as stakeholders and publics can enable 
or constrain organizational actions.  Organizations are successful in their 
environments to the degree that they are able to adjust to those forces that seek to 
constrain behavior.  Because not all disciplines such as public relations were 
conceived initially as part of strategic management theory, I believe that it was 
fundamentally incomplete.  
To understand how groups enable or constrain organizations, it is necessary to 
review how and why groups emerge in environments.  This requires knowledge of 
theories of collective action and the social psychology of groups. 
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Collective Action
The following reviews the literature of collective action.  In particular, it asks 
what are the major theories of collective action, how and why groups form, and how 
collective action affects organizations.  It is important to understand the social 
psychology of groups, their norms, and group behavior if organizations are to account 
for them in their effort to compete successfully in today’s environment.   
Sandler (1992) observed: “Collective action arises when the efforts of two or
more individuals are needed to accomplish an outcome” (p. 1).  Theories of collective 
behavior can be traced historically to several major perspectives (McAdam, 
McCarthy & Zald, 1988).  The collective behavior approach, rooted in the Chicago 
School of Sociology, places a heavy emphasis on the emergent nature of collective 
phenomena in response to strain. The mass society approach arose from assumptions 
associated with the “cold war” period and existence of totalitarian and authoritarian 
regimes when the focus was on the “atomized individual.”  The relative deprivation
approach ascribes social movements to disadvantageous inequities between groups.  
The institutional school focuses on social movement organizations, when collective 
action is viewed as a response to external environmental factors that shift over time.  
McAdam et al. (1988) noted that these “major perspectives shared two 
important emphases: They tended to stress micro-level over macro-level processes 
and to focus most of their attention on the question of movement emergence” (p. 
696).  For example, in examining what motivates an individual to become involved, 
McAdam et al. argued that there were cognitive dimensions, affective dimensions, 
and rational dimensions.  Psychological states can serve to motivate participation as 
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theorized by Rokeach (1969) and Festinger (1957, 1964).  Similar theories of 
attitudes such as Heider (1946) “locate the roots of participation squarely within the 
individual actor… activism grows out of strong attitudinal support for the values and 
goals of the movement” (McAdam, et al., p. 706).  Finally, many theorists in social 
movements argue that individuals determine the costs and benefits of action within 
the bounds of “limited rationality” (p. 707).  The problem that results from this 
approach is the over-reliance on the individual as the basic unit of analysis and a 
“preoccupation with the emergent phase of collective action” (pp. 696-697).  
Hardin (1982) concluded that the literature of collective action primarily 
addressed groups interested in the “provision of goods.”  However, Hardin also 
observed that there are many collective actions that “have as their best outcomes the 
elimination of harm rather than the provision of good or goods.”  This is an important 
point for public relations because, public relations frequently has as its primary 
objective the reduction of harm.  For example, campaigns designed to reduce drug 
use or prevent the spread of Aids are aimed at mitigating harm and reducing risk.  In 
addition, a group’s success is often measured in terms of whether the “good or bad” 
that is created arises internally or externally—“that is, by the members of the group 
themselves or by an outside party” (p. 50).   
At the other end of the spectrum are studies of collective behavior that also 
present theoretical problems.  McAdam et al. (1988) observed that macro theories of 
collective behavior focus on political or economic conditions and have a “kind of 
reactive quality to them” (p. 702).  There is an assumption that deprived individuals 
would be most likely to join movements; therefore, as the standard of living was 
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raised for society at the macro level, there would be a decline in the economic motive 
for “social movement activity” (p. 702).  Neither of these observations appears to be 
supported by the research.  In fact, “wealthy societies tend to produce the general 
conditions that favor the emergence of newly organized collectivities… indirectly 
expanding wealth has led to expanding social movement” (p. 702).  (See Bonabeau, 
2002, for a discussion of the significance of emergent phenomena.)
Hardin (1982) suggested that the study of collective action in a social context 
was the result of two major analytical traditions—the theory of public goods and 
game theory—and was essentially the “Prisoner’s Dilemma writ large” (pp. xiii-16).  
Public goods are defined by “jointness of supply” and “impossibility of exclusion.”  
A public good in joint supply is not diminished by its use by others.  For instance, an 
idea represents a public good where “consumption” is the same for every person.  In 
addition, “if a good is characterized by the impossibility of exclusion, it is impossible 
to prevent relevant people from using it” (p. 17).  Sanders (1992) suggested that 
pollution removal is a “nonexcludable,” or public, good and defined it as “benefits of 
a good, available to all once the good is provided… If the benefits of a good can be 
withheld costlessly by the owner or provider, then benefits are excludable” (p. 5).  In 
addition, Sanders also defined “the nonrivaly of benefits” as the second essential 
concept necessary to define goods (p. 6).  In contrast, a private good is characterized 
such that total consumption is the sum of individual consumptions (Hardin, 1982, p. 
18).  Sanders (1992) defined a private good as one that “possesses benefits that are 
fully excludable and rival between prospective users.  Food, clothing, and paper are 
apt examples” (p. 6).  Sanders also identified a category of good that “does not 
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display both excludability (nonexcludability) and rivalry (nonrivaly) in their pure 
forms,” which he called “impurely public” (pp. 6-7).  In essence, impurely public 
goods are those available to all under low use but become partially rival at high levels 
of use because of “overcrowding” (p. 7).  
Hardin (1982) argued that the “greatest strength of game theory is that it 
makes the strategic aspects of social interactions explicit, even emphatic” (p. 23).  For 
public relations, this recognizes the importance of developing relationships with 
important groups—a primary responsibility of public relations.  In the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma where there are two players, cooperation results in positive payoffs; 
defections result in negative payoffs; and, where there is both cooperation and 
defection, the player who cooperates receives a worse negative payoff while the 
defector receives a greater positive payoff.  According to Hardin:
The appeal of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as with the logic of collective 
action, has been its generality and apparent power in representing 
manifold social interactions.  Indeed, the problem of collective action 
and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are essentially the same… (p. 24)  
McAdam et al. (1988) underscored macro conditions for successful collective 
action.  As geographic concentration increases, so does the potential for interaction 
and the ability to recruit.  In addition, the “level of prior organization in a given 
population” also contributes to a predisposition for collective action.  Isolated social 
segments that are not well linked to other parts of society have fewer challenges to 
loyalties by the group members and the group poses little political or economic threat 
to the larger population (pp. 703-704).  Prior activism increases the likelihood of 
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future activism for three primary reasons: first, people are experienced and possess 
the “know-how;” second, people assume “new social roles;” and three, there are 
“sunk social costs that have been expended in any long-standing line of action” (pp. 
708-709).  Hardin (1982) suggested that previously organized groups:
…can occasionally cooperate to promote their interests.  However, 
over the long term, the essential difference between the actions of 
traditional, organized groups (whose political activity Olson 
characterized as a by-product) is that the narrowly defined, 
spontaneous groups commonly require some coordinating event to 
stimulate group-oriented behavior. 
(p. 31)  
McAdam et al. (1988) also noted, “companion to the macro question of 
movement emergence is the micro question of individual recruitment to activism” (p. 
704).  Thus, the challenge of micro-macro issues becomes apparent.  On the one 
hand, no social movement will occur without individuals to participate; on the other 
hand, “a lot of what prompts an individual to get involved is the sense of momentum 
that an already existing movement is able to communicate” (p. 704).  
According to Olson (1971), there is an assumption that individuals with 
common interests seek to further their own interests by forming groups—especially 
where economic objectives are concerned.  However, Olson said that this assumption 
is not supported by the research.  Although he acknowledged that one purpose of 
groups is to further the interests of their members, there are a number of forces that 
facilitate the formation of groups.  No forces emerge to motivate individuals to join 
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groups where the individuals can serve self-interests with the desired results.  
Members belonging to groups have both common interests as well as individual 
interests.  In a competitive economic market, Olson recognized that “while all firms 
have a common interest in a higher price, they have antagonistic interests where 
output is concerned” (p. 9).  In short, there comes a point where firms are willing to 
produce a product or deliver a service and charge a certain price to maximize profit; 
however, further product production or service delivery or price increases actually 
sub-optimize profits.  Olson also acknowledged that there are more than economic 
forces at work in organizations—emotion or ideology, for example—that drive 
purpose.  He cited patriotism as “the strongest noneconomic motive for organizational 
allegiance in modern times” (pp. 12-13).  At the individual level, there is a parallel 
logic in that the marginal cost of belonging to a group may exceed the benefit offered 
by membership.  
Olson (1971) also sought to understand the relationship between group size 
and its effectiveness.  He observed that the “difficulty in analyzing the relationship 
between group size and the behavior of the individual in the group is due partly to the 
fact that each individual in a group may place a different value upon the collective 
good wanted by his group” (p. 22).  Several of his findings are relevant.  First, there is 
a “systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by the small” (p. 29).  Second, in 
order for the collective good to be optimized, the marginal costs to each additional 
member must be shared in the same proportion as the benefits (pp. 30-31).  Finally, 
and most important, “the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an 
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optimal amount of a collective good” (p. 35).  Kerr (2001) also considered factors 
relevant to creating and sustaining collective action and noted:
We have learned, for example, that group members are likely to reduce 
their efforts when (a) their individual contributions cannot be 
identified and evaluated as easily in the group context as when they 
work individually, (b) individual group members see their efforts as
indispensable for group success, or (c) a group member believes that 
working hard would result in “playing the sucker,” that is, doing more 
than his or her fair share of the group’s work. (p. 352)
It is important to note that Olson’s (1971) logic of collective action was not 
without criticism.  For example, Hardin (1982) argued that it was based on “a strictly 
static analysis of the costs and benefits of any collective action uncoupled from other 
exchange relationships” (p. 229).  Thus, the cases are based on discreteness.  
Dynamic and continuous activities in relationships involving collective action are 
much more difficult to assess.  
Sanders (1992) observed that Olson’s (1971) propositions regarding collective 
action “rest on a single basic premise: individual rationality is not sufficient for 
collective rationality” (p. 3).  Part of the challenge with logically inferring collective 
rationality results from individual rationality results in an implication of 
“predictability and efficient outcomes.”  In fact, Sanders pointed to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma as the “often-cited example of collective failure” (p. 4).  
Theories of collective action tend to focus on micro-level issues and the 
emergence of movement.  There are certain conditions that enhance the likelihood of 
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collective movement in populations, such as geographic concentration and historical 
experience with activism.  There are multiple and, at times, competing motives for 
collective action by individuals where cost may exceed the benefit of membership.  
Finally, there appears to be an inverse relationship between group size and optimizing 
the collective good—to a point.  Larger groups tend to sub-optimize benefits more 
than smaller ones.  
Social Psychology of Groups
Once a member joins in collective action, what factors affect the behavior of 
that individual?  Knowledge of how relationships form between individuals is 
necessary to understand social behavior between groups.  Thibaut and Kelley (1986) 
noted that the “proper starting point for an understanding of social behavior is the 
analysis of dyadic interdependence.” (p. v).  Such interdependence results in 
transactions that affect the “outcomes of interaction—the rewards that accrue and the 
costs incurred” (p. v.).  Thibaut and Kelley also observed that an individual’s 
dependence on the relationship amounted to the other individual’s power in the 
relationship.  Relationship formation depends on the range of “possible outcomes of 
interaction; the process of exploring or sampling the possibilities; and, ultimately, 
whether or not the jointly experienced outcomes are above each member’s 
comparison level of alternatives” (p. 23).  
In examining the formation of dyadic relationships, Thibaut and Kelley (1986) 
noted that irreversible outcomes perceived to be good by the members would enhance 
the formation of the relationship.  However, relationships perceived to be “highly 
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reversible” depend on each member’s perception of “having at least partial control 
over revocation” (p. 67).  
In seeking to better understand what factors affect individual behavior, 
Thibaut and Kelley (1986) argued that several factors were especially relevant in the 
early stages of interaction.  The first included strangeness—or the degree of social 
familiarity with an individual.  For example, initial meetings of strangers “are often 
characterized by formality and constraint, thus biasing the sampled outcomes” (p. 68-
78).  The second—accessibility—permitted members to “enter tentatively 
relationships that are potentially unstable, while at the same time furnishing low-cost 
transition to improved sampling of outcomes in relationships promising stability” (p. 
78).  The third—autistic hostility [or friendliness]—describes the inclination for an 
individual to reduce [or increase] “communication with the person [with] whom he is 
hostile [or friendly]” (p. 78).  These factors tend to bias the sample of outcomes by 
individuals resulting in the premature rejection or acceptance of a relationship.  These 
factors also serve to reduce the uncertainty in subsequent interactions through the 
evolution of norms.  
Additional factors influence the perception of behavior by members 
approaching relationships.  These include, but are not limited to, first impressions, the 
primacy effect, and the halo effect.  Briefly, first impressions tend to bias evaluations 
either in favor of or against the initial assessment by an individual (Asch, 1946).  The 
primacy effect causes individuals to rely on the most recent information in judging 
others (Luchins, 1957).  Finally, the halo effect  describes the “tendency for one’s 
general attitude toward a person to influence more specific evaluations of him” (p. 
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76).  (See Heider [1946, 1958] for a more complete discussion of this phenomenon.)  
These factors also serve to reduce uncertainty in subsequent interactions.  
Thibaut and Kelley (1986) defined relationships as nonvoluntary when the 
outcomes by one group were considered “relatively poor” or the group was excluded 
from alternative relationships where the outcomes were considered “relatively good.”  
As power is increased by one group in a nonvoluntary relationship, alternatives are 
reduced for the other group (p. 186). 
Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) sought to understand why individuals 
become motivated to join groups and suggested that membership: 
….can involve any one or combination of the following three factors: 
1. Positive attractions within the group based on friendship for the 
other members and the desirability of the status and activities which 
membership makes possible… 2. Outside threats or deprivations 
which are avoided by maintaining membership in the group… 3. 
Restraints which act to keep the person within the group without 
regard to his desires… Thus, the more strongly the person is motivated 
to maintain membership in a group, the greater will be his behavioral 
conformity to its norms, and, at least under some circumstances, the 
more conforming will be his opinions.  (pp. 137-138)   
How might these factors be useful in looking at interchange between 
organizations and groups?  In examining the nature of organization-public 
relationships, Broom, Casey, and Ritchey (2000) suggested that although the 
explication of organization-public relationship “is not complete,” they provided some 
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tentative conclusions based on their research (p. 17).  Relationships can be studied as 
“phenomena distinct from the perceptions held by parties in the relationships” (p. 17).  
Formation of relationships follows perceptions and expectations of at least two parties 
generated by resource dependencies or other necessities.  Relationships can be 
described “at a given point in time” (p. 17).  They can lead to enhanced or loss of 
autonomy, “goal achievement, and structure interdependence in the form of routine 
and institutionalized behavior” (p. 17).  Relationships can be measured by unique 
properties separate from the participants.  Maintaining relationships consists of a 
“process of mutual adaptation and contingent responses” (p. 18).  And, the “absence 
of a fully explicated conceptual definition of organization-public relationships limits 
theory building in public relations” (p. 18).  
Broom et al. (2000) summarized the definition of an organization-public 
relationship:
Organization-public relationships are represented by the patterns of
interaction, transaction, exchange, and linkage between an 
organization and its publics.  These relationships have properties that 
are distinct from the identities, attributes, and perceptions of the 
individuals and social collectives in the relationships.  Though 
dynamic in nature, organization-public relationships can be described 
at a single point in time and tracked over time.  (p. 18)
Thus, transactions between members possess both rewards and costs.  And, a 
member’s dependence on a relationship can be operationalized as the other’s power.  
Irreversible outcomes perceived to be good enhance relationship formation; however, 
84
relationships perceived to be “highly reversible” rely on the perception of the 
members’ ability to revoke their participation.  
Several factors that may be characterized as strangeness, accessibility, and 
autistic hostility or friendliness guide behavior during transactions especially in the 
early stages of relationships.  Additional factors such as first impressions, the primacy 
effect, and the halo effect serve to reduce uncertainty in transactions and guide 
subsequent behavior during interactions until members acquire enough of a sample to 
make better judgments about the other member and norms evolve.  
Norms and Behavior
How are the preceding constructs important to complex relationships where 
there are more than two members involved and significantly more uncertainty?  
Following an interaction between two or more members, behavioral rules evolve 
among the participants in the interaction that come to be accepted as “norms” in order 
to introduce “a certain amount of regularity or predictability” into interactions.  
According to Thibaut and Kelley (1986):
Norms are viewed as being functionally valuable to social 
relationships by reducing the necessity for the exercise of direct, 
informal, personal influence.  Norms provide a means of controlling 
behavior without entailing the costs, uncertainties, resistances, 
conflicts, and power losses involved in the unrestrained ad hoc use of 
interpersonal power. . . . norms deal with such problems as trading, 
synchronization, eliminating unsatisfactory behaviors, reducing 
differences of opinion, and communicating effectively. . . . norms 
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provide some sort of satisfactions to the members who adopt them and 
adhere to them.  (pp. 147-148)
Cialdini and Trost (1998) noted that norms are important constructs because 
they help describe and explain human behavior.  There are a number of ways that 
norms have been conceptualized.  For example, cultural norms have been used to 
explain behaviors that are contrary to a “Western perspective” (p. 151).  Other norms 
develop out of necessity to meet basic needs for group survival.  Cialdini and Trost’s 
research is concerned with social norms: “Social norms are rules and standards that 
are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social 
behavior without the force of laws.  These norms emerge out of interaction with 
others…” and can be based on “the expectations of valued others,” personal 
expectations, or “standards that develop out of our observations of others’ behavior” 
(p. 152).  
Cialdini and Trost (1998) observed that social norms primarily emerge within 
social systems from two major perspectives—societal-value and functional.  One 
body of research suggests that norms “are arbitrary rules for behavior that are adopted 
because they are valued or reinforced by the culture.”  The other approach suggests 
that “normative behavior is functional and aids in accomplishing the goals of the 
group” (p. 152).  
The societal-value perspective, influenced by anthropological traditions, 
suggests that norms are neither inherently good nor valuable; rather their power is 
generated by cultural reinforcement.  
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The behaviors then become the preferred responses to particular 
situations because of their reward power.  The strength of these preferences 
will depend on the extent to which (1) there are communication opportunities 
between people in the social group that allow them to pass the norm to others, 
(2) the group is a cohesive unit and values uniform behavior, and (3) the norm 
is important for the group. (Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p. 152)
The functional perspective is grounded in the idea that norms evolve to 
promote survival.  Cialdini and Trost (1998) argued: “The content of norms is neither 
arbitrary nor trivial, since the ability to develop and communicate norms is 
evolutionarily adaptive and aids in our survival as a species” (p. 153).  Norms help 
govern social behavior in various situations that range from complete uncertainty to 
complete certainty.  For example, descriptive norms help guide behavior and 
decision-making: “Descriptive norms are derived from what other people do in any 
given situation… We are most likely to use the evidence of others’ behavior to decide 
the most effective course of action when the situation is novel, ambiguous, or 
uncertain” (p. 155).  Injunctive norms refer to those behaviors that “are accompanied 
by social acceptance or approval by others... They specify what ‘should’ be done and 
therefore the moral rules of the group” (p. 157).  Anti-littering has been identified by 
some researchers as an injunctive norm of social responsibility (see Stern, Dietz, & 
Kalof, 1993).  The basic idea of this particular norm as Cialdini and Trost (1998) 
noted is “an expectation that people should help those who need help without 
expecting or requesting payment” (p. 158).  According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), 
a subjective norm is “the person’s perception that most people who are important to 
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him think he should or should not perform the behavior in question” (p. 302).  
However, Ajzen and Fishbein (1970) observed a phenomenon during an experiment 
involving the prisoner’s dilemma game that suggested subjective norms were more 
important under conditions of cooperation than under competitive circumstances.  
Norms not only help guide behavior, they also serve useful purposes during 
decisions.  Clark and Mills (1979, 1993) found that norms help during resource 
allocation processes.  Two norms suggest that we deal with close friends and 
strangers quite differently.  The distributive justice norm influences resource 
allocation issues in long-term relationships in a communal way; distributive justice 
norms in short-term relationships suggest that allocations are made in a more 
exchange-like fashion.  Cialdini and Trost (1998) noted the “two types of 
relationships can be distinguished by the level of felt obligation for helping and 
repayment” (pp. 159-160).  Communal relationships result in a higher degree of “felt 
obligation;” in contrast, members in exchange relationships feel less compelled to 
return favors or follow through on commitments.  
What happens when norms conflict or compete?  Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 
(1990) and Cialdini, Kallgren, and Ren (1991) hypothesized that a norm would not 
direct behavior without being made “salient” to the circumstance.  According to 
Cialdini and Trost (1998): 
This series of studies indicates that, at any given time, an individual’s 
behavior is likely to flow with the norm that is currently focal, even 
when other types of norms might be relevant and even contrary in the 
situation… it appears that the key to predicting a person’s normative 
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behavior is to determine that person’s focus of attention within an 
interconnected and multilevel matrix of norms.” (pp. 161-162)  
Regardless of the origin of norms, unless they are shared with others and 
transmitted through generations, they cease to exist: “Norms must be communicated 
to have any effect on behavior” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p. 154).  This reference to 
the critical role of communication is fundamental to public relations.  Public relations 
can serve an instrumental role in this process.  Sherif (1936) demonstrated that 
interaction with others helps people determine reality.  This co-construction of reality 
grows out of the interactions and relationships that are established between people 
and groups.  In fact, internalization of these norms can displace “individual senses” 
and contribute to perpetuating norms among people and groups—even in the face of 
contrary positions (p. 154) (See also Festinger, 1957, 1964).
This is not to suggest that social influences wholly govern behavior.  Kashima 
and Lewis (2000), in seeking to understand where behavior comes from in attitude-
behavior relations, noted that two major approaches dominated the field.  These 
included a theory of “reasoned action and the other seeking to delineate conditions 
under which attitudes guide behavior” (pp. 116-117).  For the theory of reasoned 
action, the fundamental argument is that “intention is the central determinant” of 
behavior (p. 116).  Thus, a person’s attitude toward performing a particular behavior 
influences that behavior.  The second major approach seeks to find the intervening 
variable(s) that “moderate attitude-behavior relations.”  In this approach, “attitude 
accessibility” acts as moderating variable” between the attitude and the behavior (p. 
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116).  Kashima and Lewis said that the norm concept could “shed some light on the 
process of behavior generation” (p. 124):  
Once a norm is activated, it should then activate a cognitive 
representation of the behavior with which the norm is concerned.  In 
the process of behavior generation, then, the activation of a societal 
norm may act as a mediating process just like the activation of an 
attitude can…  recent work in social psychology shows that societal 
norms sometimes predict behaviors.  (pp. 124-125)
Hardin (1982) also acknowledged the importance of factors that result in the 
level of commitment by members to a group.  Often, a member’s commitment to a 
group or organization is independent of the goal or value of the group and may 
include such variables as social issues or “shared experiences” (p. 32).  Therefore, it 
is important to recognize that incentives to participate in collective actions may differ 
substantially among the members.  Organizationally, norms tend to cluster and 
provide for specialization of functions within groups, which may be defined as roles.  
Thus norms, which may be appropriate or applicable to the behavior of several 
members of a group, may not be applicable to others depending on the roles that are 
served.  And, norms become more important as groups increase in size because new 
options emerge by which rewards can be raised in relation to costs:    
The group’s potential for effective norm sending is increased as good 
communication within the group permits more accurate transmission 
of the norm. . . . The member’s motivation to perform the normative 
behavior will be greatly affected by his dependence on the group: to 
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the degree that the group can give him what he most wants (status, 
acceptance), he will be likely to conform.” (pp. 254-255) 
Norms depend largely on consensus among the group’s members.  In this 
regard, norms can be likened to goals.  However, Thibaut and Kelley (1986) noted 
that group goals require members to believe that their “outcomes will be improved” 
by acceptance of the group goal.  In addition, the group’s social setting can inhibit or 
stimulate the processes by which norms, goals and decisions are established:  
In reaching decisions, a group may discourage the person from 
mentioning an unusual idea, or quickly override him when he does 
suggest it, or it may insure that every suggestion is heard and 
considered.  In brief, the social setting may be constrictive and 
inhibiting, or it may be provocative and supportive.  (p. 271)  
Rogers and Skinner (1971) suggested that science increases our ability to 
control human behavior and that people are “almost always” engaged in efforts to 
control.  One way control is exerted is through the use of and enforcement of norms:  
People living together in groups come to control one another with a 
technique which is not inappropriately called “ethical.”  When an 
individual behaves in a fashion acceptable to the group, he receives 
admiration, approval, affection, and many other reinforcements which 
increase the likelihood that he will continue to behave in that fashion.  
When his behavior is unacceptable, he is criticized, censured, blamed, 
or otherwise punished.  In the first case the group calls him “good”; in 
the second, “bad”…  People behave in ways which as we say, conform 
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to ethical, governmental, or religious patterns because they are 
reinforced for doing so.  (pp. 614-636)
There are also some important within-group dynamics that must be 
considered—especially where decision-making is concerned.  For example, Kaplan 
and Wilke (2001) pointed out that “members of problem-solving groups are involved 
in a delicate interplay of two motivations: the motivation to produce an optimal group 
product (i.e., to be correct) and the motivation to act in unison with the other group 
members (i.e., to go along)” (p. 423).  Cognitively, members of the group seek to 
reach the “best” decision; however, socially, members recognize that decisions must 
be generally acceptable to most of the group.  Kaplan and Wilke concluded that 
antecedent conditions may influence information and normative processes in groups.  
For example, the extent of group interaction and group goals may enhance or inhibit 
group dynamics.  Members who identify with the majority are likely to process 
information more broadly and go along with whatever decision appears to be the 
consensus of the group.  On the other hand, members who identify with minority 
positions are likely to process information more deeply and, therefore, may have a 
better understanding of the issue and promote “more creative ideas” (pp. 423-424).    
Based on the literature, there are several inferences regarding social norms 
and group behavior that may be drawn.  Norms appear to have their greatest power 
and influence during “conditions of uncertainty, when the source is similar to us, or 
when we are particularly concerned about establishing or maintaining a relationship 
with the source” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p. 162).  In addition, the most salient norm 
is likely to have the greatest influence.  How others behave in a group that we desire 
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to associate with will also influence individual behavior.  Norms play a central role in 
group behavior and, as discussed, offer insight into how groups will act under various 
conditions of uncertainty and salience.  Finally, there are processes within groups that 
affect how information is processed by members in majority and minority statuses.  
Understanding group norms and how they influence coalitions and activism can help 
organizations assess the potential for collective action and consider how these 
constructs might be better introduced into decision-making.  
Coalitions and Activism
In reviewing the literature on coalitions, Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter (1985) 
observed that the “though the term has appeared rather often in recent articles and 
books, the literature reveals no systematic approach to how the term is used or should 
be used or how the concept can be empirically studied in organizations” (p. 256).  
Stevenson et al. noted that coalitions came to be used in the mid 1980s as a way to 
explain how individuals sought to influence organizations through collective action.  
Unlike early organizational theorists who assumed organizational goals were 
uniformly established and supported, Stevenson et al. credited organizational theorists 
such as Cyert and March (1963) with being among the first to focus on coalitions.  
Coalitions were viewed as having the ability to influence organizational 
decisions and goal setting making traditional management processes less stable 
(Stevenson et al. 1985, p. 257).  Internally, we have come to recognize the dominant 
coalition as the group that guides organizational direction and goals.  Stevenson et al. 
credited Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) with recognizing the importance of external 
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coalitions that “consist of individuals building and mobilizing support among those 
who already agree on a certain outcome” (p. 260).   
Stevenson et al. (1985) defined coalition as “an interacting group of 
individuals, deliberately constructed, independent of the formal structure, lacking its 
own internal formal structure, consisting of mutually perceived membership, issue 
oriented, focused on a goal or goals external to the coalition, and requiring concerted 
member action” (p. 261).  Thus, implicit in this definition are the constructs of 
communication, informal guides, and salient issues that act as antecedents for 
collective action.  Fundamentally, according to Stevenson et al., coalitions are 
“alliances of members uniting to achieve a common objective.  It is precisely this 
organized quality—albeit emergent—that makes coalitions so powerful and so
potentially threatening to noncoalitional members and to the formal authority system” 
(p. 267).  
Stevenson et al. (1985) made several assertions that they believe enhance the 
likelihood of coalitional activity.  For example, major changes such as in resource 
allocation increase the likelihood for formation.  Characterizing positions unfavorably 
relative to others enhances the likelihood of coalition formation.  Increased member 
interaction promotes coalition formation.  Greater discretion in how members 
perform their jobs will lead to participation in a coalition.  And, prior experience with 
coalitions increases the likelihood of subsequent coalition activity.    
But why should organizations be concerned about coalitional formation and 
activity?  One reason is that coalitions make issues more salient for those who are 
members as well as nonmembers.  In turn, nonmembers or activists might be 
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motivated to join or form new coalitions in response.  Coalitional activities can cause 
organizations to react by creating new processes or structures to respond to the 
coalition, or by constraining organizational activities.  “Potentially, the most serious 
of all coalition impacts on organizations would be the alteration of fundamental 
organizational goals” (Stevenson et al., 1985, pp. 265-266).  Activists who form 
coalitions can create significant challenges for organizations because there can be 
strength in numbers when groups emerge to oppose organizational initiatives.     
Arguably the most prolific scholar of public relations on activism is L. Grunig 
(1992a).  She defined an activist public as:
…a group of two or more individuals who organize in order to 
influence another public or publics through action that may include 
education, compromise, persuasion, pressure tactics, or force… 
learning to reconcile the competing forces of activists and the 
organizations they pressure is the challenge facing many corporate 
communicators today. (pp. 504-505) 
Meeting this challenge requires constantly scanning the environment for 
issues that relevant publics find salient and addressing them through a process that 
public relations professionals recognize as issues management.   
After a review of the literature on activism that included Gollner (1984), L. 
Grunig (1992a) observed:
…if external issues continue to impinge upon traditional domains of 
management, he argued, organizational leaders must become 
knowledgeable about the decision-making processes of those other 
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organizations and groups that affect them.  He concluded that
anticipating and controlling for the consequences of interdependence is 
the stuff of modern management and a special onus for the profession 
of public relations. (p. 507)
L. Grunig recognized that “public relations practitioners must understand why 
individuals join groups or form collectivities” (p. 508).  
Recognizing that “special interest groups operating outside the organization 
increasingly try to control it,” L. Grunig (1992a) argued that it was in the 
organization’s best interest to address this power-control phenomenon (p. 509).  She 
distilled several assumptions about activism from the literature.  In general, the 
assumptions suggest that “activist pressure is an extensive problem for organizations” 
and such groups vary widely in terms of size, tactics and effectiveness (p. 513).  L. 
Grunig noted that public relations practitioners “are integrally involved in dealing 
with hostilities between organizations and activist groups” despite the fact that some 
organizations seek to ignore the realities (p.513).  She found that all of J. Grunig’s 
(1984) models of public relations existed in organizations that depend on public 
relations departments to address activist pressure; however, “the two-way models of 
public relations (asymmetrical and symmetrical) are more effective” (p. 514).  
Finally, although the two-way asymmetrical model of public relations was most 
common “among practitioners engaged in issues management, … the two-way 
symmetrical model of public relations is rarest but most effective in dealing with 
activist pressure” (pp. 513-514).  
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Relying on an extensive study of activist groups, L. Grunig (1992a) 
concluded, “their common thread was their ability to damage organizations with 
considerably larger reputations and resources” (p. 514).  Although she could draw 
few other conclusions, L. Grunig observed, “two out of every three activists groups 
were concerned with a single issue” (p. 515).  These activist groups tended to 
leverage the power of the mass media because it conveyed legitimacy.  In fact, L. 
Grunig and J. Grunig (1997) noted, “when activist groups find their target 
organizations unresponsive, they typically contact the mass media” (p. 4).  They also 
used other tactics ranging from the relatively benign to the extremely violent as a 
means to achieve their ends.  “One particularly interesting finding about activists is 
that unlike organizational stances, which were constant, their positions shifted” (p. 
516).  She attributed this behavior to a pattern articulated by Mintzberg (1983), which 
revealed that “pressure, followed by regulation (if organizations fail to respond to the 
initial protests), followed by trust (because the organization had been regulated into a 
less autonomous mode)” (p. 517).  There were a number of instances, however, where 
L. Grunig found that activists grew impatient with regulatory processes and the 
occasional difficulty in regulatory enforcement and proceeded immediately to direct 
pressure (p. 517).  
The most often cited organizational response to such activist pressure was to 
gather information about the group.  To a much lesser extent, some organizations in 
her study reached out to activists groups and reached compromise, or actually 
included them in the decision-making process.  L. Grunig (1992a) noted, however, 
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that it was not feasible to evaluate the effectiveness of any organizational response 
because so few organizations took any significant action (p. 520).  
In seeking to understand the implications from her research, L. Grunig 
(1992a) noted that “few organizations were successful in their dealings with pressure 
groups” (p. 525).  “Perhaps the most significant finding from L. Grunig’s decade-long 
program of research on activism was the lack of appropriate and effective response on 
the part of the organizations being pressured” (L. Grunig & J. Grunig, 1997, pp. 15-
16).  Therefore, our understanding of how public relations professionals should deal 
with activists groups remains as yet normative in nature.  L. Grunig (1992a) 
developed several propositions:
Proposition 1:  Excellent organizations use two-way communication to 
learn the consequences of what they are doing on all of their relevant 
publics—not just their owners, their employees, and their associates.
Proposition 2:  Excellent organizations use two-way communication to 
tell the publics what they are doing about any negative consequences.
Proposition 3:  Continuous efforts at communication with activists are 
necessary to contend with their shifting stances.
Proposition 4: An on-going, balanced and proactive program of 
constituency relations must acknowledge the legitimacy of all 
constituent groups—regardless of their size.
Proposition 5: Conducting a two-way symmetrical communication 
program hinges on employing people with the necessary background 
and education.
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Proposition 6:  Excellent organizations learn to measure their 
effectiveness in terms of more than simplistic, short-term gains or 
losses—such as whether a returnable-bottle bill is defeated.  (pp. 525-
528)
Based on the literature, several observations can be made about coalitions and 
activism.  First, certain decisions have the potential to trigger coalitional activity.  
These include, but are not limited to, resource allocation, improper framing of 
positions, prior experience, and latitude to perform job functions.  Coalitions seek to 
influence organizational behavior by activities that enhance, though more typically 
constrain, organizations.  Activists often can influence organizations many times 
larger by leveraging the power of the mass media that tends to legitimize their issues.  
Activists initially may be willing to deal with organizations; however, when they 
grow impatient, activists turn to mass media to apply pressure and expedite 
resolution.  L. Grunig (1992a) found that most organizational responses to activism 
seldom went beyond merely gathering information about the group.  Consequently, L. 
Grunig found few organizations that were successful in dealing with activists.  
What can be learned from the literature on strategic management, collective 
action, and activism?  Organizations are open systems comprised of social actors that 
compete for control within boundaries that differentiate processes and activities from 
the environment.  Strategic management represents the internal organizational process 
whereby these social actors who are members of the dominant coalition compete for 
control by exercising power both inside as well as outside the organization.  External 
forces such as stakeholders and publics can serve to enable or constrain 
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organizational actions.  Organizations are successful in environments only to the 
degree that they are able to control or influence those forces that seek to constrain 
their behavior.  Because not all disciplines such as public relations were conceived 
initially as part of strategic management theory, I believe that it was fundamentally 
incomplete.  And, public relations can and should bring environmental information 
such as the potential for collective action into the strategic management process of the 
organization.   
With respect to collective action, certain conditions enhance the likelihood of 
collective movement in populations such as geographic concentration and historical 
experience with activism.  Multiple and competing motives and norms are often 
present in individuals who join coalitions.  Finally, larger groups tend to be less 
effective than smaller ones.  Understanding these norms can help managers deal 
effectively with groups.   
Social norms appear to have their greatest power and influence during 
uncertainty, familiar sources, or when we want to establish relationships.  More 
salient norms are likely to have greater influence, especially on behavior.  Norms can 
affect how information is processed in groups depending on the minority status of 
subgroups; therefore, it is particularly important to understand the full spectrum of 
relevant issues in decisions.  Understanding these norms can help managers deal 
effectively with groups.
Finally, certain decisions can result in coalitional activity.  Activists 
frequently seek to influence organizations by leveraging the power of the mass 
media—especially if the organization is unwilling to deal with them initially.  
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Organizations seldom deal with activists well; therefore, constructive organizational 
responses to activism are critical to allow for the largest number of options to be 
considered on important organizational issues.  
Public Relations Theory
The previous discussion examined strategic management and the role that the 
constructs of collective action, power, and strategy served in enhancing or 
undermining organizational performance.  Attention must now focus on what role 
public relations can and should play in these various domains with particular 
emphasis on strategic decision-making.  However, it is important to briefly review the 
current state of public relations practice, theory and research.
Ledingham and Bruning (2000) observed that “public relations is a field more 
often characterized by what it does than what it is” (p. xi).  This has resulted in 
essentially four schools of thought reflecting major approaches to the practice of 
public relations—the management approach, the rhetorical approach, the journalistic 
approach and the integrated marketing communication approach (IMC).  Although 
these approaches are not mutually exclusive, they do possess different sets of 
assumptions and worldviews of public relations that influence the way the profession 
is practiced and, therefore, perceived by the larger business community and relevant 
customers.  Each perspective emphasizes different constructs that have been central to 
the research.  My research seeks to advance the argument that public relations is a 
management function that provides unique and non-redundant contributions to the 
strategic management of organizations.  By better understanding strategic decision-
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making theory, public relations professionals can enhance organizational 
performance.  
In general, most public relations scholars identified with the management 
typology of public relations recognize systems theory as integral to its practice and 
central to their research.  Systems theory is important for several reasons as discussed 
earlier.  Systems theory recognizes that phenomena occur within a defined boundary.  
It also acknowledges that within this boundary, processes contribute to the 
improvement, maintenance, or destruction of the system.  Further, the system may 
operate as open or closed to the surrounding environment.  Research within this 
domain examines issues that contribute to efficiency and effectiveness of the system 
and may be applied or positive—that is, reflective of what is actually occurring or 
observed—or normative—that is, reflective of what ought to happen.  Public relations 
scholars within the management paradigm have examined research within both 
domains of positive and normative research.  They also share the view that public 
relations must belong to an open systems approach that seeks to operate in balance 
with the environment.
Situational theory of publics
J. Grunig (J. Grunig and Hunt, 1984) formulated a theory for public relations 
that provides an organizational function well positioned to enhance the effectiveness 
of strategic management.  Essentially, the theory explains “when and how people 
communicate and when communications aimed at people are most likely to be 
effective” (p. 148).  For this study, what is most important about the situational theory 
is the concept of publics.  According to J. Grunig, publics are groups of people that 
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face a common problem, usually the consequence of an organization on that public, 
or vice-versa.  Further, publics possess certain attributes that demand organizations 
attend to them.  
Three major concepts in the theory categorize people into active or passive 
publics.  As J. Grunig (1996) argued:  
The theory states that publics are more likely to be active when the 
people who make them up perceive that what an organization does 
involves them (level of involvement), that the consequences of what an 
organization does is a problem (problem recognition), and that they 
are not constrained from doing something about the problem 
(constraint recognition). (p. 28)
The attributes that emerge to identify publics may be categorized sequentially 
in a process (J. Grunig and Repper, 1992).  Briefly, these stages include a stakeholder 
stage, in which an organization has a relationship with stakeholders when the 
behavior of either the organization or the stakeholder results in consequences on the 
other; the public stage, in which stakeholders become publics upon recognizing the 
consequences and organize to act; and the issue stage, in which publics organize and 
create issues for the organization (J. Grunig, 1992, p. 124).  
J. Grunig (1996) surmised that “the value of public relations, therefore, is that 
it brings a different set of problems and possible solutions into the strategic 
management arena” (p. 16).  Specifically, public relations brings concerns and issues 
of stakeholder publics from the environment into the decision-making arena.  
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Relevant information made known to decision makers prior to decisions will result in 
better decisions:
Public relations will have value in strategic management if it can 
develop theories that enable the organization to enact those parts of the 
environment that representatives from other management disciplines 
are unlikely to recognize, and if it can develop a method that can help 
strategic decision makers determine which stakeholder publics are 
‘relatively consequential’ to the decisions to use Mintzberg’s (1994, p. 
27) terms.  In short we need theories to identify stakeholders and 
strategic publics—theories that disciplines other than public relations 
have not developed. (p. 16)  
Models of public relations
J. Grunig’s research on models of public relations revealed four ways in 
which public relations was practiced.  Huang (1997) noted that “J. Grunig (1984) 
used Thayer’s (1968) concepts of synchronic and diachronic communication to 
explain ‘why some practitioners engage in informative two-way communication and 
others in one-way manipulative communication'" (p. 18).  J. Grunig characterized 
synchronic communication as asymmetrical where the objective of the practitioner 
was to change public behavior.  He characterized diachronic communication as 
symmetrical where the objective of the practitioner was to reach a common 
acceptable view to everyone involved in the communication process.  
From this observation, J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) posited four models based 
on two variables—direction and purpose—that reflected how public relations was 
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practiced.  Direction referred to the extent the public relations model was based on 
one-way communication or two-way communication.  One-way communication 
described a simple dissemination process and two-way communication recognized an 
exchange process.  Huang (1997) observed that purpose, on the other hand: 
…characterizes whether the model is asymmetrical or symmetrical.  
Asymmetrical communication is unbalanced; it leaves the organization 
the way it is and tries to change only the public.  Symmetrical 
communication, however is balanced; it adjusts the relationship 
between the organization and public.  (pp. 18-19)  
First, the publicity model was based on the simple notion that any publicity 
was good publicity.  No publics were identified, no goals were established, and no 
evaluation occurred.  The organization sought to control its environment in this 
approach.  Second, the public information model represented those organizational 
activities in which practitioners merely disseminate information.  Again, little 
research was involved in the process.  However, Huang (1997) noted that the 
organizational goal of this model was to adapt or cooperate with its environment.  
Third, the two-way asymmetrical model involved research; however, the research was 
performed primarily for persuasion goals for the good of the organization.  
Information was used by organizations to coordinate and direct campaigns to 
convince publics to think or behave in certain ways.  The last approach was the two-
way symmetrical model.  The primary difference with the two-way asymmetrical 
approach was the recognition that information can and should flow both to and from 
the organization to its environment.  This model suggested that organizations should 
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be as susceptible to change as stakeholders.  Consequently, this perspective is the best 
normative model.  
The critical link between J. Grunig’s situational theory and organizational 
effectiveness comes from the research on organization theory.  L. Grunig, J. Grunig, 
and Ehling (1992) said that, although the literature and research on organizational 
effectiveness was broad and contradictory, there was a role for public relations.  In 
reviewing Robbins’ (1990) four approaches to organizational effectiveness (goal 
attainment, systems, strategic constituencies, and competing values), they argued that 
public relations could contribute valuable information for the strategic constituency 
approach.  Public relations could contribute to organizational effectiveness by 
identifying the strategic stakeholder groups and determining whether they were active 
or passive processors of information.  Once the strategic stakeholders were known, 
public relations could develop communication programs with clear, measurable goals.
Conceptually, this study fits in the context of organizational effectiveness and 
is based on the theory that strategic management helps organizations maintain a 
competitive advantage by more fully understanding and responding to the 
environment.  Marketing, finance, human resources, and other disciplines 
traditionally associated with strategic management have each brought unique 
strengths to the strategic mix.  Although each discipline scans the environment for 
related factors, no one functional area appears to have a view towards how decisions 
will affect the institutional level (Bowman’s [1990] term).  Conversely, no one 
functional area appears responsible for bringing in institutional-level concerns to the 
strategic decision-making process.
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Symmetrical Communication
Huang (1997) observed: "The two-way symmetrical communication model 
arouses more heated debate than any other concept in the theory of public relations" 
(p. 4).  She noted that “the four public relations models, however, like most other 
models in the literature of social sciences, draw criticism regarding the problems of 
simplicity and generalizeability” (p. 5).  Huang also noted that Leichty and 
Springston (1993) challenged the simplicity of this approach as being too “one size 
fits all” because organizations use a “combination of the four models and that the 
original contingency approach to the models makes them more practical” (see Huang, 
1997, p. 21).  Murphy (1991) argued that it was difficult to find examples of 
symmetrical communication.  
As a strategy, however, advocates of the two-way symmetrical model argue 
that it possesses significant utility.  Research from the IABC Excellence project 
support this view (J. Grunig, & L. Grunig, 2000).  Before a particular public relations 
model is employed, professionals use a technique known as environmental scanning 
that helps them monitor the environment for potential issues that might result in 
activism. 
Environmental Scanning
According to Dozier (1990), environmental scanning is a monitoring 
technique designed to detect forces in the environment that have the potential to 
affect “the homeostasis of the system” (p. 5).  Having established the open systems 
nature of organizations, environmental scanning is one of several approaches that 
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organizations use to anticipate changes in the environment in advance of 
organizational decisions or as a consequence of organizational actions.  
Dozier and Repper (1992) noted that environmental scanning constitutes part 
of the problem detection and definition stage for public relations planning.  In 
addition, Dozier and Repper suggested that environmental scanning progresses 
through three separate phases—“problem detection, exploration, and description” (p. 
186).  Thus, this initial phase of public relations research serves to frame problems as 
communication problems from which issues arise and activism results if not managed 
properly.  Used properly by practitioners, environmental scanning can inform the 
organization of potential opportunities and threats identified in the environment.    
Issues Management and Activism
Central to the practice of public relations is the construct of issues 
management.  According to Webster’s Dictionary, an issue may be defined as a 
“matter that is in dispute between two or more parties,” or “the point at which an 
unsettled matter is ready for a decision” (p. 642).  Lauzen (1995) argued that “issues 
management is the process which allows an organization to know, understand, and 
more effectively interact with their environments” (p. 287).  Bridges and Nelson 
(2000) noted:
…issues management often begins as reactions to a crisis or an event 
that has thrust its problems into the mass media or onto a legislative 
agenda. . . . The connotation of issues management presumes attempts 
to remove an issue—a potential problem—from the public agenda. (p. 
95)  
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Bridges and Nelson (2000) suggested that issues management is an ongoing 
process of monitoring the environment and making adjustments internally and 
externally to the organization.  The scholars also asserted that effective issues 
management serves to integrate analyses of public policy issues into strategic 
planning; monitor standards of organizational performance and understand the 
opinions and values of publics; develop and implement ethical codes of 
organizational accountability; assist senior management in decision-making; identify 
the issues of most strategic value; create multidimensional proactive and reactive 
response plans; establish grassroots alliances; communicate to key publics; direct 
communication to mitigate development and effects of undesirable legislation, 
regulation or litigation; and evaluate the efforts to determine if objectives were 
achieved (p. 97).  
By definition, J. Grunig and Repper (1992) have suggested, publics form 
around issues.  Once issues surface in the mass media and result in polarization of 
views, McCombs (1977) argued, the ability of organizations and actors to influence 
the debate is reduced.  
Lauzen (1995), in studying the involvement of the public relations manager in 
the diagnosis of issues (the process decision makers use to understand the 
environment and events), found a positive correlation between organizational “active 
sense-making strategies” and the perceived values shared between senior public 
relations managers and top management.  This correlation resulted in more accurate 
“issue diagnosis and strategic change” (p. 287).   
With respect to activism, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) noted:
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Different people, groups, or organizations may have different criteria 
for evaluating an organization…[and this] creates problems for the 
organization.  . . . Faced with conflicting demands, the organization 
must decide which groups to attend to and which to ignore. . . . 
Organizations could not survive if they were not responsive to the 
demands from their environment. (pp.  27-43)   
As well as advancing the nature of public relations research from the systems 
theory perspective, L. Grunig’s research has been invaluable to understanding the role 
of the environment in determining the model of public relations that organizations 
practiced.  L. Grunig (1992) argued that activism “represents a major problem for 
organizations” (p. 522).  She found that all four models of public relations could be 
found in organizations dealing with activists.  However, L. Grunig also suggested that 
using the two-way symmetrical model of public relations was the most effective way 
to deal with activists.  She qualified this observation because so few of the subjects in 
her research relied on this approach.  Her research revealed that to use any other 
approach “seemed ineffective” (p. 525).  L. Grunig’s support for using the two-way 
symmetrical approach with activists was not based on positive cases as much as it 
was on the failure of any approach to succeed at dealing with these groups.  
Public relations scholars identified with the management typology of public 
relations recognize systems theory as integral to its practice and central to their 
research.  Public relations brings unique problems from stakeholder publics as well as 
potential solutions to the strategic management process.  Research on models of 
public relations reveals essentially four models; however, the most effective model 
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appears to be the symmetrical model, which recognizes that information can and 
should flow both to and from the organization to its environment.  Using J. Grunig’s 
(1992) concept of empowerment, the two-way symmetrical model suggests that 
organizations should be as susceptible to change as stakeholder publics.  Issues 
management can be used by public relations professionals to monitor the environment 
to introduce relevant information into the strategic management process.  None of 
these constructs, however, will enhance strategic management unless public relations 
is included in the dominant coalition.  
Summary and Research Questions
The preceding conceptualization characterizes organizations as purposive, 
open systems designed to achieve goals.  Organizational decisions result from the 
interaction of social actors who exert disciplinary identities and frame environmental 
issues through processes that often are not rational.  Power historically has been 
defined in terms of control; however, empowerment may actually enable 
organizations to pursue and attain goals more effectively.  The literature on strategic 
decision-making suggests that many executives make poor choices.  Arguably, this 
happens because of incomplete information, improperly framed information, or 
natural human tendencies.  In addition, the quality of decision-making often depends 
on whether executives view decisions as discrete or part of a continuum.  However, 
there are models and principles of effective decision-making that can improve the 
quality of decisions.
Strategic management has emerged as the process in which important 
activities occur to enhance organizational effectiveness and efficiency.  The dominant 
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coalition leverages the strategic management process to direct organizations and deal 
with environmental forces.  Among these forces are groups or coalitions that seek to 
influence organizational decisions and behavior.  
Public relations scholars increasingly have identified a management paradigm 
as most relevant for communication managers.  Public relations can help reduce 
uncertainty in the environment by building relationships with key publics and 
bringing unique problems into the strategic decision-making process.  
This research is as much a study about process as it is about effectiveness.  
Because this research is exploratory in nature, traditional hypotheses are 
inappropriate.  In order to better understand these concepts, I proposed the following 
research questions:
Research question 1:  How do executives view strategic decision-making—as 
a discrete event or a continuous process and why?  What are the implications for the 
strategic decision-making process?  
Research question 2:  How do executives characterize the way they make 
strategic decisions and why?  What are the implications for the strategic decision-
making process and public relations theory and practice?
Research question 3:  How do executives determine who participates in 
strategic decisions?  Does participation in the strategic decision-making process 
enhance the effectiveness of the decision?  
Research question 4:  How do relationships affect the inclusion of people 
and/or groups in strategic decisions and what are the implications for the practice of 
public relations?
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Research question 5:  Do certain relationship attributes such as trust, 
familiarity, power and control influence which people and/or groups are included in 
strategic decisions?
Research question 6:  Why do executives in organizations that are in the midst 
of strategic decisions that affect multiple groups believe that collective action occurs?  
Research question 6a:  How do executives become aware of collective action 
during important organizational decision processes?  
Research question 6b:  How does group size affect their strategic decision-
making?    
Research question 7:  How do executives assess which issues might generate 
coalitional activity and what are the implications for public relations theory and 
practice?
Research question 8:  Does coalitional activity or the potential for coalitional 
activity alter the way executives make strategic decisions?  
Research question 9:  Which organizational elements, if any, are responsible 
for establishing relationships with external groups during strategic decisions?
Research question 10:  Are relationships with external groups established 
prior to the determination of a strategic decision-making process and how does this 
affect the strategic decision-making process?  
Research question 11:  What role(s) do public relations professionals serve in 
the strategic decision-making process?  
Research question 11a:  How do senior executives perceive the role(s) of 
public relations professionals?  
113
Research question 11b:  Is this perception shared with public relations 
professionals?  
Research question 11c:  How does this affect the quality of strategic decision-
making?
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CHAPTER III
Methodology
Introduction
Choosing an appropriate method of inquiry is fundamental to ensuring that the 
knowledge gained from scientific research is credible and advances what we know in 
a disciplined, replicable manner.  The following discussion outlines why a qualitative 
approach was the most suitable research design for this study.  Using qualitative 
analyses of active interviews with current and former senior executives from the U.S. 
Coast Guard and stakeholder groups who were involved in specific decision events, I 
explored how strategic decisions were made during these four separate decisions 
involving multiple stakeholders.  More specifically, I focused on how executives 
perceived the strategic decision-making process; how they determined who should 
participate in the process; what were some of the attributes of the various 
relationships among the stakeholders; how they acquired information on the various 
groups; what was their perception of the distribution of power among the various 
participants; and what role communication executives played in the strategic 
decision-making process. 
According to Marshall and Rossman (1995), quantitative methodology, the 
traditional schema of scientific inquiry, is appropriate when data can be obtained 
from experiments, the variables are known and unambiguous, and processes are 
relatively simple.  On the other hand, qualitative approaches provide the flexibility to 
acquire data that cannot be obtained from experiments because of ethical or practical 
reasons, the variables may be unknown or ambiguous, and processes are complex.  
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Lincoln and Guba (1985) offered four constructs that help frame assumptions 
of qualitative research.  These include credibility, which attests to how variables are 
identified and the study is conducted; transferability, which addresses how well the 
findings can be applied to other contexts, regardless of investigator; dependability, or 
the way in which researchers account for changing conditions and research design; 
and confirmability, or the degree to which the findings can be confirmed by other 
researchers.  These constructs—credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability—can be used to assess the veracity of research.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) made several observations on the strengths of 
qualitative data.  First, “they focus on naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural 
settings, so that we have a strong handle on what ‘real life’ is like” (p. 10).  In other 
words, data are usually collected in relatively close proximity to the phenomenon 
under study.  Second, the data have the potential to reveal complex constructs 
because of the “richness and holism” that exists through lived experiences and the 
various meanings people place on events, processes and structures.  Third, qualitative 
data allow researchers to explore new areas and test hypotheses.  Last, they allow 
researchers to “supplement, validate, explain, illuminate, or reinterpret quantitative 
data gathered from the same setting” (p. 10).  This study sought to understand 
phenomena revealed in routine organizational processes; therefore, I believe a 
qualitative approach was most appropriate.  
Because this study relied on a qualitative research design, I must touch briefly 
on the philosophy of qualitative research; criteria for considering an appropriate 
research design, including general ethical concerns; and several potential qualitative 
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data collection methods such as interviewing and ethnography, including their 
strengths and weaknesses.  I conclude by articulating the approach that was used in 
this study and a brief discussion of the four specific decision events that were 
analyzed.  A general description of the specific procedures and analytic techniques is 
also addressed.   
Philosophy of Qualitative Research
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) observed that the field of qualitative 
research “is defined primarily by a series of essential tensions, contradictions, and 
hesitations” (p. ix).  Plowman (1996) noted that Geertz (1973) argued that the aim of 
qualitative research was to “enlarge the universe of human discourse through 
searching for meaning in human existence” (p. 103).  
Guba and Lincoln (1994) provided an excellent synopsis of four of the 
competing paradigms in qualitative research.  These paradigms represent the basic 
worldviews held by researchers.  They fundamentally differ on issues of ontology, 
which addresses the “form and nature of reality;” epistemology, which addresses “the 
nature of the relationship of between the knower or would-be knower and what can be 
known;” and methodology, which addresses “how can the inquirer (would-be 
knower) goes about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known” (p. 108).  
Guba and Lincoln (1994) noted that positivism has been the dominant 
paradigm in the discourse of the physical and social sciences “for some 400 years” (p. 
108).  Researchers from this persuasion believe in “naïve realism” and in the 
existence of a “real reality” that can be apprehended (p. 109).  Further, they believe 
that their findings acquired through quantitative experimental and manipulative 
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approaches and verification of hypotheses reveals findings that are “true” (p. 109).  
The aim of their research is to explain, predict and control (p. 112).  
According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), postpositivists ascribe to critical 
realism where reality is real but only “imperfectly and probabilistically 
apprehendable” (p. 109).  Inquirers rely on modified experimental or manipulative 
and critical multiplism approaches to falsify hypotheses that result in findings that are 
probably true.  Postpositivists may rely on qualitative approaches to scientific inquiry.  
Like positivists, they aim to explain, predict, and control.  
Guba and Lincoln (1994) also noted that critical theorists believe in historical 
realism in which reality is “shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and 
gender values” (p. 109).  In addition, the scholars said that critical theorists rely on 
dialogic or dialectical approaches that reveal “value-mediated findings” (p. 109).  
Their purpose is to critique and transform through restitution and emancipation.  
Constructivists argue that realities are relative and locally constructed.  They 
rely on hermeneutical or dialectical approaches to reveal “created findings” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 109).  They seek to understand and reconstruct reality.
Plowman (1996) observed: “Qualitative research is holistic in that it looks at 
people and settings as part of a larger picture.  Researchers strive to understand 
people from their own frames of reference and value all perspectives of a given 
situation.  This type of research has the ability to use the participants’ own language 
and symbols in context of the whole picture, not as separate variables” (p. 106).  
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Because the aim of this inquiry was to explore how executives made strategic 
decisions under different conditions of power dispersion on issues affecting multiple 
stakeholders, several considerations were important.  First, the phenomenon of 
strategic decision-making occurs in natural settings.  Second, strategic decisions have 
social dimensions and are subject to the strengths and weaknesses of the human 
condition.  Third, most organizations have executives who must make strategic 
decisions on a routine basis.  Finally, some executives are better at strategic decision-
making than others.  Therefore, I believe that a research methodology designed to 
better understand strategic decision-making clearly fell within the scope of the 
qualitative tradition.  This research sought to explore the phenomenon of strategic 
decision-making within larger contexts and to explain how public relations might 
contribute to enhancing this process.  In addition, the research design reflected my 
postpositivist perspective—that is, I believe reality is only imperfectly apprehendable.  
Considerations in Research Design
Selecting the appropriate method is a function of what researchers hope to 
learn.  In this study, it was particularly important to understand constructs and 
contexts as understood by the participants.  Plowman (1996) identified two screening 
criteria that guide selecting the appropriate method: “(1) the complexity and depth of 
the topic and (2) feedback, meaning the importance of speaking individually to 
participants” (p. 112).  
Marshall and Rossman (1994) argued that research strategy is inextricably 
linked to the purpose of the study.  Where the purpose of the research is exploratory: 
“to investigate little understood phenomena, to identify/discover important variables, 
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[or] to generate hypotheses for further research,” then a case study or field study is an 
appropriate strategy and participant observation and interviewing are important data 
collection techniques (p. 41).  Furthermore, qualitative studies allow researchers to 
stress “the importance of context, setting, and participants’ frames of reference” (p. 
44). 
Discussing research settings, populations and phenomena, Marshall and 
Rossman (1994) suggested: “The ideal site is where (1) entry is possible; (2) there is a 
high probability that a rich mix of the processes, people, programs, interactions, and 
structures of interest are present; (3) the researcher is likely to be able to build 
trusting relations with the participants in the study; and (4) data quality and credibility 
of the study are reasonably assured” (p. 51).
My research sought to understand how executives made strategic decisions 
under different conditions of perceived power dispersion.  Thus, entry into existing 
organizational processes was necessary to explore both the complexity and richness 
of the various phenomena in play.  In addition, it was necessary to establish trust and 
credibility with the executives I interviewed in order to acquire and collect data for 
analysis.  As a member of the Coast Guard, I possessed the knowledge, familiarity 
and ability to gain access to the research setting.  However, these strengths also 
possessed ethical concerns that are addressed at the end of this chapter.  
There are general ethical prescriptions in the literature when dealing with 
human subjects.  Locke, Spirduso, and Silverman (1993) offered the following 
prescriptions when dealing with human subjects.  In general, participants should be 
informed of what is being investigated, their role, and the demands on them that will 
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be required.  Participants should understand what protocols are in place to protect 
confidentiality.  They should be offered a document for their signature that confirms 
their consent without unnecessary influence and the opportunity to ask questions.  
This “contract” should outline procedures and the potential risks and/or benefits from 
participating in the research, including the right to withdraw their consent during any 
point in the inquiry without reprisal.  Finally, participants should know to whom 
questions or concerns should be directed and offered the opportunity to receive study 
results, as appropriate (p. 31).  These participant concerns were addressed and are in 
included in appendixes A and C.  
Having discussed some of the fundamental issues with respect to the 
philosophy of qualitative research and established general criteria for the 
methodological approach, the following discussion considered several types of 
interviews and other methodological approaches that could have been used to collect 
the data for this research.  
Interviews
Interviews represented one of several approaches to collecting qualitative data 
that could have been used for this study.  H. Rubin and I. Rubin (1995) noted that 
qualitative interviews allow researchers to understand experiences and reconstruct 
events that are unfamiliar.  They also argued that interviews require an understanding 
of culture, recognition that interviewers were participants, and an acknowledgement 
that interviewers give voice to those interviewed.    
Plowman (1995) offered a practical decision matrix that captured the 
advantages of interviewing in relation to other qualitative methods.  In short, he 
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argued that interviewing offered an individual perspective, could be theory driven and 
triangulated, and performed with limited time and funds.  In addition, interviewing 
allowed the timely collection of large amounts of data that could be validated.  
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) argued that triangulation was important especially to 
qualitative methodology because the validity of qualitative research might be 
challenged because of the constructivist nature of the data collection methods.
There are disadvantages of interviewing as well, according to Marshall and 
Rossman (1995).  Data might be misunderstood or misinterpreted, results might be 
difficult to replicate, and data validity rests heavily on the participant’s truthfulness.
The purpose of the following discussion is to define and describe several types 
of interviews that were considered for this research.  In addition, consideration was 
given to the ethical implications of each type of interview.  I conclude with a 
summary discussion of the interviewing method I used, how I identified study 
participants, and which four decision events were used for this study.  I conclude with 
a review of the procedures and ethical concerns.  
Long interview
Long interviews possess unique characteristics that help the researcher 
understand and determine meaning as understood by participants.  This requires the 
researcher to invest adequate time in interviewing so that the phenomenon of interest 
will emerge through the analysis phase of a study.  Long interviews require extensive, 
thoughtful preparation to avoid amassing unnecessary data while acquiring critical 
data that will reveal answers to the questions sought by the researcher.  Thorough 
preparation also provides the best return of valuable information while minimizing 
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the time required of participants.  Critically important to long interviews are issues of 
culture and, as McCracken (1988) observed, shared meaning.  The goal of long 
interviews is to understand the phenomenon as the participant understands it.  
Unlike unstructured ethnographic interviews, long interviews provide focus 
for the researcher.  Because confidentiality is associated with this methodology, 
researchers gain access to important issues that full disclosure or identification of 
participants would likely inhibit.  Although long interviews provide structure, they 
allow for the emergence of variables and concepts that may not be known to the 
researcher at the beginning of the inquiry.  Additionally, research may be conducted 
within a much shorter time frame than traditional ethnographic research requires.  
Though no specified time lengths for long interviews are mandated, the information 
gleaned from the literature review indicates that up to eight hours may be needed to 
collect the necessary data.  Such length in interviews may require that several 
interviews be scheduled.  By allowing time between interviews, the researcher can 
review the data and follow up to clarify ambiguities.  Hon (1997) observed that the 
goal is to understand the meaning of concepts, categories, terms, relationships, and 
assumptions as the respondent understands them in his or her view and experience in 
the world.  
Researchers who use long interviews to acquire data are interested in depth 
rather than breadth.  Whether this is accomplished in two hours or eight hours 
depends on the researchers’ ability to accurately reflect the phenomenon as 
determined by participants.  The resulting shared meaning allows researchers to 
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determine the presence of cultural patterns, categories, characteristics, or 
assumptions.  
Several ethical implications are associated with long interviews.  Researchers 
are commonly understood to be instruments of data collection and analyses in 
qualitative research.  McCracken (1988) identified a number of important issues that 
must be considered.  Researchers working in their own culture must be vigilant to the 
very real problem of seeing familiar data in unfamiliar ways.  By allowing 
participants to answer questions and prompting them to use their own terms, 
researchers reduce the potential for interpretation that frequently occurs with active 
listening.  Active listening encourages researchers to repeat back words and phrases 
to discover hidden meanings of language.  
A healthy distance must be maintained between researchers and subjects.  
Like researchers who must see the familiar in unfamiliar ways, so must participants.  
Researchers must help participants to distance themselves from the familiar to 
articulate what lies beneath the surface of a belief or behavior.  Such self-reflection 
possesses significant ethical implications.  For example, emotional harm might result 
when participants are asked to reflect on uncomfortable issues relevant to the 
research.  Another legitimate reason that necessitates distance between researchers 
and participants is the nature of researchers’ roles.  Arguably, one of the differences 
between voyeur and scientist lies in intent.  It is important to understand that 
professional curiosity to fully understand phenomena motivates scientists.  
Confidentiality of participants must be protected to allow for as complete 
disclosure as possible.  Researchers must be clear about the risks of interviews as well 
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as the benefits.  For some participants, questions may evoke surprise, embarrassment, 
or anger; for others, questions may possess a cathartic quality or intellectual 
dimension.  Above all, researchers must first do no harm.  
During interviews, researchers must listen carefully for clues that require 
further probing.  McCracken (1988) identified some of these potential issues as topic 
avoidance, distortion, misunderstanding, and even incomprehension.  He also 
suggested several technical considerations such as tape recording, transcription, and 
use of the computer to aid in the collection and analysis of the data.  
In-depth interview
Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggested that in-depth interviews are 
conversations designed to explore general topics to discover meaning from the 
participant’s perspective.  In doing so, researchers should consider the responses as 
framed by participants.  Although Marshall and Rossman made no distinction 
between depth and long interviews, McCracken (1988) considered depth interviews 
to be primarily concerned with participants’ affective attributes where long interviews 
were more focused on shared categories and assumptions.  
As noted previously with all interviews, depth interviews also possess the 
ability to acquire a significant amount of data quickly.  Researchers can seek 
clarification during the interview and uncover the significance people place on events 
and experiences in everyday life.  Cooperation of participants is necessary for 
researchers to acquire the appropriate data.  Interviewers must also possess fine 
listening skills that permit them to interact, frame, and diplomatically probe 
participants.  In the end, researchers should evoke the necessary data that frequently 
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lie beneath the surface of routine responses.  Fontana and Frey (1994) pointed out the 
importance of never taking anything for granted in interviews.    
Ethical implications of depth interviews are similar to those already discussed.  
In addition, Fontana and Frey (1994) noted that traditional concerns focus on 
informed consent, privacy, and protection from harm.  Although Wolcott (1995) 
disagreed, Miles and Huberman (1994) argued that interviews must necessarily 
violate the trust and privacy of respondents.  Use of technology must be disclosed 
initially so participants are informed about the use of recording devices.  As long as 
participants understand and consent to the terms set forth in research protocols and 
researchers remain within the established ground rules, the risk of violating 
agreements is minimized.
Elite interview
Elite interviews recognize the position or experience participants possess that 
warrant special treatment or consideration.  They differ from other types of interviews 
in several ways.  Dexter (1970) suggested participants’ elite status qualified them to 
define the situation of interest.  Two characteristics are common with elites: 
participation and time.  As a result, interviewees are encouraged to structure the 
account of the situation.  Finally, interviewees are left to describe what they perceive 
as relevant.  Unlike focused interviewing where researchers define the area of 
interest, ask the questions, and seek answers within a set of boundaries, elite 
interviewers frequently desire that participants teach them what the problem is, what 
questions should be answered, and what the situation demands.  
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In addition to the special status of elites, data must be examined differently.  
Dexter (1970) observed that surveys deal with deviation statistically.  Frequently, the 
goal is to understand the norm, the typical response.  However, with elite respondents 
who are better informed, deviations may necessitate a revision or extension, or a new 
paradigm.  Hirsch (1995) reinforced the observation that disparities in information 
and perception often exist between upper and lower levels in organizations.  Thus, 
responses from elite interviewees must be framed properly to understand the value of 
their observations and contributions.
Useem (1995) favored interviewing chief executive officers because of the 
insight they offer into a company’s culture, organization, and activity.  In addition to 
understanding more about executives, researchers also gain executives’ perspectives 
on their firm and the world at large.  Useem observed in his research that elites tend 
to see both the small picture as well as the concerns of the larger business community.  
Because of the difficulty in reaching executives, Useem (1995) provided an 
array of considerations from his experience when trying to gain access to senior 
executives.  One recommendation was to identify someone of import to the executive 
to act as a door opener.  On the other hand, not all researchers appear to agree on 
whether access is a problem.  Ostrander (1995) argued that the problems of gaining 
access and establishing rapport with elites have been overstated.  
Once researchers gain access, Hirsch (1995) suggested, it is imperative to 
prepare well for the interview—relying simply on stret smarts can result in wasting 
the researchers’ efforts and, more importantly, elites’ time.  Ostrander (1995) 
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observed that elites are used to being in charge and having others defer to them.  This 
notion must be carefully, but tactfully, challenged.  
Because of the deference that elites may be accustomed to, skepticism must be 
part of the interviewer’s questioning.  Useem (1995) recognized that some managers 
know how they do something but not why.  Therefore, researchers must guard against 
assimilation into the culture to the point that objectivity is lost.  Paradigms must be 
challenged and confirmed throughout the process.  In addition to organizational 
issues, Useem noted that perceptions of events and phenomena are socially 
constructed to some degree.  For example, chief executive officers frequently travel in 
circles of similar status.  Thus, these elites often possess their own sense of 
reinforcing culture.  
Useem (1995) provided practical advice for consideration in using elite 
interviews as a research approach.  First, reaching top management may require direct 
contact.  Second, flexibility is critical because of the demands placed on elites.  Third, 
several research approaches may be necessary to obtain the information desired.  
Fourth, the researcher must remain disciplined and focused to the research at hand 
because interviews with elites frequently result in more research possibilities.  
Finally, the researcher must record those additional possibilities that often provide a 
framework for further study.  
Active interview  
Holstein and Gubrium (1995) argued that knowledge is created by the action 
necessary to acquire it.  In contrast to the traditional role of passive interviewers who 
merely record information, active interviews recognize the constructionist process of 
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producing meaning.  One of the primary objectives of active interviews is to draw out 
and make visible the linkages and horizons participants use to define and organize 
subjective meanings.  Holstein and Gubrium noted that the goal is to arrive at 
common narrative ground in the face of contextual issues and complicated matters.  
Active interviews assume that there is a mental model of the subject or 
phenomenon that lies beneath the responses of persons being interviewed.  The 
challenge for researchers is to adequately represent the phenomenon that the 
interviewee may be revealing, which may require several interviews and collaborative 
interpretation to capture the information.  Based on this assumption, several items are 
of concern.  One of the greatest challenges to this approach is for researchers to create 
an environment that is conducive to open and undistorted communication.  Rapport 
between researchers and participants is critical to the success of this approach.  
Interviewees must be competent about the subject of the research in order for the 
information to be of value.  Because participants continually revise and modify 
answers, the truth-value of responses must be measured not against some objective 
answer as in the traditional “vessel of answers” approach, but by the enduring local 
conditions that evolve.  Introductions to the interview must be carefully prepared and 
delivered to avoid predisposing participants to a set of desired responses.  In addition, 
culture and ethnographic considerations are important to framing questions.  
Researchers must necessarily and continually challenge themselves through self-
analysis to guard against bias.  
Active interviews allow for researchers to explore ill defined and marginally 
developed concepts.  With the focus on linkages and horizons, researchers can seek 
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out the model behind the vessel to better understand a phenomenon.  This approach 
has the potential to produce a large quantity of data.  In addition, this type of research 
can be done with little expense.  Active interviews deny the philosophical notion of 
objectivity.  Though some might view this as a weakness, many argue this approach 
strikes closer to the truth than traditional interviewing.  
One of the most important ethical considerations in using the active interview 
is selection of participants.  By conceiving of people in particular ways, researchers 
give voice to some while silencing others.  Thus, understanding the culture and 
knowing the terrain is tremendously valuable.  Like other approaches, similar issues 
of disclosure and confidentiality are important as well.  Maintaining professional 
relationships with participants serves several purposes.  It keeps clear the line 
between interviewers and interviewees.  This approach also avoids placing either 
participant in an advantageous position.  
Summary of Research Schema
Given what the literature has revealed about the various types of interviews, 
the following matrix was established which helped guide the selection of the active 
interview as the appropriate methodology.
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Table 3.1
Decision Matrix for Qualitative Methodological Approach
Method Individual 
Perspective
Limited 
Time and 
Money
Theory 
Driven
Triangulated Access Researcher
Knowledge
Long 
Interview
X x x x
Elite 
Interview
X x x
In-depth 
Interview
X x x x X
Active 
Interview
X x x x x X
Active interviews rely on researcher knowledge to help acquire the data from 
participants.  Because I had some knowledge of each of the decision events, it served 
to help me ask the right questions and acquire the right data.  In addition, this 
approach could be accomplished with limited funds and triangulated with documents 
obtained from the various offices involved with the decision events.  Although this 
approach denied the philosophical notion of objectivity, I believed it offered a way to 
get at some notion of reality.  
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Decision Events
The following discussion briefly and generally describes the four strategic 
decision events in the Coast Guard that were used to generate lists of participants who 
were interviewed.  In addition to the interviews, archival data in the form of studies, 
reports and analyses were examined to corroborate timelines, information, and 
decisions associated with each event.  
Decision event number one:  The Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System 
Recapitalization Program (short title: Deepwater).  In 1993, the Coast Guard 
conducted an analysis of its aging fleet of ships and determined that more than two-
thirds of these resources would reach the end of their service life within 15 years.  To 
place the aging resource issue in context, the Coast Guard’s fleet of ships was the 
third oldest of the world’s 39 similar naval fleets.  This presented a real concern for 
the organization’s leadership because the Coast Guard represents the primary at-sea 
law enforcement agency for the federal government.  In short, if there is a law that 
must be enforced on federal waters, the Coast Guard is the agency responsible for 
enforcing it.  The myriad regulations range from fiscal and immigration laws to 
sanitation and customs laws.  Many federal agencies rely on the Coast Guard to act as 
the enforcement arm for the rules and regulations that are promulgated.  At the same 
time, the Coast Guard is also recognized in federal statute as one of the five armed 
services.  The service must bridge the gap and balance its responsibilities between its 
constabulary duties in enforcing laws and its military duties in securing America from 
threats to national security.  
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Understanding that federal bureaucracies seldom act absent a crisis, the 
strategic decision in this event was how to proceed with a necessary major 
recapitalization that would require significant investment by the Administration over 
more than 15 years into the future.  Traditionally, major acquisition programs in the 
federal government purchase a single type of asset or service; however, this initiative 
required replacing all deepwater assets in an integrated way.  Although the Coast 
Guard recognized the looming challenge, many in the Administration opposed the 
acquisition because of the affect it would have on the President’s spending priorities.  
In order to identify the key participants in this decision, archival data in 
records both online and in the Program Executive Officer (PEO) files were reviewed.  
Because this acquisition was such a large project, I interviewed the top executives 
inside the organization that had primary roles in the decision process.  I also 
interviewed a senior executive in the Department of Defense, an important 
stakeholder group, which did not view this initiative as necessarily a good thing.  In 
addition to reviewing archival data to establish potential interviewees, I also acquired 
recommendations from those interviewed.  
Decision event number two:  The Coast Guard Search and Rescue Station 
Realignment Initiative (short title: Station Realignment).  In the early 1990s, the 
Coast Guard was directed by the Administration to reduce its budget by 12 percent.  
As the organization studied ways to reduce its outlays, it discovered a 
workforce/workload imbalance in its search and rescue stations that are designed to 
rescue mariners in distress and enforce safety regulations on the water.  As part of its 
workforce reduction, the organization sought to redistribute its workforce to better 
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balance the workload.  Consequently, some of these search and rescue stations would 
be closed so that personnel could be released from the payroll and others reassigned 
to better manage the workload.  
Search and rescue stations are considered to be as relevant and important as 
fire houses by the communities in which they are located in much the same way that 
communities rely on their fire houses to respond, seaside communities rely on Coast 
Guard stations to respond when their residents get into trouble on the water.  I 
interviewed senior executives inside the organization who worked on the study.  The 
strategic decision in this event was which search and rescue stations should be closed 
and, more importantly, how that decision would be made.  
Decision event number three:  The Coast Guard Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation Initiative (short title: Vessel Documentation Consolidation).  As one of 
its many responsibilities, the Coast Guard is required by the United States Code to 
document vessels of certain dimensions that are used for certain purposes.  Much like 
a registration is required for automobiles that travel on highways, vessels that travel 
on domestic waters and whose owners seek the protection of U. S. laws are required 
to be documented by the Coast Guard.  
To accomplish this responsibility, the Coast Guard had vessel documentation 
offices across the country in major metropolitan areas adjacent to seaports.  This 
made sense because this was where the customers resided.  However, advances in 
technology created an opportunity to streamline this process resulting in cost savings 
and arguably better service to the customers.  I interviewed senior executives within 
the organization as well as stakeholders outside the organization who participated in 
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this event.  The strategic decision was how to go about consolidating offices in a 
manner that was supported by customers and politicians whose districts would lose 
federal employees and perceived federal services to constituents.  
Decision event number four:  The Coast Guard Civilian Personnel 
Organizational Realignment (short title: Civilian Personnel Realignment).  In the 
early 1990s, budgetary pressures from Congress required that the Coast Guard 
consider numerous cost saving initiatives.  With approximately 7,000 civilian 
employees in the organization of 40,000 people, one of the initiatives was to reduce 
the necessary administrative infrastructure to support those employees.  This issue 
had been studied numerous times over the years as a way to save money.  I 
interviewed senior executives from inside the organization who participated in the 
restructuring study.  The strategic decision was how to achieve savings in the civilian 
personnel structure of the Coast Guard.  
Selection of Participants 
Participant selection was done through a purposive sample and limited to 
senior executives of the U.S. Coast Guard responsible for strategic decisions as well 
as leaders of stakeholder groups who were responsible for promoting or discouraging 
collective action outside the organization.  They were not selected on the basis of age, 
sex, race, ethnic origin, religion, or socio-economic conditions.  Identification of the 
participants resulted from discussions with participants already known to be involved 
in the issues by the researcher and those identified in record archive materials that 
were reviewed for each of the decision events.  
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Initially, a core group of eight executives known to be involved with each of 
the four decision events were identified.  Letters were mailed to each of the 
participants soliciting their participation.  During follow up discussions to coordinate 
the interviews and during each of the interviews, participants were asked to identify 
additional executives who participated in the strategic decision-making event.  This 
approach yielded 15 other executives who were sent letters inviting their 
participation.  Only two of the additional prospective participants were not 
interviewed.  One executive declined to be interviewed because he did not believe he 
had much insight to offer.  The other executive was unresponsive to my requests.  
Of the 21 executives who were interviewed, 14 were internal to the Coast 
Guard and seven were external to the Coast Guard for each of the four decision 
events.  Seven executives were interviewed who participated in decision event one.  
Two of these participants were external to the Coast Guard.  Four executives were 
interviewed for decision event two, one who was external to the Coast Guard’s 
decision process.  There were five executives interviewed who participated in 
decision event three, two who were external to the Coast Guard.  Lastly, five 
executives were interviewed for decision event four, two who were external to the 
Coast Guard’s decision-making process.     
Document summary forms were used for archival data that were reviewed 
during this research.  The document summary forms were used to capture the 
importance of the document to the particular decision event, a brief summary of the 
contents, and connection to a participant who is identified from the material (see 
Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 54-55).  
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An active, face-to-face interview was conducted with those participants whose 
role was determined to be instrumental in the particular decision event.  When a face-
to-face interview was impractical because of scheduling, access, or costs, a telephone 
interview was conducted.  This only happened on two occasions when respondents 
resided in California and schedules were too problematic to facilitate a face-to-face 
meeting.  Participants were contacted initially via letter or e-mail, which explained 
the nature of the research and why I sought their participation.  Only one prospective 
participant declined to participate.  All participants were advised of not only the 
voluntary nature of the interview but also their option to suspend their participation at 
any point during the process.  All participants signed documentation acknowledging 
their consent and rights.  Twenty-one senior executives in total participated in the 
interviews.  
Procedures
Participation consisted of responding to face-to-face active interviews, with 
the exception of two interviews that had to be completed by telephone.  The initial 
interviews, which began in early August 2003 and concluded in May 2004, varied in 
length between an hour and half to two hours and a half.  This length of time has been 
determined by researchers to be sufficient when interviewing senior managers (Agar, 
1994).  Nearly all interviews required subsequent discussions with the participants to 
acquire additional information or clarification of comments made during the initial 
interviews to help me better understand the data provided.  Subsequent interviewing 
required an additional 15 to 20 minutes on average and most follow up questions 
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were answered by telephone.  Thus, the data yielded collaborative interpretations of 
the themes and patterns that emerged from the interviews.  
All of the interviews were conducted at mutually agreed upon locations and 
times in the case of face-to-face interviews and during mutually agreed upon times 
for the two telephonic interviews.  Although an interview protocol was approved by 
the Human Subjects Review Board, University of Maryland, and followed in each 
case (see Appendix B), the interviews were only marginally structured and many of 
the questions were open-end, which allowed for the participants to deviate from the 
original questions and discuss areas they thought relevant to the strategic decision-
making event.  All participants permitted me to tape record the interviews, and each 
interview was personally transcribed.  All digital files of the initial interviews were 
retained in an electronic format.  After I completed transcribing the interviews and 
made notes in the margins where I needed clarification, I e-mailed the transcript to 
each participant and asked for clarification or elaboration through additional 
meetings, written responses, or follow-up phone calls.  
Contact summaries were used for each participant.  The contact summary 
form was designed to be simple and capture information that described when the 
interview was conducted, how the interview was conducted, how long the interview 
took, where the interview was conducted, general observations about major themes, 
key responses generated by the interview protocol, and unresolved questions that 
required additional inquiry (see Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 51-54).  The contact 
summaries were used to capture relevant and significant data from the interview field 
notes and were instrumental in coding the data.  Following the interviews, 
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participants were contacted for clarification of issues that were unclear in the field 
notes through e-mails or follow-up phone calls.  
Participants were provided a brief summary of the research in letters 
requesting their participation (Appendix A), an outline of questions for the interview 
(Appendix B), and informed consent forms (Appendix C).  The interview questions 
were developed to probe areas dealing with participation in the strategic decision-
making process.  These included the role and expertise of participants and whether 
they were identified to participate in the process or initiated action to be included.  
Questions also probed the actual decision-making process and whether participants 
perceived it as continuous or discrete, whether power was perceived as highly 
concentrated or more dispersed among the participants, how participants became 
aware of the event, and the role communication managers played in these strategic 
decision-making events.  I pretested the interview with a small sample of associates to 
clarify questions that might arise from the interview protocol before proceeding full 
scale with the research.  Based on the pretest, necessary adjustments were made with 
the interview protocol.  The informed consent form contained information about the 
project, the investigator, the participants’ rights, and contact information for the 
researcher.  Participants were informed that their participation was strictly voluntary, 
and they signed and return the informed consent forms to the investigator prior to the 
interviews.  
In addition to interviewing, I collected or reviewed in excess of 50 documents 
that were relevant to substantiate, amplify, or refute information gleaned from the 
interviews.  This allowed for triangulation of the data.
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Ethical Considerations
There are several general ethical issues that are of concern in qualitative 
research and are relevant to this study because the researcher is an “instrument” of 
data collection.  Being part of the study is fundamental to qualitative research 
designs—especially when data collection techniques such as interviews are being 
used.  Marshall and Rossman (1994) categorized these issues as either technical—
“ones that address entry and efficiency in terms of role”—or interpersonal—“ones 
that capture the ethical and personal dilemmas that arise” (pp. 59-60).  Technical 
concerns include “participantness…revealedness…intensiveness and 
extensiveness…” and whether the focus of the study is “specific or diffuse” (pp. 60-
61).  These concerns consider how researchers gain access to the research site and 
participate in activities that are part of the phenomenon being studied, to what extent 
the participants are aware of the study, how much time researchers spend in the 
setting, and the specificity of the study’s focus.  According to Marshall and Rossman, 
interpersonal issues that arise arguably:
…depend primarily on the interpersonal skills of the researcher.  In 
general texts this is often couched as building trust, maintaining good 
relations, respecting the norms of reciprocity, and sensitively 
considering ethical issues.  These entail an awareness of the politics of 
organizations, as well as sensitivity to human interaction. (pp. 64-65)  
With respect to the technical ethical issues, I was very explicit with 
participants in the description of my role as a researcher because of my affiliation 
with the Coast Guard.  Although it was important to disclose my status as a member 
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of the Coast Guard, it was equally critical that none of the participants sought to use 
my role as a researcher to leverage their respective positions in the strategic decision-
making process for their respective decision events.  The four decision events were
historical; therefore, there was minimal risk that participants would seek to use my 
research to influence past decisions.  From an interpersonal ethical perspective, it was 
necessary that I protect the data acquired from the participants during the interview 
process.  Confidentiality was provided to all participants.  
These decision events posed few ethical concerns because most of the 
interview participants had moved to different assignments within the Coast Guard, 
retired from the Coast Guard, or were external to the organization.  Notwithstanding 
the benefits of historical context, there remained some interpersonal ethical concerns 
because some of the data gathered might, if mishandled, reflect adversely on some of 
the key participants because they continue to serve in the Coast Guard.  From a 
technical ethical perspective, although I was serving as the Chief of Coast Guard 
Media Relations during the time some of these decision events transpired, my role 
was simply to disseminate the information that was given to me by my superiors; I 
had no direct role in the actual strategic decision-making process.  
This project presented minimal risks to participants.  The potential risks and 
benefits were explained to all interview participants prior to their participation in the 
project.  There was no foreseeable harm to participants.  Standard methods to protect 
privacy were adhered to.  The identities of the participants and their affiliations were 
protected and remain confidential 
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Benefits of participation included a greater understanding of how strategic 
decisions were made in this organization and how they might enhance future strategic 
decision-making.  
Analytical Techniques and Approach
Huberman and Miles (1994) argued that qualitative data analysis should be as 
easy to replicate as quantitative data analysis.  Citing the difficulty in using original 
field notes to arrive at similar conclusions, they suggested an interactive model for 
data analysis.  This model called for three subprocesses of data analysis: data 
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing or verification.  
In Miles and Huberman’s (1994) view, data reduction subprocesses actually 
commence before data are collected.  Data collection may come from a variety of 
sources such as interviews, documents, field notes from observations, and surveys.  
By considering how data are to be reduced, the researcher is guided toward certain 
types of data collection methods.  Marshall and Rossman (1995) made a similar 
observation about the critical link between data collection and data analysis.  They 
noted that Schatzman and Strauss (1973) recognized this relationship when they 
argued that because qualitative data are complex, researchers must analyze as data are 
collected and adjust collection strategies toward those data most critical to 
understanding the phenomenon of interest.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested numerous analytical techniques.  As 
discussed earlier, contact summary sheets, which represent a one-page synopsis of 
questions that researchers use to develop summaries of field contacts, were used for 
this research.  In addition, document summary forms were used to help clarify and 
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understand the importance of documents collected during fieldwork.  Although 
contact summary sheets and document summary forms were used, they were not 
coded.  However, the interview transcripts were coded for retrieval and analysis.  
Codes represent meaning of the actual words and can be descriptive, interpretive, or 
patterned.  In this study, I sought to understand whether there were patterns that 
revealed themselves through the interviews and documents.  Clear operational 
definitions are imperative for codes to reduce ambiguity and inconsistency and to 
facilitate analysis.  Coding schemes actually represent what Miles and Huberman 
referred to as a conceptual web.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that reflective remarks represent what 
researchers think about as they record raw field notes.  Such reflections might include 
new hypotheses, questioning existing data, or elaboration of prior information thought 
to be irrelevant and included in parentheses.  Marginal remarks, on the other hand, are 
included in margins and help clarify and add meaning to field notes.  In addition, 
colleagues and critics can provide marginal remarks to help researchers examine 
alternative explanations.  
Pattern coding was used in this research to help group emergent or inferential 
themes.  Pattern coding reduced large amounts of data into smaller units, facilitated 
analysis during collection, and assisted in clarifying the conceptual map.  According 
to Miles and Huberman (1994), pattern codes typically focus around themes, causes, 
personal relationships, and theoretical constructs.  
Marshall and Rossman (1995) argued that analysis is complete only after 
critical categories are defined and relationships of categories are established.  They 
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observed that five modes govern analytic procedures.  These include organizing data; 
establishing categories, themes, or patterns; testing hypotheses against the data; 
considering alternative paradigms; and writing the report.  
Miles and Huberman (1994), in positing the second subprocess of data 
display, made clear the centrality of this concept to identifying the linkages and 
patterns that emerge from the data.  Data displays that are focused, co-located, and 
complete allow users to draw conclusions.  These data displays represent the 
distillation of raw data and, if done adequately, improve confidence in the findings 
through various levels of abstraction.  For example, Miles and Huberman offered 
contact summary forms and reports of case analysis meetings as examples to consider 
for data displays.  
Data displays can take two general formats: matrices that have defined cells 
and networks that have links between the various nodes.  Data entries can take many 
forms depending on what researchers are trying to understand.  Examples include 
text, quotes,  and ratings.  Miles and Huberman (1994) said it is important to note that 
“the creation and use of displays is not separate from analysis, it is part of the 
analysis” (p. 11).  Data displays help validate qualitative analyses because they 
provide the framework from which conclusions may be drawn.
As discussed in Chapter II, this research was primarily designed to understand 
the relationship between power and the effectiveness of particular decision events and 
what role communication management might or should play in the strategic decision-
making process.  Consequently, the analysis concentrated on the relationship of 
defined cells such as those noted in table 3.2.
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Table 3.2
Perceived Effectiveness of Decision
More Less
Perceived Power Dispersion High
Low
Miles and Huberman (1994) offered some “rules of thumb” for such matrix 
displays.  For example, for this research, the partitions are based on observations 
about decision events as perceived by participants and are more descriptive in nature 
than explanatory.  Miles and Huberman also noted that ordering, sequencing and 
categorization were also considerations (p. 240).  Of critical import, Miles and 
Huberman noted that “the conclusions drawn from a matrix can never be better than 
the quality of the data entered”(p. 241).  
Data Analysis
There were essential two steps to the data analysis that were based on the 
analytic techniques of Huberman and Miles (1994), Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
Marshall and Rossman (1995).  Following the collection of the data, the first step in 
the data analysis process consisted of data reduction.  This process consisted of 
transcribing the interviews, recording and reviewing field notes, and clarifying the 
data by conducting additional interviews with the participants.  As indicated, each 
interview was digitally and audio recorded and personally transcribed.  Personally 
transcribing the interviews allowed me to remain close to the data and compare the 
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audio with field notes to underscore areas perceived to have special relevance to the 
participants, which I inferred from emphasis made during the interviews. 
The annotated transcriptions with marginal notes and questions were provided 
to each of the participants for clarification during subsequent interviews.  The revised 
transcriptions with clarifying comments were then compiled for the second phase of 
the data analysis—interpretation analysis.  
The interpretive analysis, which was the second step of the analysis, had 
several components.  First, edited transcriptions based upon active interviews with 
senior executives were examined.  As indicated, notes were made in the margins 
where I had questions about comments made by participants that required 
clarification.  These questions were answered during subsequent discussions with the 
participants.  So, the interpretation of the meaning of various phenomena was more 
collaborative than a product of my own attribution of meaning.    
The edited transcripts were then used as the basis for contact summary sheets, 
which facilitated identifying relevant issues, common patterns or similar themes or 
categories.  I initially examined the data in each decision event to develop the 
recurrent themes, patterns, and categories.  
The analysis of each of the four decision events was then compared with each 
analysis of the other decision events to determine if there were areas of similarity or 
consistency in the themes, patterns and categories.  To support the participants’ 
comments and patterns, I sought confirming, as well as disconfirming or conflicting, 
information in the numerous documents that I was either allowed to review on site or 
were provided to me.  By looking for disconfirming or conflicting information, I 
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considered the potential for other explanations.  By using an interactive model of data 
display, which included tables of “cut and pasted” lists and two-by-two matrices, I 
established loosely-connected relationships among the various themes, patterns, and 
categories.  
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CHAPTER IV
Results
This research was exploratory and sought to better understand strategic 
decision-making and how public relations might contribute to enhancing this process 
in one organization, the U.S. Coast Guard.  Active interviews with senior executives 
of the organization and external stakeholders involved in each of the four decision 
events provided me the opportunity to acquire rich narratives of the various strategic 
decision-making processes.  In addition, document reviews and analyses allowed for 
the confirmation and corroboration of data to establish claims and assertions made by 
the participants.  
Each research question presented a unique set of circumstances and challenges 
about how best to visually display the themes and patterns that emerged from the 
analyses.  Therefore, the results are presented through the use of a combination of 
matrix displays of categories with themes and patterns supported by comments made 
by the participants when I believed they were appropriate and interpretive narratives 
that captured the essence of the common themes and patterns that emerged from the 
data.  
As a brief review, the research examined strategic decision-making processes 
that involved four decision events that occurred in the U.S. Coast Guard.  Two of 
these decision events were believed by the researcher to result in greater success than 
the others.  Although numerous criteria could be use to establish what is meant by 
“greater success,” the central metric that was used in this study to assess whether the 
decision event was more successful boiled down to whether the organization was able 
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to accomplish what it initially set out to accomplish.  The notion of more effective 
versus less effective was discussed with a subset of the participants who were familiar 
with all four decision events.  The four participants with whom I discussed or 
exchanged correspondence on the issue of effectiveness suggested that all of the 
decision events were good ideas; however, two of the events appeared to be “plagued 
by poor implementation.”  The outcome of two of the decision events were 
considered less effective not because they were bad business decisions but because 
the process that was followed to achieve the outcome appeared to be flawed.  Because 
this research is a study of process as well as outcome, this is an important distinction.  
How might a different process have yielded a different outcome?  For example,
decision events one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation) 
were perceived by the participants who were familiar with all four events as more 
effective not only because they appeared to achieve their objectives but also because 
they appeared to follow different paths during the implementation.  These were the 
same two events I had judged previously to be most effective.  Therefore, one of the 
primary objectives of the research was to understand these differences and determine 
what the implications might be for strategic decision-making and public relations 
theory and practice.      
As a review, decision event number one was the Coast Guard Integrated 
Deepwater System Recapitalization Program (Deepwater).  Today, the organization is 
implementing the results of this strategic decision and building a new fleet of ships, 
planes, communications capabilities and sensors.  
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Decision event number two was the Coast Guard Search and Rescue Station 
Realignment Initiative (Station Realignment).  The organization was able to 
implement only minor portions of this strategic decision.  The primary goal, which 
was to close underused search and rescue stations in order to redistribute resources, 
was not achieved.  Although a limited number of resources were redistributed 
throughout the search and rescue station community, the decision did not meet 
organizational objectives because no units were closed.  
Decision event number three was the Coast Guard Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation Initiative (Vessel Documentation Consolidation).  This strategic 
decision was highly successful.  Today, there is one consolidated center that services 
clients all over the United States.  Not only did the organization gain significant 
efficiencies, it also provides better service to its customers, an assessment that comes 
from those who use the organization’s Vessel Documentation Office’s services.  
Decision event number four was the Coast Guard Civilian Personnel 
Organization Realignment (Civilian Personnel Realignment).  This strategic decision 
has been largely reversed following its initial implementation.  The primary goal, 
which was to streamline the organization’s civilian personnel system to reduce costs 
and provide better service, failed to achieve its objective and cost the organization 
more money in the final analysis.  The results of the initiative alienated personnel and 
created problems where none had existed in managing civilian personnel in the 
organization.  
Why was the organization successful in only two of these strategic decision 
events?  Were there common themes, patterns, or attributes that contributed to the 
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success of these events?  And, especially important for the purposes of this research, 
might the communication management function of the organization have served a 
role that would have improved the likelihood that the organization might have 
achieved its objective in all four of the important initiatives?  
Research question 1:  How do executives view strategic decision-making—as a 
discrete event or a continuous process and why?  What are the implications for the 
strategic decision-making process?
The first research question sought to better understand how executives who 
had participated in these four decision events perceived their particular strategic 
decision-making process and whether this seemed to correlate with how effective the 
decision was perceived to be in the end.  Additionally, I wanted to understand how 
the participants’ viewed the various “drivers” which caused the strategic decision-
making event to occur, and whether there appeared to be a pattern among the decision 
events.  
Several themes and patterns emerged on the question of how executives 
viewed their respective strategic decision-making process.  These included the 
observation that decisions viewed as discrete appeared to be less effective than 
strategic decisions thought to be continuous by the participants (Table 4.1).  In 
addition, strategic decisions that tended to be influenced by external drivers appeared 
to be more effective.  Finally, strategic decisions that did not possess clarity of 
purpose and were not communicated in a manner understood by those participating in 
a decision process, appeared to be less effective.
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Table 4.1
Decision Event Effectiveness versus Decision-making Perspective
Discrete Continuous
Decision Effectiveness
More 1, 3
Less 2, 4
Participants involved in decision events two (Station Realignment) and four 
(Civilian Personnel Realignment) were much more likely to characterize the strategic 
decision-making event as discrete.  An executive involved with decision event two 
said: “This was an internally-generated initiative and was not influenced by groups 
outside the Coast Guard… It was actually isolated.”  On the other hand, another 
participant involved with decision event number four remarked: 
The driver was external…the goal was a 50 percent reduction.  Rather 
than wait for a solution to be imposed on us, we decided to take 
matters into our own hands at the direction of the Commandant and try 
and achieve these reductions...I think we viewed it more discretely.  
In this instance, although the participant viewed the pressure on the organization as 
external, he characterized the actual decision-making process as discrete, or isolated, 
with little or no connection to other organizational initiatives.  
Participants of decision events one (Deepwater) and three Vessel 
Documentation Consolidation), on the other hand, were more likely to view the 
process as more continuous, or connected to other strategic initiatives by the 
organization.  Although executives generally characterized decision event one as 
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more discrete, they recognized the importance of connections to longer term 
initiatives as reflected in the following comment:
Unlike the Department of Defense where they have consistently a 
fairly stable acquisition budget, the Coast Guard acquisition cycle is 
discrete.  …Unfortunately, I think the Coast Guard still believes that 
this process is a discrete one that is stretched over 20 years.  The 
danger that the Coast Guard faces, especially if we accelerate this 
project will be that we will face block obsolescence again.  
Therefore, I interpreted the participant’s observation as understanding the importance 
of this particular strategic decision as being more continuous than discrete.  And, in 
the case of decision event three, several participants noted that this process of 
consolidating documentation offices was merely a continuation of prior 
consolidations designed to improve customer service while reducing costs.  
Participants of decision event three viewed their process as evolutionary and 
connected with other previous organizational initiatives.  
This notion of prior experience and connectedness is important for two 
reasons.  First, the literature on the social psychology of groups and activism reveals 
that prior experience with activism can enhance the likelihood of group activity 
during strategic decision-making processes (Stevenson, et al., 1985).  Second, public 
relations professional should account for the likelihood of activism during strategic 
decision-making processes by understanding whether stakeholders have prior 
experience that might increase or discourage group activity and, more importantly, 
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whether executives involved in a strategic decision-making initiative view the process 
as discrete or continuous (L. Grunig & J. Grunig, 1997).  
Externally-driven strategic decisions appeared to have been more successful 
than those that were self-generated.  Forces applied from outside the organization by 
various stakeholders and customers involved in the process actually appeared to help 
facilitate a more effective decision.  For example, an executive involved with decision 
event number three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation) observed:
The major driver was that the statute required within a certain time to 
provide a consolidated record of all vessels of the United States.  The 
only way that this could be accomplished was to somehow consolidate 
all of the offices.  Each of the vessel documentation offices operated 
independently and under the cognizance of their respective marine 
safety offices.  
Another participant noted that customers were frustrated because of the lack of 
consistency and demanded the organization improve its processes:
I had one attorney in San Francisco who called me very supportive of 
our effort because she was tired of having to consult people for the 
secret forms in the bottom right hand drawer to get documentation for 
her vessels.  
Of particular interest was the perceived “lack of clarity” by the participants in 
the stated purposes for decision event numbers two (Station Realignment) and four 
(Civilian Personnel Realignment).  Noted one participant involved in decision event 
number two: “It kind of evolved.  We knew we didn’t have enough billets [positions] 
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in the field to do the job.”  Another participant from decision event number four 
remarked:
The Coast Guard was looking for a cheaper way to do things, not 
necessarily a more efficient way to do things.  This was in stark 
contrast to how the initiative was initially framed—we knew this was 
about a smaller Coast Guard, but we also believed it was about a better 
Coast Guard… In the earlier study, we had strong leadership and a lot 
of clarity…we started out one way and ended another…It was bait and 
switch. 
In this study, the executives involved in the decision events believed to be 
more effective viewed their strategic decision-making process as more continuous 
and connected to other critical, longer-term organizational initiatives.  In addition, 
these events were also perceived to possess more significant external drivers and had 
greater clarity of purpose.  
Research question 2:  How do executives characterize the way they make strategic 
decisions and why?  What are the implications for the strategic decision-making 
process and public relations theory and practice?
The second research question was designed to clarify how the participants 
characterized the way decisions were made.  Were there particular qualities of the 
strategic decision-making process that the participants perceived as instrumental in 
the outcomes of their efforts?  
Although several patterns emerged from the research in response to this 
question about how executives characterized the way they made strategic decisions, 
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one particular quality stood out among all four decision events and addressed whether 
the process was perceived by the participants as more or less transparent with all of 
the stakeholders.  Other recurring themes included issues concerning public 
disclosure, assumptions, and timing.
Transparency was a common theme for the decision events that were 
perceived to be more effective (Table 4.2).  Participants recalled the processes as 
considerably more open.  Regarding decision event one (Deepwater), for example:
The mission analysis war room, as we called it, was open for anyone 
to come in and out of.  This war room was free for people to come in 
and see what was going on; they were also encouraged to make 
comments.  This was fascinating and relatively unprecedented that 
people could come in and look around and provide comment on such a 
major project.
Table 4.2
Perceived Decision Effectiveness versus Transparency of Process
More Transparent Less Transparent
Decision Effectiveness
More 1, 3
Less 2, 4
In decision event three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation), a participant noted:
[Executive] actually recruited people and solicited others to participate 
in the process.  So, people either volunteered or they were identified 
by their units as having something to add to this process…we did take 
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a lot of input from our customers…we conducted numerous public 
meetings…
In contrast, executives involved in decision events two (Station Realignment) 
and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) shared the observation that they were 
constrained from being more public about the process—at least until the initial 
positions had been established.  For example: 
The team worked on this project exclusively at the time and came up 
with a product.  At that point, the product had to be marketed and 
distributed among other offices in the [Headquarters] building and 
field units for comment and input…Once we went public, it was a 
fairly open process.
This approach was markedly different from the process followed in decision events 
one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation) where there was 
active engagement and encouragement to be part of the strategic decision-making 
process early on.  Participants of decision events two (Station Realignment) and four 
(Civilian Personnel Realignment) thought they had been “fairly open;” however, this 
characterization was more legitimate after the decision had already been 
accomplished and the organization had entered an implementation phase of the 
strategic decision-making process.  In short, stakeholders involved in decision events 
two (Station Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) had little or no 
say in that actual decision process.  This finding supports L. Grunig’s (1992a) 
proposition that suggests that excellent organizations should use two-way 
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communication to inform and remain informed about external stakeholders’ positions 
and activities.  
Public disclosure of positions not well supported early on in the strategic
decision-making process made it difficult for the participants in decision events two 
(Station Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) to follow through 
and deliver more effective decisions.  Noting that “our early numbers became etched 
in stone,” one participant observed: “Once someone says it, it becomes hard to 
change especially if you’re talking about money.”  In decision event four (Civilian 
Personnel Realignment), when the executive was asked about estimated savings from 
streamlining the civilian personnel system, he noted:
[Participant] told me that he was not going to hold me to any hard 
numbers.  Therefore, I gave him some cost savings based on no hard 
analysis…What was really upsetting to me was that I found out that 
[participant] used those numbers as hard numbers.  Those numbers 
found their way into the Coast Guard budget in terms of savings.
This particular reflection highlights two critical attributes of decision-making.  The 
first deals with trust, which was undermined in this decision-making event.  The 
second attribute addresses public disclosure of positions not well supported by staff 
work.  Executives in strategic decision-making processes should first do their 
homework to ensure that commitments offered in negotiations can be honored; 
however, trust is also a critical component that must be carefully protected to ensure 
organizations openly discuss robust alternatives.  
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Assumptions are part of every decision-making process; however, in decision 
events two (Station Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment), they 
proved to be fatal.  In decision event two, one participant observed that the public 
affairs function was not included in the process because:
…we were doing a scientific analysis, not a political one.  
Understanding politics [would be] involved, we wanted to have a 
righteous list to give to General Accounting Office (GAO) that was 
defensible.  We felt like we could show them the rigorous analysis, 
show them the numbers, and keep the Commandant off of [the
investigative news program] “60 Minutes.”  
This participant’s perspective of public affairs as merely an organizational function 
designed to provide a political overlay to keep the chief executive officer out of 
trouble in the news simplifies the potential contribution of public relations to the 
strategic decision-making process.  According to Nutt (2001), organizations can 
improve decision-making by better managing not only the business case requirements 
for the decision but also the social and political forces that are inevitably part of every 
decision-making event.  
According to an executive involved with decision event four (Civilian Personnel 
Realignment):
One of the assumptions underpinning the consolidation was that we 
would be heavily invested in technology and could therefore improve 
service and reduce outyear costs…This assumption that we would be 
heavily invested in technology did not happen.
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Decision events two (Station Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel 
Realignment) were significantly undermined by faulty assumptions.  In philosophical 
terms, the issue of assumptions deals directly with epistemology.  How organizations 
know what they know can enhance decision-making, or doom it to failure.  In 
decision event two, the participants completely ignored the political and social forces 
involved in the decision event until after the decision was made and the organization 
was moving toward implementation.  Participants seemed to believe that the decision 
would be able to stand on its sound business merits and would withstand the scrutiny 
of Congress and the affected stakeholders.  Effective Public relations professionals 
are trained to identify and understand how stakeholders view issues and events that 
will affect them.  Including this type of information can reduce uncertainty in the 
strategic decision-making process.  
Decision event four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) was based heavily upon 
the assumption that technology would allow employees to communicate with 
important elements of the organization rather than walking down the hall and 
interacting personally with staffs.  The participants completely ignored the “human 
element” of the communication process.  This was especially true for the civilian 
personnel program, which was established to support employees of the organization.  
Losing the human touch when the customers—in this case, the organization’s 
employees—were unable to accomplish the same work that consisted of sharing very 
personal information by leveraging technology, which was assumed to be in place, 
demonstrated a lack of understanding by the participants of a key component of the 
strategic decision-making process.  
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The last recurring theme that emerged from the data addressed timing issues 
associated with strategic decision-making processes.  This was most evident in 
interviews with participants associated with decision event four (Civilian Personnel 
Realignment):
There were a lot of reasons it failed…Another problem was timing.  
There is an old saying that you don’t reorganize the firehouse in the 
middle of a fire.  In the midst of streamlining the entire Coast Guard, 
we streamlined civilian personnel, which was going to be needed to 
support the larger streamlining initiative.  We reorganized in the 
middle of a fire.
Another participant echoed these sentiments:
…we recommended not to reorganize the civilian personnel system in 
the middle of reorganizing the Coast Guard because these are the 
people, expertise and processes that were critically needed to carry out 
the overall Coast Guard with regard to civilians.
Transparency of the strategic decision-making process was perceived to be an 
important attribute of decision events one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel 
Documentaion Consolidation), and less relevant in decision events two (Station 
Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment).  Public disclosure of early 
positions in strategic decisions seemed to unnecessarily constrain the options for 
participants of decision events two and four.  In addition, had assumptions proved 
accurate for decision events two and four, the decisions might have been more 
effective.  Finally, timing may be an important consideration in a strategic decision-
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making process.  The decision to “reorganize the firehouse in the middle of a fire,” as 
one participant noted, resulted in the unintended consequence of undermining the 
necessary support systems to execute other strategic decisions.  
Research question 3:  How do executives determine who participates in strategic 
decisions?  Does participation in the strategic decision-making process enhance the 
effectiveness of the decision?
The third research question was primarily concerned with better 
understanding how executives determined who did, or should have, participated in the 
strategic decision-making process.  By contrasting the four decision events against 
who participated in the process and whether the outcome was perceived as more or 
less effective, I wanted to determine if there were consistent patterns among or 
between the four decision events. 
Executives who were involved in the decision events that were perceived to be 
more effective appeared to have a much broader list of stakeholders who were 
included in the strategic decision-making process (Table 4.3).  For example, a 
participant from decision event one (Deepwater) noted that “We identified key 
figures…to help co-opt their support. … As far as the working group was concerned, 
we had members from every group who could conceivably benefit.”  Another 
participant involved in this process indicated that “There was actually a marketing 
and communications group that was created as part of the strategy…the Coast Guard 
leadership came out with a long list of key groups.” 
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Table 4.3
Participants of Strategic Decision-making Process
Decision Event 1 2 3 4
Participant Category
Process Leaders/Owners X X X X
Program Specialists X X X X
Stakeholders X X
Customers X X
General Public X X
Similar patterns were noted by participants involved in decision event three 
(Vessel Documentation Consolidation).  Said one executive: “[participant] actually 
recruited people and solicited others to participate in the process…we did take a lot of 
input from our customers…”  
On the other hand, participants who were involved in decision events two 
(Station Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) seemed to exclude 
anyone from participating who was not directly in charge of an overarching strategic 
decision-making process at the headquarters level.  When asked whether there was 
any thought given to including individuals or groups from outside the program or 
study team, the participants generally observed: 
…no, it was pretty much a programs issue, [or]… In the early going, it 
was primarily headquarters…I do not think we involved anyone below 
the district level, [or]…each personnel officer from the five personnel 
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centers across the country were charged with assembling information 
and feedback on various options that were being 
considered…Customers had the least opportunity for feedback.  
Thus, decision events one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation) appeared to have been much more inclusive of external stakeholders 
in the strategic decision-making approach, which appeared to enhance the outcome of
the process.  
Research question 4:  How do relationships affect the inclusion of people and/or 
groups in strategic decisions and what are the implications for the practice of public 
relations?
The question of how relationships affected the inclusion of people or groups 
was designed to understand how this social phenomenon influenced the strategic 
decision-making process.  The data indicated that I had to consider the participants’ 
responses based on whether the information was relevant to groups inside the 
organization or external to the organization.  Therefore, I reduced the data to identify 
whether the participants’ responses were directed at internal or external groups.  The 
research question also sought to identify whether the participants perceived particular 
relationship qualities as important.  The primary qualities that emerged from the 
interviews included cooperation, loyalty, trust, and commitment.  Finally, I wanted to 
know whether the participants characterized the various attributes of the relationships 
as relatively strong or weak.
In general, the recurring themes of cooperation, loyalty, trust and commitment 
were perceived as relatively strong by the participants of decision events one and 
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three.  In contrast, participants of decision events two and four perceived these 
qualities as relatively weak (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4
Perceived Strengths of Relationship Attributes with Internal and External 
Groups
Decision Event 1 2 3 4
Perceived Relationships Internal S W S W
External S S S S
Perceived Cooperation Internal S W S S
External S W S S
Perceived Loyalty Internal S W S S
External S S S S
Perceived Trust Internal S W S S
External S S S S
Perceived Commitment Internal W W S S
External S S S S
S = Strong W = Weak
In speaking about one of the external groups important to the Coast Guard, a 
participant who was external to the Coast Guard and serving with the Navy involved 
with decision event one (Deepwater) noted:
My perception was that parts of the Navy [an important stakeholder] 
were a little bit worried of the potential negative consequences this 
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might have on their own acquisition abilities.  By and large, however, I 
think they saw the wisdom of this approach.
The same participant observed that an important stakeholder group to the Coast 
Guard was perceived to be willing to assume some degree of risk in supporting the 
Integrated Deepwater System acquisition in spite of the potential negative 
consequences, which demonstrated considerable commitment and cooperation to the 
relationship.  In fact, according to documents provided by the Coast Guard, the Navy 
financed a study external to the Coast Guard that supported the organization’s efforts 
to recapitalize its assets.  
Another respondent spoke of a pointed exchange between two top executives 
who were internal to the organization and involved in the same strategic decision 
event:  
[Executive] sent in a strong response to the 1995 Deepwater Mission 
Analysis draft report.  Some of the Headquarters staff were taken 
aback by his strong criticism of this draft report—that it contained no 
memorable theme about the Coast Guard’s role in maritime security, 
that the force planning process was in a death spiral with no 
identifiable process, that it focused upon past performance and past 
missions and not future demands and future missions, and national 
defense missions were exceedingly poorly defined.  His points were 
correct.
This particular passage revealed how confident the participants internal to the 
organization felt about voicing their opposition to some of the options being 
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discussed.  The passage also suggested a high degree of confidence by the participant 
that the criticisms would not be held against him.  Thus, there was significant 
commitment, loyalty and trust perceived by the executives who participated in this 
strategic decision-making process.  
Participants involved in decision event three (Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation) acknowledged that: “Personal relationships were very strong…  That 
made us keep New Orleans open.”  Such strong relationships in this process actually 
hindered the final outcome because the organization was precluded from closing one 
of its regional offices, which was a stated objective of the Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation initiative.  On balance, however, the organization was able to close 
every other documentation office and eventually closed the New Orleans office when 
customers realized that they were getting much better service under the streamlined 
and consolidated approach.  
The data regarding decision events two (Station Realignment) and four 
(Civilian Personnel Realignment) revealed different perspectives on the issue of how 
relationships affected the inclusion of people and groups in the strategic decision-
making process.  One participant involved in decision event two made the following 
observation:
The relationship between headquarters and the field units deteriorated 
as we reached the decision point.  Especially, among those units that 
were going to lose positions.  You just can't make people happy when 
you take something away.  I think we tried to bend over backwards to 
make them happy but it did not work.
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Another participant, who was external to the Coast Guard’s decision-making 
process, in this same decision event noted that:
I don't think any initiative with substance doesn't have someone who 
doesn't try and influence the outcome….Generally, my observation is 
that we react instinctively in defensive behaviors.  Eventually, most of 
us come around to rational decisions slowly, and sometimes painfully.
Similar themes emerged in the data provided by participants of decision event 
four (Civilian Personnel Realignment).  Because there seemed to be less trust in the 
relationships, participants were less likely to recall much commitment, cooperation, 
or loyalty in the strategic decision-making process.  As indicated earlier, one 
executive noted:
[Executive] told me that he was not going to hold me to any hard 
numbers.  Therefore, I gave him some costs savings based on no hard 
analysis.  The estimate that I gave him based on some general numbers 
… were not even close to accurate.  What was really upsetting to me 
was that I found out that [executive] used those numbers as hard 
numbers.  Those numbers found their way into the Coast Guard budget 
in terms of savings.  We started off behind the power curve in that we 
were forced to drive towards a number. …There was another 
dimension to this thing that made it extremely difficult.  That was the 
office of personnel leadership at the time…  Our relationship got so 
bad that anything I suggested, he automatically seemed to dismiss.  
That certainly didn't help. 
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Another participant I interviewed had a very interesting comment regarding 
the organization’s leadership and the strategic decision-making process.  In an earlier 
conversation between the participant and a flag officer, the participant relayed this 
exchange:
I remember asking him a question, like: “Did you use flag conferences 
to discuss these major change efforts?”  The officer cut me off and 
said:  "Wait a minute, commander, I never felt like I was part of senior 
leadership.  I always felt like we were simply going through the 
motions at these meetings.”  I think his perceptions were that the real 
decisions were being made following the flag conferences, when the 
three-star and higher admirals met during SAG [strategic advisory 
group] meetings.  I found this fascinating.  Here I thought, a flag 
officer was part of the senior leadership of our organization and you 
guys vote on these various options that had strategic implications for 
the organization and you do not even feel like you're part of senior 
leadership.
Thus, what appeared to emerge from the data was the notion that relationships 
characterized as having stronger cooperation, commitment, loyalty, and trust resulted 
in being included and consulted and, consequently, yielded a more effective strategic 
decision-making process.  One participant made the following observation in 
reference to comparing decision events two (Station Realignment) and three (Vessel 
Documentation Consolidation): “Personal relationships were very strong in some of 
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these areas…  There was really no difference in the merits of each case.  So, we lost 
that battle with the small boat stations.”  
Research question 5:  Do certain relationship attributes such as trust, familiarity, 
power and control, influence which people and/or groups are included in strategic 
decisions?
The fifth research question sought to determine if certain attributes, as defined 
by the participants, contributed to the perceived effectiveness of the strategic 
decision-making process by including or excluding various individuals or groups.  
The participants identified the attributes of trust, familiarity, commitment, loyalty, 
cooperation, transparency, persistence, and power as most relevant in their respective 
decision events.  Relationship attributes were generally characterized remarkably 
differently among the four strategic decision-making events.  However, there 
emerged a consistent pattern in two of the decision events considered to be more 
effective in contrast to the two decision events that were considered less effective 
(Tables 4.5 and 4.6).
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Table 4.5
Perceived Strength of Relationship Attributes 
Decision Event: 1 2 3 4
Perceived Relationship Attributes
Trust H L H L
Familiarity H L H L
Commitment H L H L
Loyalty H L H L
Cooperation H L H L
Transparency H L H L
Persistence H L H L
H = High L = Low
Table 4.6
Perceived Power Dispersion 
Decision Event: 1 2 3 4
Perceived Relationship Attributes
Power D C D C
D = Dispersed C = Concentrated
In decision event one (Deepwater), a participant observed:
The relationship between [Coast Guard] Headquarters and [Coast 
Guard] Atlantic Area was very, very contentious.… I remember 
having arguments with [executive], because he felt we should be 
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consulting with futurists; we should be doing a lot of different things, 
and he was right, but we didn't have the budget or people. … That 
said, they kept pushing us to do some other things they wanted and in 
the end, it made the project better.
The interesting point about this comment is that, in spite of a “contentious” 
relationship, the participants believed that the strategic decision-making process 
possessed a higher degree of cooperation and trust.  This represented a classic 
example of what Garvino and Roberto (2001) described as the first “C” of the three 
critical “C’s” of decision-making—conflict, consideration, and closure.  Through the 
focus on cognitive conflict rather than affective conflict, the participants were able to 
improve the decision-making process, or at least enhance its health.  Although there 
was significant and critical feedback, individuals and groups were not excluded from 
the process.
Another participant who was external to the Coast Guard during decision 
event one (Deepwater) and familiar with the relationship between the top two 
executives in the Coast Guard and the Navy said they “could not have been closer on 
this issue.”  A senior executive involved with decision event one, remarking on his 
initial, but early “rocky” relationship with a fellow executive indicated that:
[Executive] and I had it out one time very early in my tenure here.  We 
closed the door, aired our differences and committed to working 
together when the door opened again.  Following the meeting, we 
developed a terrific working relationship.  In fact, at times, we found 
ourselves shifting roles between the acquisition and sponsor.
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This narrative served as another example of the participants’ focus on cognitive 
conflict, which provides for healthier decision-making processes.
Another executive, who participated in the first decision event (Deepwater), 
identified “persistence” as one of the most important attributes of his relationships 
with key stakeholders.  In addressing the attribute of transparency, an executive who 
was outside the organization from one of the Coast Guard’s stakeholder groups and 
who was involved with decision event three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation), 
remarked:
Yes, a small group of us that attended felt that it was a very open 
meeting, and we had opportunity to comment.  In fact, after the 
meeting, we went out to dinner with [executive], where we had a 
further opportunity to discuss the initiative.  Actually, as I continued to 
talk to him, I still had my doubts.  I could not imagine how this was 
going to work.  By the end of the conversation we began talking about 
documentation services and setting up a professional organization of 
professionals like myself.  [Executive] was very encouraging about 
this initiative.  We also had a mutual friend who was an attorney with 
us at dinner and we all came out of that thinking this was the right time 
to develop a professional organization or association.
Another executive who participated in decision event three (Vessel 
Documentation Consolidation) underscored the importance of familiarity with 
stakeholders as well as the issues:
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I think we knew our stakeholders well enough and my experience as a 
field person helped me assess the problem areas.  I had been one of the 
most vocal opponents of consolidation back in 1983.  I routinely 
consulted with local congressional staffers during that effort.  So, 
because of my experience, I knew not only where the opposition 
would come but what it would look like.
Thus, what emerged from the participants’ observations of decision events 
one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation) indicated relatively 
strong perceptions of familiarity, trust, persistence, commitment, loyalty, and sense of 
shared power.  The concept of power appeared to be more defined by the participants 
in decision events one and three as having their contributions considered rather than 
the traditional perspective of power as a control mechanism.  These findings were in 
contrast to the perceptions of the participants from decision events two (Station 
Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment).  For example, when asked 
about the perceived power distribution, a participant who was external to the strategic 
decision-making process and involved in decision event two noted that “the people in 
the programs staff” held most of the power in the strategic decision-making process.  
Without these people supporting the organizational initiative, the process possessed 
little chance of success.  There was a clear attempt by those who participated in 
decision event two to control the information flow and outcome of the decision.
In addition, participants of decision event two (Station Realignment) noted:
At the [Coast Guard] district level it [the relationship] was 
accommodating and supportive; however, at the [Coast Guard] unit 
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level it was not.  It is hard for people at the local level to see what our 
[Headquarters] perspective is.  At times, there were numerous 
questions from the field about our data; however, we resolved them, 
when they came in.  They did not always agree with it, but they 
understood it.  [So, in your view, the more transparency you provided 
to the process, the less conflict you experienced?]  Yes.  In hindsight, I 
don't think we went out with information early enough and far enough 
down the organization.
With regard to familiarity, participants interpreted the question as referencing 
both familiarity with stakeholders and issues.  For example, an executive who was 
involved in decision event four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) noted that 
“[executive] and subsequent commanding officers found themselves spending an 
inordinate amount of time in civilian personnel matters for which they had no 
experience or training.  This really became a drain for the commanding officers.”  
One participant from decision event four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) 
relayed a vivid example that demonstrated the lack of trust in this particular decision-
making process.
I recall being summoned to a meeting with the Chief of Staff and there 
was a small group assembled.  The Chief of Staff said: “I am 
concerned about what the streamlining team is doing.  I am the Chief 
of Staff and they work for me, and I'm not fully aware of what they are 
doing so I want you collectively to review their work and provide 
recommendations and thoughts on the streamlining team’s 
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recommendations.”  I thought holy smokes!  This is kind of odd.  At 
that point, we began to go over to the streamlining team and have them 
brief us on what they were doing.  That was not a comfortable 
situation.  These folks felt like they had done a lot of work, and who 
the heck now was this group of five or six people who were reviewing 
their work.
Participants in the four decision events seemed to perceive the relationship 
attributes quite differently as they recounted their experiences.  However, it was 
apparent that the two decision events, which were believed to be more effective (one 
(Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation)), shared one set of 
common qualities and the two decision events, which were believed to be less 
effective (two (Station Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment)), 
shared different qualities.  The more effective decision events seemed to possess 
higher degrees of trust, familiarity, commitment, loyalty, cooperation, transparency, 
persistence, and dispersed power.
Research question 6:  Why do executives in organizations that are in the midst of 
strategic decisions that affect multiple groups believe that collective action occurs?
The next research question was designed to establish why the executives 
believed collective action resulted in each of their decision events and whether there 
appeared to be any pattern among the decision events.  I established the 
characterization of strong/weak, or win/lose based on interpretive analyses of the 
participants’ responses.  For example, a participant from decision event one 
(Deepwater) observed that “when the Coast Guard gets new money, someone else in 
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the government bureaucracy loses it.  Thus, education loses money or some other 
social program,” which I interpreted to represent a win/lose approach to decision-
making. 
In general, there appeared to be similar patterns associated with 
communications, transparency, empathy, politics, and honesty among the four 
decision events (Table 4.7).  Decision events one and three appeared to reflect a 
stronger approach to communications, transparency, and empathy, while decision 
events two and four appeared to be perceived as having stronger associations with 
politics and weaker associations with honesty.  
Table 4.7
Strength of Collection Action Attributes
Decision Event 1 2 3 4
Collective Action Attributes
Win(W)/Lose(L) Approach W S W S
Communications S W S W
Transparency S W S W
Empathy W W S W
Emotion W S S S
Politics W S W S
Honesty S W S W
S = Strong W = Weak
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For example, a participant associated with decision event two (Station 
Realignment), when asked about why collective action occurred during the process, 
noted:
Leadership and better communication [was the problem].  Simple as 
that.  First and foremost, we have to tell the people affected what we 
plan to do, why we plan to do it, and give then our expectations on 
how they can help us achieve that goal.  We did a poor job of that 
internally and externally.
The executive concluded that had there been more proactive communication, there 
likely would have been less collective action surrounding this particular decision 
event.  
In contrast to the poor communication associated with decision event two, a 
participant from decision event three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation) indicated 
that:
We told folks in the field that we planned to do this but we couldn't 
give them any details or confirmation until the Commandant had made 
a decision.  I promised my employees that I would never lie to them.  I 
told them that there might be things I could not discuss.  I told them 
that I might not be able to tell them yet; however, I promised them that 
I would never lie to them.  We kept them informed throughout the 
entire process as soon as we knew when the dates were set.  One of the 
things that I was determined to avoid was how we conducted the 
consolidation back in 1983.  They were done very badly in 1983.  
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Although there had been rumors for a long time, we learned third hand 
through the news.  The newspaper called the unit and wanted to know 
what my reaction was to the fact that my office was going to be closed.  
It had been released to the news media on a Thursday.  I tried to call 
Washington, DC, on Friday morning, which is when I learned of the 
decision; however, they were on a four-day workweek and I had to 
wait until the following Monday before I could speak with someone.  
So I had to sit through the weekend wondering whether the news was 
accurate.  It was just a terrible way to do business.  Every effort was 
made here to keep the employees informed.
This passage demonstrated remarkable clarity and purpose by the executive to 
ensure that communication was strong, clear, and honest during the decision-making 
process.  His experience with a prior similar decision resulted in his commitment to 
avoid mistakes of the past.  
Regarding the issue of empathy, a participant of decision event three (Vessel 
Documentation Consolidation), who was an external stakeholder to the organization, 
remarked:
Those people worked very, very hard getting this thing off the ground.  
[And, how did you know they worked very hard?]  Because I was told, 
and in personal conversations with them.  Our association also had a 
meeting at the National Vessel Documentation Center soon after this 
initiative was completed.  We had opportunity to talk to them, while 
we were there.  We got to go into the center and listen to their 
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experiences.  They showed us different areas of the center.  Looking at 
the piles and piles of boxes that they still had to go through, gave us a 
sense of what they had already accomplished and what they had yet to 
do.  The amount of work they have to do is incomprehensible.
These observations were rich with detail and helped an external stakeholder to 
the strategic decision making process who had a vested interest in the outcome more 
fully understand the nature of the challenges that had to be addressed at the end of the 
decision.  Empathy appeared to be an important factor in reducing resistance to the 
initiative.  
And, another participant who was external to the Coast Guard and familiar 
with the politics of decision events two (Station Realignment) and three (Vessel 
Documentation Consolidation) noted:
There was very little difference between this [decision event three] and 
the small boat station effort [decision event two].  You’re taking away 
something from the local-area.  The issue becomes what's the cost.  
This is something that the Coast Guard might slowly be starting to 
learn.  Just because you have a great idea, and it's the right thing to do, 
and you're going to save a lot of money and you’re going to be more 
efficient and have better service, it doesn't mean it's going to pass 
muster.  The right arguments were made in both initiatives.  One made 
it and one didn't.  It all came down to how strong are the politics of it.
Although the participant suggested that politics was a determining factor, empathy 
also appeared to play a significant role.  In decision event two, there was no attempt 
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to establish empathic stakeholders by including them in the decision-making process.  
On the other hand, participants of decision event three made a concerted effort to 
generate empathy and then solicit stakeholder input on how to resolve the challenges 
that the strategic decision-making event was designed to address.  
Interviews with the participants revealed similar patterns associated with 
communication, transparency, empathy, politics, and honesty among the four decision 
events.  There appeared to be fewer issues associated with collective action in 
decision events one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation).  
Arguably, the participants’ approach to these events to the decision-making process 
demonstrated a stronger commitment to communication, transparency, and empathy.  
Participants associated with decision events two (Station Realignment) and four 
(Civilian Personnel Realignment) relayed stronger associations with the politics of 
decision-making and weaker associations with honesty.
Research question 6a:  How do executives become aware of collective action during 
important organizational decision processes?
In examining the data collected for consideration of how executives became 
aware of collective action during strategic decision-making processes, there did not 
appear to be any consistent themes or similar patterns among the four decision events 
that helped executives become aware of collective action during strategic decision-
making.  
No particular organizational function was identified by any of the participants 
as having the responsibility to monitor the environment for collective action, or the 
potential for collective action.  However, there was more general awareness by the 
181
participants among decision events one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel 
Documentation Consolidation) regarding how the organization’s stakeholders 
perceived the issues associated with the decision event.  Arguably, the decision 
processes for these two events were much more transparent and there appeared to be 
greater inclusion of stakeholders in the decision.  Therefore, one could conclude that 
the participants in these two events were monitoring the environment and bringing 
this information into the organization’s decision process so that other participants 
would be aware of the issues.
Participants of decision events two (Station Realignment) and four (Civilian 
Personnel Realignment) indicated that awareness about the potential for collective 
action was much more constrained because there was tighter control on the flow of 
information and much stricter control on who participated in the strategic decision-
making process.  
For example, when a participant involved in decision event two was asked 
about consulting with external groups, he responded that “this was another big regret.  
Most of the effort and energy was focused internally, because it had to be sold there 
first before going outside.”  Another participant noted that:
The people in the field figured out what was going on after all these 
requests for information.  They put two and two together.  They 
figured out what was going on and, guess what?  They spun up the 
[Coast Guard] auxiliaries, who mentioned it to their congressmen.  All 
of a sudden, they started asking questions.  In my view, it was pay now 
or pay later… After the third or fourth data call, we began to get more 
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resistance.  I will never forget having a conversation with a [Coast 
Guard] district office and saying, “You have to get a handle on 
lieutenant so-and-so and remind him who he works for—that is the 
Commandant.  The Commandant wants to do this and you boys best 
get on the right side of the fence.”
Another participant involved with decision event four revealed:
The [executive] and civilian personnel leadership tried to keep our 
workforce informed.  However, that was a problematic area.  The 
[executive] had a total freeze on information going out to our 
workforce.  I don't believe that worked very well.  [Executive] was 
concerned about plans being disclosed that were not going to be 
implemented.  As a result, I don't believe as much information went 
out to our workforce as should have gone out to them.
Another participant of decision event four observed: “I do not think we did a 
good enough job of reaching out to those people who were still in the organization.”  
Although there was no organizational function responsible for making 
executives of strategic decision-making processes aware of collective action during 
the four decision events, participants of decision events one (Deepwater) and three 
(Vessel Documentation Consolidation) appeared to have a better understanding of 
their environment with respect to collective action.  This was likely the result of the 
fact that participants said they thought there was greater transparency and 
communication with stakeholders during the decision-making process.  The 
restrictive communication approach experienced by executives of decision events two 
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(Station Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) resulted in 
undermining the organization’s ability to better monitor the environment and consider 
the desires of the various stakeholders who had interests in the outcome of the 
decision.  
Research question 6b:  How does group size affect their strategic decision-making?
The next research question was designed to understand the effect of size of a 
coalition group on the strategic decision-making process.  It became clear through the 
interviews, however, that few participants recalled specific information regarding the 
sizes of the various groups with whom they interacted during the decision event.  This 
proved problematic in the data collection process.  However, several other 
dimensions other than size did emerge as influential for the participants I interviewed.  
The executives from the four decision events were unable to recall whether 
group size had any effect on their strategic decision-making.  However, several 
participants recalled other key variables that appeared to contribute to the degree of 
activism that was experienced during the decision events.  For example, a participant 
involved with decision event two (Station Realignment) recalled:
The key variables were community emotion [and] degree of activism.  
Some communities were more rational; others were more emotional.  
A lot of it had to do with the elected officials involved.  A lot of it had 
to do with how local Coast Guard people were interacting with the 
community.  And, there were instances where the local Coast Guard 
was not aligned with what we were trying to accomplish [at 
Headquarters].  In other words, local Coast Guard people in some 
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communities were inciting to riot rather than towing the company line.  
Station [name] was probably the worst outreach effort.  This unit was 
running less than 100 hours of total search and rescue on an annual 
basis.  The issue there was that the local Coast Guard people were so 
integrated into the community.  They were EMS [emergency medical 
services]; they were the volunteer firefighters; they were paychecks in 
a small community, where the small number of Coast Guard people 
made a huge difference in the community.  There were clearly some 
expectation management issues there.
Another participant involved in the same decision event observed:
As I recollect, there were snipers, who were disbursed all over the 
place.  Nothing appeared to be organized.  And, we were able to deal 
with the snipers as they cropped up.  The organized groups were the 
elected representatives.  It did not appear to me that they even had to 
organize.
Regrettably, I was unable to establish any useful patterns or themes regarding 
group size that might be of value to advancing our understanding of how group size 
influences the strategic decision-making of executives.  The literature informs us that 
larger groups have a more difficult time motivating their members.  However, how 
this influences decision-making remains unanswered.  The other dimensions that 
addressed emotion and activism by participants were isolated to data collected about 
decision event two (Station Realignment).
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Research question 7:  How do executives assess which issues might generate 
coalitional activity and what are the implications for public relations theory and 
practice?  
The seventh research question was aimed at seeking to understand how 
executives monitored the environment—especially regarding those issues that might 
incite coalitional activity.  For public relations, this is arguably an important role that 
is played in organizations.  Environmental scanning serves to warn organizations 
what is coming at them so they can be prepared to respond.  
This question sought to determine how executives in each of the four strategic 
decision events monitored their environment.  Specifically, I wanted to understand 
how they assessed which issues might have the capacity to generate coalitional 
activity and whether there was any specific organizational function responsible for 
monitoring and analyzing the environment.
Executives conducted numerous activities that could be classified as 
environmental scanning; however, there was little rhyme or reason to their 
methodology.  The environmental scanning generally occurred during benchmarking 
activities, or when information was acquired by some organizational function that 
raised the issue as a potential problem.  For example, an executive associated with 
decision event one (Deepwater) noted: “We went out to a lot of organizations, 
primarily to conduct research about how the process should run.  We did not do much 
priming of the pump.”  Thus, at least for this decision event, the executive did not 
believe there was much engagement with stakeholders prior to the strategic decision-
making process other than to conduct a comparative analysis.  
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Another executive associated with decision event two (Station Realignemnt) 
appeared to be very concerned with the political dynamics of the strategic decision-
making process: “I think leadership’s take given the political environment was that 
we had to find the least politically charged way to fix the problem.”  And, a different 
participant observed:
Other than the localities where we were going to take people away, the 
majority of people were against it.  Surprisingly, a couple of 
congressmen who were having stations closed in their District were for 
the effort.  Outside of that there weren’t many others who supported 
our efforts.
An executive associated with decision event three (Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation) acknowledged a constraint, which precluded federal agencies from 
conducting outreach until “the president’s budget is announced.  For me, I had to 
identify which politicians we needed to get on our side.”  
An executive involved in decision event four (Civilian Personnel 
Realignment) raised an interesting but unrelated point regarding those who 
participated in these types of decision processes.  He stated: 
People who often participate in these types of things feel entitled, 
because of the enormous amount of work.  Although most people may 
agree to do these types of projects without expecting anything in 
return, there must be a little what's in it for me in the back of their 
minds.
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His observation revealed that people who participate in decision-making processes 
often feel they are owed something for their efforts.  The motivation for people or 
groups to participate can become clouded by individual or group desires that may not 
be aligned with the actual goal of the strategic-making effort.  
And, another participant involved in this strategic decision-making process 
noted:
If time and resources were not an issue, I would have advocated 
getting our customers involved.  The Commands [Coast Guard units]
obviously wanted to retain their civilian personnel functions.  My own 
personal view is that if you want to improve customer support, you 
need to be close to the customer.  We did just the opposite.
Although there were numerous activities that appeared to be consistent with 
environmental scanning techniques used by public relations practitioners, no clear 
pattern emerged among or between the four decision events.  However, there did 
seem to be recognition by the participants that this was an important organizational 
activity even though no specific function appeared to be primarily responsible for 
monitoring the environment and evaluating whether organizational actions might 
generate coalitional activity.  
Research question 8:  Does coalitional activity or the potential for coalitional activity 
alter the way executives make strategic decisions?  
The eighth research question was designed to determine whether actual or 
potential coalitional activity influenced how executives made decisions.  For 
example, in decision event two (Station Realignment), there was resistance by local 
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communities to closing Coast Guard units.  How did this affect the behavior of the 
decision process for those executives involved?  
There did appear to be some distinct differences, which resulted in similar 
communication patterns between executives who were involved in decision events 
one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation), and executives 
who participated in decision events two (Station Realignment) and four (Civilian 
Personnel Realignment).  
For instance, participants in decision events one and three tended to describe 
the process as far more open and transparent, while participants of decision events 
two and four acknowledged concerted efforts by executives to conceal information 
until it was absolutely necessary to share.  Even though the organization assumed 
there might be resistance from a key stakeholder group—namely the Department of 
Defense (DoD)—participants still engaged key personnel in DoD because, as one 
executive said, “we also knew that we needed DoD on the sidelines.”  This reflected 
an overt attempt to influence the behavior of a key stakeholder group by sharing 
information.  Participants of decision events one and three were much more likely to 
engage all of the affected stakeholders associated with the decision event before the 
final decisions were made.  For example, a participant involved in decision event 
three said: “We held over our public meeting for a second session to allow people to 
vent.”  Again, this was a clear example of the participants seeking to better 
understand the concerns of their stakeholders.  Even an executive involved the 
decision event two (Station Realignment) acknowledged:
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You have to be proactive.  If you want to close a small boat unit, the 
only way I have found that works is the way that I did it in [location].  
Before we did anything, we went out and greased the skids.  We spoke 
with the local congressmen.  We briefed town councils.  We got their 
buy-in.  I am not naïve as to think that we would have been successful 
across-the-board; however, we were unable to even close one.  
On the other hand, participants of decision events two (Station Realignment) 
and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) consistently observed that there was 
concern by the organization that releasing information too soon would significantly 
inhibit the decision-making process, thereby constraining the organization from 
deciding and acting as it desired.  
Clear communication patterns emerged that suggested executives associated 
with decision events one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation) understood the value of considering the concerns of stakeholders.  
Unfortunately, in hindsight, I do not believe the respondents’ answers yielded much 
insight in answering the question.  This is more likely a problem with how the 
question was stated.  For example, a decision that may affect no one other than the 
person making the decision would not require information from external sources.  
However, an executive who must make a strategic decision that affects large numbers 
of stakeholders may or may not consider their concerns.  The challenge is in 
acquiring data that illuminates a psychological process on an individual level.  I do 
not believe I was able to adequately draw any conclusions from the responses 
provided by the participants.  
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Research question 9:  Which organizational elements, if any, are responsible for 
establishing relationships with external groups during strategic decisions?
Research question nine was intended to establish whether a particular 
organizational function in the Coast Guard was perceived to be in charge of, or 
responsible for, establishing relationships with external groups prior to or during 
strategic decision-making initiatives where the groups had an interest in the outcome.  
This question presumed that external stakeholders were identified prior to the 
decision-making process by the organization; therefore, where there was little or no 
outreach during the strategic decision-making process, participants were unable to 
identify specific examples where an organizational element engaged stakeholders.  
In general, participants of all of the decision events observed that the unit 
responsible for the decision outcome was also responsible for identifying and 
engaging, where appropriate, various stakeholders.  There were remarkable 
differences in how the participants engaged stakeholders, which appeared to be 
related to the knowledge or understanding of both decision-making processes and 
communication processes.   
For example, participants of decision events one (Deepwater) and three 
(Vessel Documentation Consolidation) noted that they had to both identify and reach 
out to all stakeholders who had an interest in the outcome.  More importantly, these 
executives understood the importance of developing communication programs and 
conducting outreach activities that effectively informed stakeholders of the issues in 
the decision but also gathered information and feedback from the stakeholders, which 
was then considered in the decision-making process.  A participant of decision event 
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two (Station Realignment) understood the importance of establishing relationships 
and effectively communicating with stakeholders but, in hindsight, he acknowledged 
that they had failed to incorporate these important attributes during the original 
process in which he was involved.  According to the participant:
I certainly would have involved people at the unit level.  I would have 
provided a better way to provide comprehensive data to everyone.  If 
we had given everyone all the data then they could have compared it.  
[What were their biggest objections?]  They did not agree with some 
of our logic regarding coverage of areas.  We didn’t communicate very 
well.
Another participant of this same decision event (two) noted that although 
there was “a community outreach plan conducted,” it was performed after the 
decision had already been made by the organization.  This resulted in legislation that 
today “requires us to conduct outreach efforts in any future station closing 
initiatives.”  Interestingly, the same participant noted: “We did have members of the 
local communities protesting against our actions.”  When asked whether the 
organization ever sought to identify and engage leaders of the resistance, he 
responded: “No, because this simply wasn't a very big issue.”  This observation 
demonstrated a clear lack of awareness and understanding of the emotion and 
perceived importance by affected stakeholders in the outcome of the decision event.  
In hindsight, he indicated that he would have taken it much more seriously.  
Although there was no specific Coast Guard organizational function identified 
as responsible for establishing relationships with external groups prior to or during 
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strategic decision-making events, participants clearly articulated the need for such a 
role.  For decision events one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation), executives appeared to possess a better understanding of both 
communication processes and decision-making.  For example, they developed 
strategic communication plans that identified key stakeholders and appropriate 
engagement activities.  During the decision-making process itself, these executives 
sought to reduce affective conflict while attending to cognitive conflict.  Even 
executives of decision event two (Station Realignment) acknowledged the importance 
of establishing pre-need relationships.  The key proposition that arises out of this data 
is that organizations whose public relations professional understands these concepts 
and builds them into the key strategic decision-making processes make better 
decisions. 
Research question 10:  Are relationships with external groups established prior to the 
determination of a strategic decision-making process and how does this affect the 
strategic decision-making process?
The preceding research question was designed to determine whether the 
organizational function of public relations served as the lead in establishing 
relationships with key stakeholders prior to the start of a strategic decision-making 
process.  Reasearch question ten focused on the proactive nature of the decision-
making process by seeking to better understand whether stakeholders were engaged 
by the Coast Guard prior to the start of the decision-making process.  
There were clear differences among the four decision events with regard to 
this issue.  Participants of decision events one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel 
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Documentation Consolidation) were able to recall examples where stakeholder 
relationships were established prior to the decision-making process.  On the other 
hand, participants of decision events two (Station Realignment) and four (Civilian 
Personnel Realignment) were unable to provide examples that would indicate 
relationships had been established prior to the decision-making process.  
A participant of decision event one (Deepwater) remembered reaching out to 
the Navy and actually establishing an agreement that articulated where the 
organization’s initiative would be viewed as complimentary.  [When large 
acquisitions, such as ships, are made by the Federal government, agencies and 
departments that have similar equipment often view the acquisitions as threats to their 
budgets.  This is especially true between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.]  
This agreement was called the “National Fleet Concept,” which essentially stated that 
the United States should develop and fund only one fleet of naval vessels.  In 
addition, the organization reached out to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) in an effort to bring their 
concerns into the decision-making process.  In the early phase of decision event one, 
the Commandant of the Coast Guard enjoyed a very strong relationship with the 
Chief of Naval Operations.  According to an executive who was serving with the 
Navy and external to the Coast Guard but familiar with this relationship, he 
characterized it as “very close.”  This is a very important point because it underscored 
the fact that the Commandant understood the value of reaching out early and 
establishing solid working relationships with key stakeholders.  Although an 
argument could be made that the relationship between the Coast Guard and the Navy
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had always been close, it grew significantly closer under this particular Commandant 
during a time when the organization really needed the Navy to support a key strategic 
decision.  
Participants of decision event three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation) 
were very aggressive in engaging their stakeholders.  The executives sought 
participation from internal and external stakeholders as well.  As one participant 
noted earlier, a completely new association was established to help bring industry 
issues of concern to the organization for consideration.  
In rather stark contrast, executives involved in decision events two (Station 
Realignment) and four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) remembered very little 
activity in establishing relationships prior to the decision-making process.  Outreach 
efforts that were identified by the participants revealed that they occurred during the 
implementation phase following the actual decision.  The following observation was 
representative of what executives associated with decision two recalled:
Yes, we did a lot of flying around the country doing public meetings 
with communities.  Of course this was already after they were pissed 
off.  So, we did it after the fact instead of before the fact.  The public 
meetings were damage control.  And, they were very contentious.  
[And your assertion is that had we engaged the communities before, 
rather than after it would've had a higher probability of success?]  It is 
easier to sell than it is to defend.  
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Although this participant did not engage stakeholders prior to the process, he 
acknowledged this was a critical error that resulted in undermining the outcome of the 
effort.  
The executives, who participated in decision events one (Deepwater) and 
three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation), established pre-need relationships with 
stakeholders who had a vested interest in the outcome of the decision event.  More 
importantly, the participants conducted numerous outreach efforts to understand what 
was important to the affected groups and sought to address those issues through the 
process as examplified by the National Fleet Concept policy agreement signed by the 
Coast Guard and the Navy.  In decision event three, the participants went so far as to 
help establish an association that would serve an advocacy role for the various 
stakeholders.  On the other hand, participants of decision events two and four avoided 
establishing relationships until the decision had already been determined and then 
sought to establish buy-in from the various stakeholders.  Ultimately, stakeholders of 
decision events two and four were unwilling to support the organizational initiative 
because of the perceived lack of consultation and consideration by the organization.  
The final group of research questions sought to better understand what role the 
public relations professionals served in the strategic decision-making process.  To a 
large degree, the responses to these questions had to be framed in normative terms 
because public relations, or public affairs as it is recognized in the Coast Guard, 
appeared to serve marginal roles in the four decision events.  
Research question 11:  What role(s) do public relations professionals serve in the 
strategic decision-making process?  
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The role of public relations professionals in these four decision events 
appeared to be a function of how the organization viewed public affairs.  The reality 
is that public relations as an organizational function served little or no significant role 
in these four strategic decision events.  Therefore, I had to examine more deeply 
whether communication activities were conducted by the participants themselves.  In 
short, none of the participants perceived the contribution of public relations as 
particularly important; however, when I examined the communication activities that 
were conducted in each of the events, there were common patterns that which 
emerged between decision events one and three and between decision events two and 
four that informed this research.  
Most of participants acknowledged that public affairs was not part of the 
strategic decision-making process.  In one instance, a participant in decision event 
one (Deepwater) noted that: “I don’t think we had good representation from the front 
office [Commandant], or the public affairs staff.”  Another executive from decision 
event two observed: “…there was no one from public affairs as part of the study 
team.”  And, another executive who was involved with decision event four noted: “I 
do not recall much involvement by the public affairs people…”  A participant from 
decision event four suggested:
Public affairs might have been involved in some of the 
implementation.  The organization was more concerned about 
congressional affairs than they were public affairs.  For example, they 
commissioned a flag level study team to analyze the political 
landscape.  The study team took care of all marketing and 
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communication material.  I guess public affairs should have been 
involved.
There was significant consistency among all of the participants in their 
responses to their recollection of any public relations professionals being involved in 
the decision-making process.  Those few participants who did recall the involvement 
of public relations professionals generally said the involvement was limited to the 
implementation phase of the decision-making process. 
However, when I questioned the participants regarding the communication 
activities that were conducted during their respective strategic decision-making 
process, some interesting patterns emerged between decision events one (Deepwater) 
and three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation) about activities that many public 
relations professionals perform as part of their responsibilities for clients.  For 
example, participants of both of these decision events identified communication 
efforts to reach out to various stakeholders who had a vested interest in the outcomes.  
They engaged the stakeholders in open and honest discussion and thoughtfully 
considered the concerns and contributions provided by the groups.  For example, 
participants of decision event one (Deepwater) made specific attempts to speak with 
members of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Transportation, and the Office of 
Management and Budget—prior to making any decisions.  Executives interviewed for 
decision event three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation) recalled extraordinary 
efforts to gather and consider the many fears expressed by stakeholders who were 
concerned about the organization’s efforts to consolidate vessel documentation 
offices.  They conducted numerous public meetings to record the concerns of their 
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affected publics.  One participant commented that: “There seemed like thousands of 
people who were involved in making it happen.”  
Thus, what can be interpreted from the participants’ responses to this question 
is more a reflection of how they viewed public relations as part of the strategic 
decision-making process for the organization.  In short, they thought little of the 
function.  On the other hand, when participants of decision events one and three were 
asked about the various communication activities that they conducted that, in 
hindsight, they attributed to the success of their efforts; they appeared to have an 
intuitive sense of what they needed to do: monitor the environment, proactively 
engage and establish relationships with key stakeholders, give voice to the affected 
stakeholders in the decision process, and frame strategic issues that are important for 
the organization as well as stakeholders.  
Research question 11a:  How do senior executives perceive the role(s) of public 
relations professionals?  
Most participants interviewed had neutral answers to the question that sought 
to better understand what role public relations professionals played in each of the 
decision events.  However, the participants discussed various activities that helped me 
interpret how they perceived the role of communications in the strategic decision-
making process.  From this perspective, I could then draw parallels to public relations 
roles, which have been established in the literature.  In particular, most participants 
shared observations that allowed me to classify their perspectives of communication’s 
role in the decision event similar to the typology established by White and Dozier 
(1992).  
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Participants of decision event one (Deepwater) perceived the role of public 
affairs or communication managers as experts, consultants, or facilitators.  None of 
the participants viewed the communications staff as decision makers.  For example, 
one participant noted that [executive] had “the insight to recognize it was important to 
raise the visibility, even if it was at the displeasure of some internal parts of the 
organization, so that the program could get a fair hearing in the public.”  This 
comment acknowledged the critical role public affairs people could serve to help 
frame the problem, which I interpreted to mean that they served as experts “who 
primarily supply input to the currently modeled problem structure” (White & Dozier, 
1992, p. 104).  Another participant from this same decision event observed that:
In the beginning, there was a lot of education and salesmanship that 
was necessary.  It was a new way of thinking.  Trying to break that 
paradigm of how we bought ships required a great deal of education.  
We had to get others that were involved in this process to divest 
themselves of the old way of thinking that we would always use a 
certain product to deliver a certain service.
I interpreted this observation to suggest that the communications personnel served as 
facilitators because the participant perceived the role as one that did not have a direct 
decision-making role; however, communication was perceived to assist in facilitating 
a paradigm shift.  
Finally, some participants of decision event one perceived the role of public 
affairs as consultants who simply advised on how to get information out to the 
various stakeholders.  For example, one participant commented:
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We also initiated the annual panel presentation by Coast Guard 
admirals at the U.S. Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Symposium, 
beginning in June 1999.  We had numerous professional articles 
published in Armed Forces Journal International, Sea Power, 
Comparative Strategy, The National Journal, National Interest, EEZ 
Technology, Defense News, and the U.S. Naval Institute’s 
Proceedings.
These comments reflected a consultant perspective whose job it was to best represent 
the problem.  
Participants of decision event two (Station Realignment) generally believed 
that the role of communicators was to serve as “proposers” who only had the “power 
to make recommendations” (White & Dozier, 1992, p. 104).  In an especially frank 
disclosure, an executive indicated: 
I have a very strong opinion why I think this effort failed.  It is 
because, while we were very well along in this process and had the 
list, we developed the algorithm, we developed the unit change guide, 
which was a mandate by GAO that required us the next time we were 
going to close a unit that we had to follow.  The process was 
defensible.  The Commandant said, thank you guys for all of your hard 
work, and then turned to everyone in the room and said, “this 
information stays in this room, if this information gets out I will have a 
special wind sock [a wind direction detection device] in Kodiak 
[Alaska] that I will assign you to watch and report back daily on which 
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way the wind was blowing” or words to that effect.  What that meant 
was do not do any congressional outreach, do not do any public affairs, 
I will sell this when the time comes.
The participant clearly took exception to the direction from the Commandant 
regarding how he believed he should be communicating with stakeholders.  He felt 
that “it would have been good to have a strategy meeting and have all the interested 
stakeholders including public affairs included.”  However, this recommendation was 
ignored.  
In contrast, participants of decision event three (Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation) viewed communication as central to their strategic decision-making 
process.  Following was a typical characterization of the process:
We held conference calls with all of our offices and employees and 
included Coast Guard employees that worked in Martinsburg, and it 
provided a forum to allow employees to talk to each other…  So, we 
had people who lived at the new location, who could speak to the 
concerns of the people we were planning to move there.  Once you’ve 
been there yourself, you are a little more sensitive to some of these 
issues…  Those who did put roots down in the community were very 
satisfied.
Participants of decision event four (Civilian Personnel Realignment) were 
extremely ambivalent about the role of communication and could recall few details 
about its contribution in the strategic decision-making process.  For example, when 
one participant was asked about the role of public affairs, he stated (again):
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No, not to my knowledge.  Public affairs might have been involved in 
some of the implementation.  The organization was more concerned 
about congressional affairs, and they were public affairs.  For example, 
they commissioned a flag level study team to analyze the political 
landscape.  The study team took care of all marketing and 
communication material.  I guess public affairs should have been 
involved.
Interestingly, another participant from decision event four, when pressed about what 
she thought should have happened regarding communication, said:
My thought is that even if you don't like it or don't agree with it, you at 
least knock down rumors and give people information.  People will
still be anxious, but I think they will respect the fact that you are trying 
to communicate with them.  
Research question 11b:  Is this perception shared with public relations professionals?  
Because there was so little involvement by public relations professionals in 
these four decision events, little data emerged that could help me understand whether 
those in the public affairs community shared similar perceptions about the role of the 
function in strategic decision-making processes.  However, those public affairs 
personnel who were aware of these decision events and were interviewed 
acknowledged several key roles that public relations serves for organizations.  For 
example, they recognized that one of the biggest challenges was “to get those people 
to understand that there was a crisis situation looming just around the corner” in the 
case of the decision event one.  Thus, there was an awareness role that public affairs 
203
served.  In addition, the same participant perceived a rhetorical “sales role,” when he 
observed that “the challenge was to be able to sell it to the Department [of 
Transportation] in order to proceed down the acquisition process.”  
There also was recognition that public relations played a “strategic role,” even 
though there were no public relations professionals assigned to the process.  Another 
participant of the decision event one (Deepwater) observed they had “developed a 
strategic communications plan to inform policy-makers whose decisions affected the 
Coast Guard.”  Inherent in this statement is the understanding that there was critical 
research and environmental monitoring necessary to track the various issues and 
inform important policy-makers about actions and decisions that would affect issues 
relevant to the organization.  
Active engagement with key stakeholders was another activity that a 
participant argued was an important part of the process.  He observed:
I would have engaged think tanks, like Rand Corporation and CNA 
[Center for Naval Analyses] to build us future scenarios in regard to 
future maritime challenges and threats.  We needed to answer the 
question more fully, what does the nation want us or require us to 
do…I also would've built a very strong communications team for 
ourselves and others (external supporters) to communicate the need 
for Deepwater.
An executive who was involved in decision event three (Vessel 
Documentation Consolidation), although not a public affairs professional, noted: 
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… we published the notice in the Federal Register.  We then held 
public meetings.  We held them at every location where there was a 
vessel documentation office.  We invited the affected public.  We 
explained what we wanted to do.  And, we got their buy-in to some 
extent.  One of our biggest critics was from the Long Beach area.  So, I 
went to lunch with the attorney who was representing the various 
interests.  Out of lunch grew a professional network of people who 
acted as intermediaries in the documentation process.  Out of this 
discussion grew the American Vessel Documentation Association.  
This was the first industry group of its kind.  They became quite 
active.  In fact, on May 3 of this year they're having their biennial 
meeting at [the Vessel Document Office].  I carried my discussions on 
to every subsequent location and was greeted with resounding support 
for the initiative.
Even though this participant was not a public relations professional, he saw the need 
to conduct various communication activities arguably within the domain of public 
relations.  
There appeared to be a much greater awareness of the need for 
communication activities and involvement by the participants involved in decision 
events one and three.  This is important because both of these decision events 
appeared to be more effective in the end.  
Research question 11c:  How does this affect the quality of strategic decision-
making?  
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For the four decision events analyzed, there appeared to be a consistent 
pattern that emerged between the two decision events considered more effective (one 
and three) and the two decision events considered less effective (two and four) (Table 
4.8).  
Table 4.8
Communication Activities in Relation to the Perceived Decision 
Quality
Decision Event 1 2 3 4
Perceived Quality of 
strategic decision-making
More Transparent Communication Activities X X
Fewer Transparent Communication Activities X X
There was consistency of responses among the participants when asked about 
how communication activities affected the quality of the strategic decision-making 
process.  In general, the participants of the decision events in which communication 
activities were exercised more frequently and earlier in the process seemed to assess 
the outcome more favorably and as effective.  These turned out to be decision events 
one (Deepwater) and three (Vessel Documentation Consolidation).
Even in decision events two (Station Realignment) and four (Civilian 
Personnel Realignment), which were assessed by the participants as less effective, the 
responses by the executives suggest that if they could do the process over again, they 
would pursue much more aggressive communication strategies.  Their interest was 
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driven largely by a concern as expressed in the following comment by a participant of 
decision event two:
There was some thought that it we released information too soon it 
would be shot down.  And so it would never make it in the budget 
process.  [So, you believe that was a strategy?]  Yes, it was a strategy 
to manage the external release [of information] carefully.  With any 
type of policy change that affects people, there will be people who will 
try and undermine it because they don't like this or that.  In this case, 
we were trying to close some stations and some of our people did not 
like that.  A few tried to undermine our efforts.
Another participant from decision event two echoed his concern: 
I do not believe we had the [communication] plans enough ahead of 
time to explain the data.  From the data analysis side, it just appeared 
as our plans weren’t as well formed as they should've been for the 
subsequent rollout and marketing.  Neither our business plan nor the 
marketing plan which would normally follow was well thought out.  I 
do not believe it was laid out as well as it could have been.
An executive who participated in decision event four (Civilian Personnel 
Realignment) shared her desire to be more open with all of the stakeholders, which 
was in contrast to what actually occurred during the decision-making process: “In my 
opinion, employees should have information early and often even if decisions are not 
imminent or final.  I told my folks what was going on every week.”  
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An executive involved in decision event three (Vessel Documentation 
Consolidation), which was considered very effective by the participants, responded to 
a question regarding what would he have done differently a second time around by 
saying he would have “asked for more help…I would look for people to help me with 
the communications work.”  
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CHAPTER V
Conclusions and Implications
The purpose of this study was to explore how senior executives in an 
organization made strategic decisions and determine what implications emerged for 
public relations theory and practice in that process.  I examined four different 
strategic decision-making events by the U.S. Coast Guard to determine if there were 
common themes, patterns, or strategies that emerged during the deconstruction 
process as I interviewed senior executives and reviewed relevant documents 
pertaining to each of the four decision events.  I suggested that by examining strategic 
decision-making processes, group behavior, and communication strategies, I could 
better understand how public relations might make important contributions to the 
strategic management of organizations.  Further, I suggested that public relations 
professionals who understood how strategic decisions were made and could reduce 
the uncertainty of how relevant groups would respond to those decisions would 
contribute critical information to the strategic management of organizations and, 
consequently, enhance the field of public relations as an essential component of the 
strategic management process.  
This chapter first presents the summary of the results followed by conclusions 
from major findings of the study.  The findings are compared and contrasted with the 
research questions to determine the implications from this study for the theory and 
practice of public relations, and the strategic decision-making practice and theory of 
organizations.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of recommendations for 
further research and limitations.
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In general, some of the insights gained from this research reinforce existing 
theory for public relations and strategic decision-making.  For example, decisions that 
are framed as part of larger, continuous processes and possess external drivers tend to 
get implemented.  For public relations professionals, establishing pre-need 
relationships with stakeholders and enhancing certain attributes such as trust, 
familiarity, commitment, loyalty, cooperation, persistence, and dispersed power can 
help organizations be more effective.  In addition, understanding historical precedent 
with collective action and environmental scanning can alert organizations to the 
potential for environmental factors that may be problems.  And creating conditions 
that promote cognitive conflict and reduce affective conflict can improve strategic 
decision-making.
More importantly, however, there are some revelations that emerge from this 
analysis.  This study revealed that there was no one in charge of the strategic 
decision-making process for these four decision events for the organization.  
Establishing rules, identifying participants, challenging assumptions, and developing 
norms and qualities can improve the process and foster better strategic decision-
making for organizations and are fertile opportunities for public relations theory and 
practice.  Public relations professionals who possess a theoretical understanding of 
decision theory and practice can facilitate better decision-making by organizations.
In addition, there are “non-communication” executives who have an intuitive 
understanding of how to create the conditions for more effective strategic decision-
making in organizations through effective communication.  Public relations 
professionals should identify these individuals and leverage their intuitive 
210
understanding of public relations to advocate the inclusion of certain attributes in 
strategic decision-making initiatives.  
Summary of Results
For this study, there were a number of patterns and themes that emerged 
among the decision events that were deemed to have more effective outcomes 
because they were implemented.  The following summarizes those patterns and 
themes to frame the discussion of how public relations can contribute to more 
effective strategic decision-making in organizations.
Participants who tended to view their respective decision-making as more 
continuous and connected to other important organizational goals found their efforts 
to be more effective.  Although not clear from the data, executives who perceived the 
drivers of organizational change as external also found their efforts to be more 
effective.  Arguably, this dimension may be related to their efforts in soliciting the 
concerns of stakeholders and including them in the decision-making process.  
Participants who described their efforts as having clear goals also reported more 
favorable decision-making results.
Transparency was an important quality of the more effective decision events.  
This led to a higher degree of perceived trust among the participants and stakeholders.  
In addition, decision events that engaged and included all stakeholders who had an 
interest in the outcome of the process appeared to produce more favorable results for 
the organization.  In contrast, executives who described information sharing as 
constrained found more activism and lower perceived trust by participants and 
stakeholders.  However, early public disclosure of organizational positions 
211
undermined efforts to establish robust alternatives and resulted in stakeholders taking 
advocacy approaches to decision-making rather than inquiry approaches.  Two 
additional important issues that were raised by the executives concerned assumptions 
and timing.  Assumptions in two of the decision events contributed significantly to 
the failure of the organization to accomplish its strategic objectives.  It is important to 
“know what you know” and more important to “know what you do not know.”  
Timing may be critical because of a decision’s relationship to other organizational 
objectives.  One executive aptly stated: “You don’t reorganize the firehouse in the 
middle of a fire.”
Identification and engagement of all stakeholders who have vested interests in 
the outcome of strategic decision-making events is critical.  Although this is not 
necessarily a new concept, there did not appear to be any particular organizational 
function responsible for this key requirement of a strategic decision-making process.  
Relationships can facilitate, or inhibit, a strategic decision-making process, 
depending on how the relationships are established and nurtured.  Establishing pre-
need relationships with stakeholders appears to improve decision-making when their 
contributions are relevant and important to the outcome.  Strong relationships can 
enhance cooperation, commitment, loyalty, and trust, which are critical attributes to 
improved decision-making.  
Relationship attributes and patterns emerged that suggest that higher degrees 
of trust, familiarity, commitment, loyalty, cooperation, transparency, persistence, and 
dispersed power among stakeholders contribute to more effective decision-making.  
These qualities must be carefully developed well before a decision process 
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commences; otherwise, organizational attempts to establish relationships with 
stakeholders will be perceived as disingenuous and asymmetrical.  
Executives who understand the environment and monitor issues that can 
generate coalitional activity serve an early warning function for organizations.  The 
real challenge is whether the executives approach this activity cross-
programmatically.  Often, executives will be intimately familiar with hot button 
issues within their respective programs.  However, because organizational decisions 
tend to be connected and continuous, executives with a limited worldview are subject 
to making decisions that have unintended consequences for the organization and can 
result in collective action.
Focusing on cognitive conflict while minimizing affective conflict can 
enhance decision-making.  Reducing emotion can enhance effective decision-making.  
And, understanding whether stakeholders or communities have a history of activism 
can help organizations determine the likelihood of coalitional activity.  
In order to motivate stakeholders to participate in decision-making processes, 
organizations must consider that the participants bring an expectation to the process 
that there is something in it for them.  Alignment of organizational goals and 
stakeholder goals is critical to a constructive decision-making process.  Collective 
activism, or the potential for collective activism and coalitional activity, should 
strengthen the requirement for communication activities between organizations and 
stakeholders. 
Finally, consolidating the organizational responsibilities to identify and 
engage key stakeholders within a function designed to monitor the environment may 
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contribute to more effective decision-making.  An organizational function that 
possesses cross-programmatic responsibilities led by an executive with a larger 
worldview is more likely to anticipate potential coalitional activity.  
Conclusions from Major Findings
Strategic decision-making in organizations, when perceived by participants 
and stakeholders as part of larger organizational goals that are clear tends to be 
assessed as more effective by those who participate in the process.  Strategic 
decision-making viewed as a continuous, iterative process results in an incremental 
approach, which allows managers opportunities to “build the seeds of understanding, 
identity, and commitment into the very processes that create their strategies” (Quinn, 
1980, p. 144).  This incremental approach to strategic decision-making at the meta-
level helps organizations make better decisions.  
For public relations professionals, this notion of a discrete versus continuous 
strategic decision-making approach is important for two reasons.  First, public 
relations professionals can assess the likelihood of coalitional activity by knowing 
whether there is a history of group activity associated with a particular issue and 
assessing the level of understanding that relevant stakeholders possess regarding the 
issues involved in the decision.  Second, by understanding whether the strategic 
decision-making process is considered discrete or continuous, communication 
managers can help redirect or frame the discussions in a broader context of other 
organizational efforts.  
Communication managers should understand that externally-driven strategic 
decisions may have a higher chance for success because of the outside forces being 
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applied to an organization.  On the other hand, internally motivated strategic 
decisions that require external support may be more difficult to achieve because of 
the significant investment of time and resources necessary to identify, include, and 
educate the various stakeholders who should be included in the strategic decision-
making process.  In this study, the externally-driven issues appeared to have been 
more successful than those that were generated by the organization.  Forces applied 
from outside the organization by various stakeholders and customers involved in the 
process actually appeared to help facilitate a more effective decision.
The observation drawn from this study that externally-driven change appears 
more successful than internally-driven change offers both benefits and risks for 
organizations during strategic decision-making processes.  For example, should an 
organization seek change that affects stakeholders, it could initiate and frame
communication programs that raise awareness of the issue in such a manner that 
external groups demand change.  The challenge that arises is the issue of power and 
control.  The resulting change may not necessarily reflect the desires of the 
organization.  The paradox of power is that the more that is shared, the more that 
appears to be gained.  As L. Grunig, J. Grunig and D. Dozier (2002) have found in 
their research, for public relations professionals, this may be appropriately described 
as “empowerment” (p. 141).  As organizations “empower” their stakeholders, the 
stakeholders perceive a vested interest in the outcome of organizational action and are 
willing to facilitate goal attainment or resolution of conflict.  
Strategic decision-making processes that are perceived to be more transparent 
by stakeholders appear to stand a better chance of being implemented by 
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organizations.  This places a burden on organizations to communicate frequently and 
openly with all affected groups about issues.  Additionally, this observation supports 
L. Grunig’s (1992a) proposition that suggests excellent organizations use two-way 
communication to inform and remain informed about external stakeholders’ positions 
and activities.  Executives who choose to withhold information from stakeholders 
during strategic decision-making initiatives risk undermining the entire process—
especially if the information is leaked or is made public without first being shared 
with relevant stakeholders.  Transparency builds trust and integrity for 
organizations—two very important factors in strategic decision-making processes.  
Assumptions are part of every decision process; however, they should be 
made with due diligence and validation.  In this study, unsubstantiated assumptions 
proved to be problematic and were made because the executives involved in the 
strategic decision-making process did not want to reveal information for fear of losing 
control of the decision-making process.  Rather than communicating, they made 
assumptions about positions that, in the end, proved detrimental to the final decision.  
For example, recall that during the civilian personnel realignment initiative, 
technology was assumed to be able to take the place of supervisors walking down the 
hall and speaking with the civilian personnel staff about human resource issues.  This 
was a flawed assumption about human behavior and preferences in the final analysis.  
Another example emerged when one of the executives commented that, in their 
efforts to close Coast Guard stations, they viewed the analysis as a “scientific” one 
rather than a “political” one.  The consequence of this assumption was that politics 
undermined the decision.  Had the “political” assumption been validated early on in 
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the process, there might have been a more effective decision outcome.  This appeared 
to be a classic example of executives exerting disciplinary identities during the 
decision-making initiative.  
Public relations professionals can facilitate better decision-making by 
challenging assumptions that can be verified through communications and research.  
Although this may present risk in a strategic decision-making process, the results 
from this study suggest there is greater risk in faulty assumptions than in 
communicating with all stakeholders about issues.  
Organizations should be cautious about taking public positions early in 
strategic decision-making processes until relevant stakeholder concerns and 
contributions are considered.  Expressing organizational positions without having at 
least considered the concerns of stakeholders potentially creates an adversarial 
relationship once a decision is reached.  This study revealed instances where early 
engagement of stakeholders in strategic decision-making processes, even in cases 
where the stakeholders disagreed with the ultimate decision, proved to be a good 
communication strategy.  It also reaffirmed Nutt’s (2001) observation that 
organizations can improve decision-making by better managing not only the business 
case requirements for the decision but also the social and political forces that are 
inevitably part of every decision-making event.  Although the stakeholders might 
have disagreed with the outcome, they at least believed they had an opportunity to 
participate in the process and did not actively undermine the results of the decision.  
For communication managers, the ability to motivate organizations’ executives and 
stakeholders to commit to strategic decision-making processes that are perceived as 
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transparent and committed to inquiry and understanding rather than advocacy can 
facilitate more effective decision-making.  
Time is an important element of strategic decision-making processes and 
should be considered in relation to other organizational initiatives that may be in 
progress.  Change creates stress for organizations.  Timing organizational change that 
results from strategic decisions can either facilitate implementation or undermine it.  
Time is also an important consideration for information sharing with stakeholders.  
Technology has made information ubiquitous.  The ability to acquire information 
from publicly available sources, critical stakeholders, or disgruntled employees 
underscores the importance of sharing information with key stakeholders in a timely 
manner.  For public relations professionals, this requires early engagement of 
stakeholders.  Stakeholders who acquire their information from credible sources are 
less likely to seek information from other opinion leaders.  In turn, this builds trust 
and integrity for the organization.
Strategic decision-making benefits when more stakeholders participate in the 
process.  Therefore, public relations professionals should advocate that organizational 
decision processes include as many stakeholders as possible to mitigate the risk that a 
relevant group’s interests will be excluded during deliberations.  The two decision 
events in this study in which the organization sought to expand participation in the 
decision process rather than restrict participation were considered to have resulted in 
more effective outcomes.  
The lesson for public relations is that early and comprehensive identification 
of stakeholders is only the initial step in helping organizations make better decisions.  
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The second and equally important part of the process is managing the decision-
making process so that those who have a vested interest in the outcome have a say in 
the process.  Public relations managers may find themselves at odds with other 
organizational elements as they give voice to affected stakeholders whose opinions 
may not be welcomed by the organization’s leadership.  However, by including the 
concerns and opinions of all stakeholders—those who have the means to engage 
organizations as well as those who may not have the means to express their concerns, 
the decision process will be perceived as more ethical and having attended to all 
stakeholders, and not just to a few special interests.  
The importance of relationships to the practice of public relations has grown 
stronger through the research.  The challenge for researchers has been, and continues 
to be, to determine how organizations measure relationships.  Although this research 
does little to advance our understanding of how relationships are measured between 
organizations and stakeholders, there were numerous relational qualities that emerged 
from this study that reinforce existing research on relationships.  
Four qualities of relationships were articulated in interviews as relatively 
stronger in the two decision events that were considered to be more effective by the 
participants.  These included the elements of cooperation, loyalty, trust, and 
commitment.  Some of the reasons for their importance suggest that participants were 
willing to take greater risks in voicing alternative perspectives, which allowed for 
more robust discussion and analysis, the organization being willing to compromise on 
certain issues deemed important to stakeholders, the participants and the organization 
experiencing empathy for alternative perspectives and developing a deeper 
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understanding for why stakeholders established certain positions, and participants 
being confident that when conflict developed during the strategic decision-making 
event that commitment to the process was greater than commitment to the position.  
In essence, there appeared to be greater awareness and understanding of the issues 
and respect for alternatives in the more effective decision events.  
Public relations professionals who invest in developing solid relationships 
with organizational stakeholders where there is stronger cooperation, commitment, 
loyalty, and trust enhance the strategic decision-making process.  These attributes 
imply a greater long term commitment to maintaining and/or enhancing the 
relationship rather than acting in a manner that might undermine the relationship.  
Communication activities that contribute to improving these attributes serve an 
important function in strategic decision-making efforts.  
This study suggests that more effective strategic decision-making processes 
may be characterized as possessing higher perceptions of trust, familiarity, 
commitment, loyalty, cooperation, transparency, and persistence.  In addition, those 
processes that appear to have greater dispersion of power among the various 
stakeholders appear to have a higher probability of success.  
Public relations can contribute to more effective strategic decision-making by 
conducting communication activities that enhance these strategic decision-making 
process attributes.  For example, establishing “pre-need” relationships with 
stakeholders well before an organization pursues a strategic decision-making 
initiative results in a stronger sense of commitment to the relationship because there 
is no predetermined agenda for establishing the relationship beyond the 
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acknowledgement that organizational behavior may affect the stakeholders at some 
point.  More importantly, communication activities that result in empowering 
stakeholders, or dispersing power, can contribute to more effective decision-making 
by organizations.  
Participants’ reasoning for collective action in this study appeared to be a 
reflection of how the organization approached various stakeholders in each of the 
decision events.  The decision events that were characterized as having stronger 
perceptions of commitment to communication, transparency, empathy, and honesty 
appeared to have resulted in more effective decisions.  On the other hand, the decision 
events that were characterized as having stronger perceptions of emotion and politics 
as part of the process appeared to have resulted in less effective decisions.  
Additionally, the decision events that were perceived to reflect more of a win/lose 
approach also appeared to result in less effective decisions.  This observation 
regarding win/lose approaches to decision-making is consistent with the research (see 
Fisher and Ury, 1981).  
The implications for public relations suggest that communication managers 
should advocate strong communication programs that strive to frame issues 
associated with strategic decisions as transparently as possible with a view toward 
developing empathy in stakeholders as well as the organization.  At the same time, 
communication managers should conduct communication activities that have as their 
goal managing the politics of decision processes.  This requires a commitment to 
revealing hidden agendas and reinforcing honesty as a key quality during strategic 
decision-making processes.  
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This research suggests that organizations seek early warning information that 
might help them anticipate collective action and reduce uncertainty in their 
environments.  Although no particular function was identified as having this 
responsibility in this study, the participants of the decision events conducted activities 
that the public relations profession has identified as environmental scanning.  The 
decision events that were characterized by the participants as having stronger 
communication efforts appeared to possess better awareness of the potential for 
collective action. 
Public relations professionals who not only aggressively monitor the 
environment for issues but also understand how various stakeholders perceive the 
issues—and will react—can serve a critically important role in strategic decision-
making.  This requires early engagement of stakeholders and frequent interaction with 
strong communication efforts to ensure that stakeholders are aware of organizational 
actions and potential actions, as well as a solid understanding of the issues and 
concerns that are important to affected stakeholders. 
This study reinforces the importance of environmental scanning for public 
relations.  Although the public affairs function was not perceived by the participants 
as the organizational function that performed this activity, it was clear by their 
responses that this was considered an important responsibility that should reside 
somewhere in organizations.  This perception regarding public relations as an 
important organizational function was more likely the result of how the organization 
viewed the role of public affairs rather than the participants’ objections to placing this 
responsibility in the function.  Arguably, this responsibility should be located in a 
222
function that is part of the dominant coalition where it can contribute critical 
information used to frame strategic decision-making initiatives.  Existing research in 
public relations suggests that environmental scanning is and should be the purview of 
communication departments (see Lauzen, 1995; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992).  
Information sharing can serve to “empower” stakeholders during strategic 
decision-making initiatives.  Stakeholders who perceive themselves as empowered 
and having been heard in the process will be more likely to support the outcome.  On 
the other hand, when information is tightly controlled and participation in strategic 
decision-making initiatives is restricted, there is greater potential for collective action 
that does not support an effective strategic decision-making process.  
Two other relevant factors emerged in this study as an indicator for the 
potential for collective action.  The degree of perceived community emotion about a 
particular issue can serve to facilitate interest for collective action—especially if the 
community does not perceive that its concerns are being heard or considered by an 
organization.  In addition, a community with a history of collective action is more 
likely to resort to collective action.  This observation is also consistent with earlier 
findings on collective action (see McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1988).  Therefore, 
organizations should assess and understand the “relative temperature” that 
communities have for issues that might be affected in strategic decision-making 
initiatives.  Being aware of historical experience with collective action can serve as an 
early warning indicator for organizations.  Both of these factors are of concern for 
public relations.  Knowledge of these two factors can help communication managers 
alert organizations to the increased potential for coalitional activity.  Armed with this 
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knowledge, public relations professionals can and should develop communication 
programs that mitigate the risk for collective action.  
The implications for public relations professionals who must monitor the 
environment for potential coalitional activity suggests that as stakeholders or 
communities are determined by the organization to have prior experience with 
coalitional activity and are assessed to perceive a stronger degree of emotion for 
certain issues, more aggressive communication programs are necessary during 
strategic decision-making initiatives.  This finding is also consistent with the 
Excellence theory and J. Grunig’s situational theory of publics.  
Implications for Public Relations Theory and Practice
As a profession and field of academic research, public relations has emerged 
as an interdisciplinary organizational function that makes organizations more 
effective.  The research demonstrates that public relations, which is based on a set of 
core principles such as the Excellence Theory establishes, can help organizations 
reduce or contain costs, or advance organizational initiatives by using two-way 
symmetrical communication.  This study contributes to public relations theory by 
identifying an important responsibility in the strategic decision-making process that 
can facilitate more effective decision-making by organizations.  Effective 
communication that attends to certain aspects of decision-making through an 
organizational strategic decision-making initiative can enhance the likelihood of more 
effective decisions.  
The first implication of this study contributes to public relations theory: Public 
relations can and should play an integral role in strategic decision-making.  The 
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boundary-spanning nature of the function, combined with the interdisciplinary focus 
of public relations activities helps organizations anticipate unintended consequences 
of strategic decision-making initiatives.  Public relations, by its nature as a boundary 
spanner, constantly interacts with the organization’s environment.  Consequently, the 
function should be able to assess how different parts of the environment will react to 
organizational decisions and actions.
The second implication suggests that public relations managers should strive 
to frame strategic decision-making as a continuous, iterative process because this 
allows the function to acquire important information from stakeholders and introduce 
the information to the strategic decision-making process.  And, assuming that the 
organization is conducting communication in a two-way symmetrical fashion, it also 
allows stakeholders an opportunity to better understand organizational intentions and 
preferences.  Consequently, there is better opportunity to create win/win 
opportunities.  
The third implication is that strategic decision-making initiatives that are 
exclusively internally-generated and driven by organizations may result in a less 
effective decision.  On the other hand, strategic decision-making initiatives by 
organizations that have an external component may result in a more effective process 
because of the perceived transparency of the process by stakeholders.  In short, 
stakeholders in the two decision events in the study that assessed the process as more 
transparent and willing to at least consider their concerns stood a much better chance 
of being implemented.  The attributes of strategic decision-making processes can 
affect their outcome.  For example, those organizational decisions that are perceived 
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by participants to be collaborative engender a greater degree of support for the 
outcome—whether or not they agree with the end result.  
The fourth implication for public relations is that communication managers 
should test assumptions to discern their validity during strategic decision-making 
processes.  This requires a significant investment in establishing pre-need 
relationships with stakeholders who have interests in the outcome well before the 
decision process is initiated.  
The fifth implication concerns the ability of public relations to counsel 
organizations on environmental factors or conditions that might influence the timing 
of a strategic decision-making initiative.  Environmental scanning can reveal political, 
social, legal, or other considerations that may affect the timing of an important 
initiative, thereby contributing to the success or failure of the effort.
The sixth implication addresses the absolute critical need for organizations to 
identify early the stakeholders with whom the organization depends so that it can 
establish, maintain, and enhance a relationship well before important organizational 
initiatives are started.  As a result, organizations can solicit participation from the 
stakeholders in various decision-making processes without agendas or motivations 
being challenged.  Establishing pre-need relationships builds trust and integrity for 
organizations.  It also facilitates more effective decision-making.  
The seventh implication for the practices of public relations and strategic 
decison-making concerns the importance of understanding historical context and 
behavior of stakeholders on whom the organization must rely.  Research suggests that 
groups who have experience with coalitional activity are more likely to resort to such 
226
behavior—especially if they do not believe their concerns are being considered.  
Additionally, public relations professionals who can frame organizational initiatives 
through their communication programs to minimize the chance for affective conflict 
and maximize the opportunity for cognitive conflict can facilitate more effective 
strategic decision-making.  
The eighth implication concerns public relationship education.  Because 
strategic decision-making is so important to organizations, public relations educators 
should strive to include business courses that address strategic management in public 
relations curricula and requirements.  This serves two important functions.  First, 
students of public relations will learn the lexicon and principles of business.  Second, 
business school students will understand the critical role that the public relations can 
serve in helping organizations make better decisions.  
The last implication concerns the lack of public relations involvement in 
strategic decision-making processes in the U.S. Coast Guard.  The Coast Guard has 
made significant investments in formally training some of its junior officers at the 
graduate level in public relations.  Yearly, at least two people with approximately 
four to seven years of general Coast Guard experience attend graduate programs in 
public relations or a related discipline.  
In the late 1990s, the Coast Guard reorganized the public affairs function and 
the congressional relations function under one organizational element reporting to a 
single Flag officer.  [Flag officers and Senior Executive Service personnel serve as 
the Coast Guard’s leaders and are responsible for guiding the strategic direction of the 
organization.]  This reorganization was the result of a two-year study that 
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benchmarked “excellent” public relations programs and was designed to better 
integrate and coordinate public affairs initiatives and congressional relations 
activities.
Part of the reason that the Coast Guard continues to place little emphasis on 
public affairs has to do with the seniority of Coast Guard officers who have been 
trained in public relations.  The Coast Guard did not begin to invest seriously in 
professional public relations education for its officers until the late 1980s.  And, only 
recently has the Coast Guard selected a senior officer with graduate training in public 
relations to the rank of rear admiral. 
Historically, the Coast Guard assigned general duty officers to public affairs 
positions.  This reflected the organizational view that anyone could perform the duties 
and carry out the activities typically associated with public relations.  As officers have 
promoted through the ranks, the organization gradually has matured in its view of the 
importance of public relations.  Some of the resistance to including public relations 
professionals in strategic decision-making processes is simply cultural.  Because 
public relations was not part of the dominant coalition, the function is viewed 
skeptically.    
Because the Coast Guard’s interaction with multiple stakeholders has risen 
dramatically following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Coast Guard 
commanders are increasingly demanding that public relations-trained officers serve as 
members of their senior advisory teams.  Much like an organization’s general counsel 
and finance director are viewed as essential, Coast Guard operators gradually are 
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recognizing that public affairs professionals are necessary to accomplishing the 
organization’s mission.  
In some respects, external events have forced Coast Guard leadership to 
acknowledge the important role that communication plays in accomplishing its 
mission.  However, this recognition has been one of necessity during crises rather 
than the result of strategic insight.  To facilitate and accelerate public relations’ 
integration into strategic decision-making, communication managers must 
demonstrate more clearly how communication contributes to the bottom line.  
In the public sector, metrics must be developed that demonstrate how the 
function helps the organization achieve its objectives.  In the private sector, there is 
the added burden usually associated with effective program management.  How are 
the dollars invested in the communication program either creating value for the 
organization or reducing risks?  As public relations professionals develop and refine 
their ability to tie their communication activities to measurable results, organizations 
will place increasingly greater emphasis on their participation in strategic decision-
making.  
The Coast Guard could enhance its return on investment and improve its 
decision-making by including these professionals in all strategic decision-making, not 
just when a crisis emerges.  In addition, this research suggests that non-public 
relations people can be effective in introducing effective communication processes 
that improve strategic decision-making.  To maximize its investment, the Coast 
Guard should institutionalize a formal training requirement for all Coast Guard 
officers who are selected to lead units in communication management.    
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Recommendations for Further Research
This study was exploratory in nature and sought to establish relationships 
between public relations and more effective strategic decision-making.  Because there 
has been little research in this particular area for public relations, the normative 
constructs identified in this study should be investigated in other organizations to 
determine if they were unique to the organization and groups studied in this research.  
Other research designs that help confirm the veracity of the propositions 
would contribute significantly to whether these are valid or simply unique to two 
strategic decision-making initiatives pursued by the Coast Guard.  Additional 
exploratory research would also reveal whether the constructs that emerged in this 
study are also present in other organizations.  
Finally, additional research is necessary to understand and to explicate more 
fully the role of non-public relations people who perform public relations activities in 
organizations.  In this study, non-public relations executives who conducted excellent 
communication activities were instrumental in the two decision events that were more 
effective.  Understanding why these executives conducted these communication 
activities might help inform the research.   
Limitations of the Study
This research explored constructs that emerged during strategic decision-
making in the context of four different strategic decision-making initiatives for one 
organization.  This research intentionally sacrificed breadth for depth.  Therefore, the 
first limitation of this study deals with the issue of numbers.  
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Rather than interviewing a large number of participants, the study was 
designed to understand concepts that emerged through the eyes of senior executives 
who were involved in each of these strategic decision-making events.  The experience 
and understanding acquired by senior executives affords them much greater insight 
into complex organizational challenges and processes.  Multiple interviews with these 
individuals helped me capture the essence of their interpretations about what 
happened in their respective experiences.  However, only seven of the 21 executives 
interviewed were external to the four decision events.  Therefore, the views expressed 
by the executives represented a narrow slice of a larger population of potential 
participants who could have been interviewed.  In addition, the core participants were 
known by the researcher to have been involved in each of the decision events.  
Subsequent participants were identified by asking the core group to suggest other 
executives who participated in the respective decision events.  The problem with this 
approach is that it unintentionally may have given voice to certain perspectives and 
biased the results while inadvertently silencing other perspectives.  
The second limitation that can affect a study’s findings deals with the issue of 
validity.  However, by granting confidentiality to the participants of the study, I 
believe that the information that they shared was reliable.  Triangulating participants’ 
observations and statements with document analyses allowed me to confirm their 
representations and interpretations of the facts.  In addition, by personally recording 
and transcribing all of the interviews, I remained “close” to the data.  And by 
confirming information in follow-on discussions with the participants, the 
interpretations were more collaborative.
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The third limitation of the study concerns external generalizability and 
transferability.  Because the study focused on four decision events in one 
organization, its conclusions and implications are unique to the Coast Guard.  
Additional research should aid in understanding whether the results can be replicated 
in other organizations thereby enhancing transferability as well as generalizability.  
Thus, both the generalizability and transferability of the results from this research 
remain an open issue.
The fourth limitation of this study reflects the limited sample of participants.  
This was a purposive sample of senior executives who were involved in four different 
strategic decision-making events of one organization.  Although this was a limitation, 
it could be considered a strength because I was able to interview senior participants 
who possess greater insight and provide richer detail about how these decision events 
transpired.  
The fifth limitation was funding.  I was unable to interview one executive in-
person because she lived in California.  Therefore, I had to conduct several phone 
interviews.  Communication processes are complex and being able to observe her 
reactions to questions would have provided better context.  
An additional but important limitation of this study concerns the limited 
number of public relations professionals who were interviewed.  This appeared to be 
a reflection of the organization’s general perception of the public affairs function 
because communication responsibilities were considered to be within the purview of 
the program managers.     
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Appendix A
Name
Address
Dear Madam/Sir:
I respectfully request to interview you as part of my doctoral research that seeks to 
better understand the relationship between collective action, strategic decision-
making and communication management.  Because of your role in an historical major 
Coast Guard initiative, [insert the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System 
Recaptilization; Coast Guard Search and Rescue Station Realignment; Coast Guard 
Vessel Documentation Consolidation; or Coast Guard Civilian Personnel 
Reorganization], I believe your insights are critical to understanding how 
organizations make important decisions and how executives account for the 
perspectives of the various groups that each had or have a stake in the outcome of 
particular decisions.  
This interview is an important and necessary part of a research project that will help 
me fulfill the requirements for a doctoral degree in the Department of Communication 
at the University of Maryland.  Professor James Grunig is the advisor for this 
research.  
The interview, which can be scheduled at your convenience, should take 
approximately 2 hours.  Though the interview may be conducted over the telephone, I 
would prefer to interview you in person.  In addition, I would like the opportunity for 
a follow-up discussion to clarify any questions I may have regarding your responses.  
This will help me insure that the data is accurately captured for further analysis.  
This project is not being funded and is being used solely for academic research.  Your 
participation and responses will remain strictly confidential.  If desired, I would be 
happy to provide you a copy of the results of my research.  You can advise me when 
we meet.  
If you have any questions, you may contact me as follows:
(202) 267-2665 (office)
(703) 450-3983 (home)
pat_philbin@yahoo.com (personal e-mail) or jphilbin@comdt.uscg.mil (office e-
mail)
You may also contact my advisor, Dr. James Grunig, as follows:
(301) 405-6525 (office)
jg68@umail.umd.edu (office e-mail)
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Thank you very much for your cooperation and participation.  I look forward to 
speaking with you.  
Very respectfully,
John P. Philbin
Candidate for Doctoral Degree
Department of Communication
University of Maryland
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Appendix B
Initial questions for the interview are generic in nature and designed to 
generate a comfortable atmosphere with participants.  The goal is to establish a 
relationship with participants so that they provide honest answers.  In addition, a 
review of the consent agreement and options to terminate the interview or refuse to 
answer questions will also be discussed with participants.  The questions are designed 
to explore the participants’ knowledge and views on collective action, strategic 
decision-making and the various roles that senior executives play in the decision-
making process.  
General questions:  Participant identification, role and experience
1. Please identify the position that you held during the decision event (e.g., Coast 
Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System Acquisition decision process; Coast 
Guard’s Search and Rescue Station Realignment decision process; Coast 
Guard Vessel Documentation Consolidation decision process; or Coast Guard 
Civilian Personnel Organizational Realignment decision process). 
2. If you were an external stakeholder to the Coast Guard for this decision event, 
please explain your position and role.   
3. How long did you hold this position relative to the commencement of the 
decision process and the actual final decision being made?
4. Why were you in this organizational position that caused you to be involved 
with the decision event and did you possess any special qualifications to hold 
this position? 
RQ1 and RQ2 questions:  The strategic decision-making process (discrete 
versus continuous)
5. From your perspective, please explain why this particular decision event was 
initiated by the Coast Guard? 
6. Did you perceive this decision event to be part of a larger organizational 
initiative and why or why not?
7. Were the forces involved in the decision event internal or external to the Coast 
Guard? 
8. Can you please explain how you perceived the decision process unfold?  
RQ3 and RQ4 questions:  Participation and power/empowerment
9. Who were the primary participants in the decision event and why did they 
participate?
10. For groups who were involved in the decision event, do you know about how 
many members were in the group?  
11. Who determined which individuals or groups participated in the decision 
process and why were these individuals or groups included?  
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RQ5 and RQ6 questions:  Relationships and power distribution
12. How would you describe the relationships between the key players in the 
decision process?  
13. What were the most important attributes of the relationships?  
14. How would you characterize the relationships and dynamics between the key 
groups who were involved in the decision event?
15. What were the most important attributes of the relationships?    
16. Were any individuals or groups excluded in the decision–making process and, 
if so, why?  
17. Do you think this affected the outcome of the decision and how so?
18. How would you characterize the distribution of power among the various 
participants in the decision event and why?
19. In your view, how would assess the effectiveness of the final decision and 
why?    
RQ7 and RQ8 questions:  Stakeholder awareness, group behavior and issues 
management
20. Were you aware of which individuals or groups had an interest in the outcome 
of the decision?  If so, how did you know? 
21. Were you aware or anticipate that individuals or groups who had an interest in 
the outcome of the decision might seek others with similar views and act 
collectively to influence the outcome?  
22. Was there an unanticipated effort by groups to influence the decision that 
caught you unaware?  If so, should you have known about these individuals or 
groups and, if so, which organizational element should have informed you and 
others in the decision-making process?
23. When you were aware of collective action to influence the decision, do you 
think the size of the group affected the way you thought about the group’s 
interests in the decision event?  
RQ9, RQ10 and RQ11 questions:  Role of public relations and relationship 
management 
24. In your view, which organizational element(s) or function(s) was responsible 
for establishing relationships in this decision event?   
25. Was a distinction made between internal and external relationships?  
26. Were public affairs personnel included in the decision-making process?
27. How would you characterize the role of public affairs during the decision 
event?  If the function was included, what did its personnel do during the 
decision event?  
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Appendix C
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Title Group behavior, strategic decision-making and public relations 
strategies
Statement of Age 
of Participant 
(parental consent 
needed for minors)
I state that I am 18 years of age or older, in good physical 
health, and wish to participate in a program of research being 
conducted by James Grunig, Ph.D. and John P. Philbin, 
Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Communication at the 
University of Maryland College Park, Maryland 20742-7635.
Purpose The purpose of the research is to explore the relationship 
between group behavior, strategic decision-making and public
relations strategies.
Procedures The procedures involve one interview of approximately 1-2 
hours with the possibility of a follow-up interview to clarify 
data obtained in the interview.  Questions that may arise from 
the researcher’s field notes may be provided following the 
interview to insure that responses accurately reflect the 
intentions of the participant.  I understand my participation will 
require approximately 3 total hours.
Confidentiality All information collected in the study is confidential, and my 
name will not be identified at any time. The data I provide will 
be grouped with data others provide for reporting and 
presentation.
Risks I understand that there are no foreseeable personal risks 
associated with my participation.
Benefits I understand that the experiment is not designed to help me 
personally, but that the investigator hopes to learn more about 
personal characteristics and how people respond to narrative 
passages.
Freedom to 
withdraw and 
ability to ask 
questions
I understand that I am free to ask questions and/or to withdraw 
from participation at any time without penalty.
Principal 
Investigator
James Grunig, Ph.D.
Department of Communication
2112 Skinner Building
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7635
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Phone: 301.405.6525; E-mail: jg68@umail.umd.edu
Obtaining a copy 
of the research 
results
I understand that I may obtain a copy of the results of this 
research after December 2003 by contacting Mr. John P. Philbin 
at 12659 Terrymill Drive, Herndon, VA 20170.
Printed Name of Participant______________________________________
Signature of Participant__________________________________________
Date__________________________________________________
<Last revision by HSRC 8/5/02>
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